A

VOYAGE

ROUND THE

WORLD,

In the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV.

BY

GEORGE ANSON, Eſq;

Now LORD ANSON,

Commander in Chief of a Squadron of His Majeſty's Ships, ſent upon an Expedition to the *South-Seas*.

COMPILED

From his PAPERS and MATERIALS,

By RICHARD WALTER, M. A.

Chaplain of his MAJESTY's Ship the *Centurion*, in that Expedition.

Illuſtrated with Forty-Two COPPER-PLATES.

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DIRECTIONS to the Bookbinder, for placing the Copper-Plates.

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Directions to the Bookbinder, &c.

TO

HIS GRACE

JOHN,

DUKE of *BEDFORD*,

MARQUIS of *TAVISTOCK*,

EARL of *BEDFORD*,

BARON *RUSSEL*,

BARON *RUSSEL* of *Thornhaugh*,

AND

BARON *HOWLAND* of *Streatham*;

One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State; and Lord-Lieutenant, and Custos Rotulorum of the County of BEDFORD.

My LORD,

THE following Narrative of a very singular naval atchievement is addressed to Your GRACE, both on account of the infinite obligations which the Commander in Chief at all times professes

to have received from your Friendſhip; and alſo, as the Subject itſelf naturally claims the patronage of One, under whoſe direction, the *Britiſh* Navy has reſumed its ancient Spirit and Luſtre, and has in one ſummer ennobled itſelf by two victories, the moſt deciſive, and (if the ſtrength and number of the captures be conſidered) the moſt important, that are to be met with in our Annals. Indeed, an uninterrupted ſeries of ſucceſs, and a manifeſt ſuperiority gained univerſally over the enemy, both in commerce and glory, ſeem to be the neceſſary effects of a revival of ſtrict diſcipline, and of an unbiaſſed regard to merit and ſervice. Theſe are marks that muſt diſtinguiſh the happy period of time in which Your GRACE preſided, and afford a fitter ſubject for hiſtory, than for an addreſs of this nature. Very ſignal advantages of rank and diſtinction, obtained and ſecured to the naval profeſſion by Your GRACE's auſpicious influence, will remain a laſting monument of Your unwearied zeal and attachment to it, and be for ever remembred with the higheſt gratitude, by all who ſhall be employed in it. As theſe were the generous rewards of paſt exploits, they will be likewiſe the nobleſt incentives, and ſureſt pledges of the future. That Your GRACE's eminent talents, magnanimity, and diſintereſted zeal;

whence the Public has already reaped ſuch ſignal benefits, may in all times prove equally ſucceſsful in advancing the proſperity of *Great-Britain*, is the ardent wiſh of,

My LORD,

Your GRACE's

Moſt obedient,

Moſt devoted,

AND

Moſt humble Servants,

RICHARD WALTER.

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INTRODUCTION.

NOTWITHSTANDING the great improvement of navigation within the last two Centuries, a Voyage round the World is still considered as an enterprize of so very singular a nature, that the Public have never failed to be extremely inquisitive about the various accidents and turns of fortune, with which this uncommon attempt is generally attended. And though the amusement expected in these narrations, is doubtless one great source of that curiosity, with the bulk of readers; yet the more intelligent part of mankind have always agreed, that from accounts of this nature, if faithfully executed, the more important purposes of navigation, commerce, and national interest may be greatly promoted: For every authentic description of foreign coasts and countries will contribute to one or more of these great ends, in proportion to the wealth, wants, or commodities of those countries, and our ignorance of those coasts; and therefore a Voyage round the World promises a species of information of all others the most desirable and interesting; since great part of it is performed in seas, with which we are as yet but very imperfectly acquainted, and in the neighbourhood of a country renowned for the abundance of its wealth, though it is at the same time stigmatised for its poverty, in the necessaries and conveniencies of a civilized life.

These considerations have occasioned the compiling the ensuing work; which, in gratifying the inquisitive disposition of mankind, and contributing to the safety and success of future navigators, and to the extension of our commerce and power, may doubtless vie with any narration of this kind hitherto made public: Since as to the first of these heads, it may well be supposed that the general curiosity hath been strongly excited by the circumstances of

of this undertaking already known to the world; for whether we consider the force of the squadron sent on this service, or the diversified distresses that each single ship was separately involved in, or the uncommon instances of varying fortune, which attended the whole enterprize, each of these articles, I conceive, must, from its rude, well-known outlines, appear worthy of a compleater and more finished delineation: And if this be allowed with respect to the narrative part of the work, there can be no doubt about the more useful and instructive parts, which are almost every where interwoven with it; for I can venture to affirm, without fear of being contradicted on a comparison, that no voyage hitherto published, furnishes such a number of views of land, soundings, draughts of roads and ports, charts, and other materials, for the improvement of geography and navigation, as are contained in the ensuing volume; which are the more valuable too, as the greatest part of them relate to such Islands or Coasts, as have been hitherto not at all, or erroneously described, and where the want of sufficient and authentic information might occasion future enterprizes to prove abortive, perhaps with the destruction of the ships and men employed therein.

And besides the number and choice of these marine drawings and descriptions, there is another very essential circumstance belonging to them, which much enhances their worth; and that is, the great accuracy with which they were executed. I shall express my opinion of them in this particular very imperfectly, when I say, that they are not exceeded, and perhaps not equalled by any thing of this nature which hath as yet been communicated to the world: For they were not copied from the works of others, or composed at home from imperfect accounts, given by incurious and unskilful observers, (a practice too frequent in these matters) but the greatest part of them were delineated on the spot, with the utmost exactness, by the direction, and under the eye of Mr. *Anson* himself; and where (as is the case in three or four of them) they have been done by less skilful hands, or were found in possession of the enemy, and consequently their justness could be less relied on, I have always

taken care to apprize the reader of it, and to put him on his guard against giving entire credit to them; although I doubt not, but these less authentic draughts, thus cautiously inserted, are to the full as correct as those, which are usually published on these occasions. For as actual surveys of roads and harbours, and nice and critical delineations of views of land, take up much time and attention, and require a good degree of skill both in planning and drawing, those who are defective in industry and ability, supply these wants by bold conjectures, and fictitious descriptions; and as they can be no otherwise confuted than by going on the spot, and running the risque of suffering by their misinformation, they have no apprehensions of being detected; and therefore, when they intrude their supposititious productions on the Public, they make no conscience of boasting at the same time, with how much skill and care they are performed. But let not those who are unacquainted with naval affairs imagine, that impositions of this kind are of an innocent nature; for as exact views of land are the surest guide to a seaman, on a coast where he has never been before, all fictions in so interesting a matter must be attended with numerous dangers, and sometimes with the destruction of those who are thus unhappily deceived.

Besides these draughts of such places as Mr. *Anson* or the ships under his command have touched at in the course of this expedition, and the descriptions and directions relating thereto, there is inserted, in the ensuing work, an ample account, with a chart annexed to it, of a particular navigation, of which hitherto little more than the name has been known, except to those immediately employed in it: I mean the track described by the *Manila* ship, in her passage to *Acapulco*, through the northern part of the *Pacific* Ocean. This material article is collected from the draughts and journals met with on board the *Manila* galeon, founded on the experience of more than a hundred and fifty years practice, and corroborated in its principal circumstances by the concurrent evidence of all the *Spanish* prisoners taken in that vessel. And as many of their journals, which I have examined, appear to have been not ill kept; I pre-

ſume, the chart of that northern Ocean, and the particulars of their route through it, may be very ſafely relied on by future Navigators. The advantages, which may be drawn from an exact knowledge of this navigation, and the beneficial projects that may be formed thereon, both in war and peace, are by no means proper to be diſcuſſed in this place: But they will eaſily offer themſelves to the ſkilful in maritime affairs. However, as the *Manila* ſhips are the only ones which have ever traverſed this vaſt ocean, except a *French* ſtraggler or two, which have been afterwards ſeized on the coaſt of *Mexico*, and as during near two ages, in which this trade has been carried on, the *Spaniards* have, with the greateſt care, ſecreted all accounts of their voyages from the reſt of the world; theſe reaſons alone would authorize the inſertion of thoſe papers, and would recommend them to the inquiſitive, as a very great improvement in geography, and worthy of attention from the ſingularity of many circumſtances therein recited. I muſt add too, (what in my opinion is far from being the leaſt recommendation of theſe materials) that the obſervations of the variation of the compaſs in that Ocean, which are laid down in the chart from theſe *Spaniſh* journals, tend greatly to compleat the general ſyſtem of the magnetic variation, of infinite import to the commercial and ſea-faring part of mankind. Theſe obſervations were, though in vain, often publicly called for by our learned countryman the late Dr. *Halley*, and to his immortal reputation they confirm, as far as they extend, the wonderful hypotheſis he had entertained on this head, and very nearly correſpond in their quantity, to the predictions he publiſhed above fifty years ſince, long before he was acquainted with any one obſervation made in thoſe ſeas. The aſcertaining the variation in that part of the world is juſt now too of more than ordinary conſequence, as the Editors of a new variation-chart lately publiſhed, have, for want of proper information, been miſled by an erroneous analogy, and have miſtaken the very ſpecies of variation in that northern ocean; for they make it weſterly where it is eaſterly, and have laid it down 12° or 13° different from its real quantity.

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Thus much it has been thought neceſſary to premiſe with regard to the hydrographical and geographical part of the enſuing work; which it is hoped the reader will, on peruſal, find much ampler and more important than this ſlight ſketch can well explain. But as there are hereafter occaſionally interſperſed ſome accounts of *Spaniſh* tranſactions, and many obſervations relating to the diſpoſition of the *American Spaniards*, and to the condition of the countries bordering on the *South-Seas*, and as herein I may appear to differ greatly from the opinions generally eſtabliſhed; I think it behoves me particularly to recite the authorities I have been guided by in theſe matters, that I may not be cenſured, as having given way either to a thoughtleſs credulity on one hand, or, what would be a much more criminal imputation, to a wilful and deliberate miſrepreſentation on the other.

Mr. *Anſon*, before he ſet ſail upon this expedition, beſides the printed journals to thoſe parts, took care to furniſh himſelf with the beſt manuſcript accounts he could procure of all the *Spaniſh* ſettlements upon the coaſts of *Chili*, *Peru* and *Mexico*: Theſe he carefully compared with the examinations of his priſoners, and the informations of ſeveral intelligent perſons, who fell into his hands in the *South-Seas*. He had likewiſe the good fortune, in ſome of his captures, to poſſeſs himſelf of a great number of letters and papers of a public nature, many of them written by the Viceroy of *Peru* to the Viceroy of *Santa Fee*, to the Preſidents of *Panama* and *Chili*, to Don *Blaſs de Lezo*, Admiral of the galeons, and to divers other perſons in conſiderable employments; and in theſe letters there was uſually inſerted a recital of thoſe they were intended to anſwer; ſo that they contained no ſmall part of the correſpondence between thoſe officers for ſome time previous to our arrival on that coaſt: We took, beſides many letters ſent from perſons intruſted by the *Spaniſh* Government to their friends and correſpondents, which were frequently filled with narrations of public buſineſs, and ſometimes contained undiſguiſed animadverſions on the views and conduct of their ſuperiors. From theſe materials

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those accounts of the *Spanish* affairs are drawn, which may at first sight appear the most exceptionable. In particular, the history of the various casualties, which befel *Pizarro*'s squadron, is for the most part composed from intercepted letters. Though indeed the relation of the insurrection of *Orellana* and his followers, is founded on rather a less disputable authority: For it was taken from the mouth of an *English* Gentleman then on board *Pizarro*, who often conversed with *Orellana*; and it was, upon enquiry, confirmed in its principal circumstances by others who were in the ship at the same time: So that the fact, however extraordinary, is, I conceive, not to be contested.

And on this occasion I cannot but mention, that though I have endeavoured, with my utmost care, to adhere strictly to truth in every article of the ensuing narration; yet I am apprehensive, that in so complicated a work, some oversights must have been committed, by the inattention to which at times all mankind are liable. However, I am as yet conscious of none but literal and insignificant mistakes: And if there are others more considerable, which have escaped me; I flatter myself they are not of moment enough to affect any material transaction, and therefore I hope they may justly claim the readers indulgence.

After this general account of the ensuing work, it might be expected, perhaps, that I should proceed to the work itself, but I cannot finish this Introduction, without adding a few reflexions on a matter very nearly connected with the present subject; and, as I conceive, neither destitute of utility, nor unworthy the attention of the Public; I mean, the animating my countrymen both in their public and private stations, to the encouragement and pursuit of all kinds of geographical and nautical observations, and of every species of mechanical and commercial information. It is by a settled attachment to these seemingly minute particulars, that our ambitious neighbours have established some part of that power, with which we are now struggling: And as we have the means in our hands of pursuing these subjects more effectually, than they

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can, it would be a dishonour to us longer to neglect so easy and beneficial a practice. For, as we have a navy much more numerous than theirs, great part of which is always employed in very distant stations, either in the protection of our colonies and commerce, or in assisting our allies against the common enemy; this gives us frequent opportunities of furnishing ourselves with such kind of materials, as are here recommended, and such as might turn greatly to our advantage either in war or peace. Since, not to mention what might be expected from the officers of the Navy, if their application to these subjects was properly encouraged, it would create no new expence to the Government to establish a particular regulation for this purpose; as all that would be requisite, would be constantly to embark on board some of our men of war, which are sent on these distant cruises, a person, who with the character of an engineer, and the skill and talents necessary to that profession, should be employed in drawing such coasts, and planning such harbours, as the ship should touch at, and in making such other observations of all kinds, as might either prove of advantage to future Navigators, or might any ways tend to promote the Public service. Persons habituated to these operations (which could not fail at the same time of improving them in their proper business) would be extremely useful in many other lights, besides those already mentioned, and might tend to secure our Fleets from those disgraces, with which their attempts against places on shore have been often attended. And, in a Nation like ours, where all sciences are more eagerly and universally pursued, and better understood than in any other part of the world; proper subjects for these employments could not long be wanting, if due encouragement were given to them. This method here recommended is known to have been frequently practised by the *French*; particularly in the instance of Monsieur *Frezier*, an Engineer, who has published a celebrated voyage to the *South-Seas:* For this person, in the year 1711, was purposely sent by the *French* King into that country on board a merchantman, that he might examine and describe the

 coast,

coaſt, and take plans of all the fortified places; the better to enable the *French* to proſecute their illicit trade, or, on a rupture between them and the court of *Spain*, to form their enterprizes in thoſe ſeas with more readineſs and certainty. Should we purſue this method, we might hope, that the emulation amongſt thoſe who were commiſſioned for theſe undertakings, and the experience, which even in the moſt peaceable intervals, they would hereby acquire, might at length procure us a proper number of able Engineers, and might efface the national ſcandal, which our deficiency in that ſpecies of men has ſome times expoſed us to: And ſurely, every ſtep to encourage and improve them, is of great moment to the Public; as no perſons, when they are properly inſtructed, make better returns in war, for the diſtinctions and emoluments beſtowed on them in time of peace. Of which the advantages the *French* have reaped from their dexterity (too numerous and recent to be ſoon forgot) are an ample confirmation.

And having mentioned Engineers, or ſuch as are ſkilled in drawing, and the other uſual practices of that profeſſion, as the propereſt perſons to be employed in theſe foreign enquiries, I cannot (as it offers itſelf ſo naturally to the ſubject in hand) but lament, how very imperfect many of our accounts of diſtant countries are rendered by the relators being unſkilled in drawing, and in the general principles of ſurveying; even where other abilities have not been wanting. Had more of our travellers been initiated in theſe acquirements, and had there been added thereto ſome little ſkill in the common aſtronomical obſervations, (all which a perſon of ordinary talents might attain, with a very moderate ſhare of application) we ſhould by this time have ſeen the geography of the globe much correcter, than we now find it; the dangers of navigation would have been conſiderably leſſened, and the manners, arts and produce of foreign countries would have been better known to us, than they are. Indeed, when I conſider, the ſtrong incitements that all travellers have to purſue ſome part at leaſt of theſe qualifications, eſpecially drawing; when I conſider

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how much it would facilitate their obſervations, aſſiſt and ſtrengthen their memories, and of how tedious, and often unintelligible, a load of deſcription it would rid them; I cannot but wonder that any perſon, who intends to viſit diſtant countries, with a view of informing either himſelf or others, ſhould be wanting in ſo neceſſary a piece of ſkill. And to inforce this argument ſtill further, I muſt add, that beſides the uſes of drawing, already mentioned, there is one, which, though not ſo obvious, is yet perhaps of more conſequence than all that has been hitherto urged; I mean the ſtrength and diſtinguiſhing power it adds to ſome of our faculties. This appears from hence, that thoſe who are uſed to draw objects, obſerve them with more accuracy, than others who are not habituated to that practice. For we may eaſily find, by a little experience, that when we view any object, however ſimple, our attention or memory is ſcarcely at any time ſo ſtrong as to enable us, when we have turned our eyes away from it, to recollect exactly every part it conſiſted of, and to recall all the circumſtances of its appearance; ſince, on examination, it will be diſcovered, that in ſome we were miſtaken, and others we had totally overlooked: But he that is accuſtomed to draw what he ſees, is at the ſame time accuſtomed to rectify this inattention; for by confronting his ideas copied on the paper, with the object he intends to repreſent, he finds out what circumſtance has deceived him in its appearance; and hence he at length acquires the habit of obſerving much more at one view, and retains what he ſees with more correctneſs than he could ever have done, without his practice and proficiency in drawing.

If what has been ſaid merits the attention of Travellers of all ſorts, it is, I think, more particularly applicable to the Gentlemen of the Navy; ſince, without drawing and planning, neither charts nor views of land can be taken; and without theſe it is ſufficiently evident, that navigation is at a full ſtand. It is doubtleſs from a perſuaſion of the utility of theſe qualifications, that his Majeſty has eſtabliſhed a Drawing-maſter at *Portſmouth*, for the inſtruction of thoſe, who are preſumed to be hereafter intruſted with the com-

mand of his Royal Navy: And though ſome have been ſo far miſled, as to ſuppoſe, that the perfection of Sea-officers conſiſted in a turn of mind and temper reſembling the boiſterous element they had to deal with, and have condemned all literature and ſcience as effeminate, and derogatory to that ferocity, which, they would falſely perſuade us, was the moſt unerring characteriſtic of courage: Yet it is to be hoped, that ſuch abſurdities as theſe have at no time been authoriſed by the Public opinion, and that the belief of them daily diminiſhes. If thoſe who adhere to theſe miſchievous poſitions were capable of being influenced by reaſon, or ſwayed by example, I ſhould think it ſufficient for their conviction, to obſerve, that the moſt valuable drawings inſerted in the following work, though done with ſuch a degree of ſkill, that even profeſſed artiſts can with difficulty imitate them, were taken by Mr. *Piercy Brett*, one of Mr. *Anſon*'s Lieutenants, and ſince Captain of the *Lion* man of war; who, in his memorable engagement with the *Elizabeth* (for the importance of the ſervice, or the reſolution with which it was conducted, inferiour to none this age has ſeen) has given ample proof, that a proficiency in the arts I have been here recommending is extremely conſiſtent with the moſt exemplary bravery, and the moſt diſtinguiſhed ſkill in every function belonging to the duty of a Sea-officer. Indeed, when the many branches of ſcience are attended to, of which even the common practice of navigation is compoſed, and the many improvements, which men of ſkill have added to this practice within theſe few years, it would induce one to believe, that the advantages of reflection and ſpeculative knowledge were in no profeſſion more eminent than in that of a Sea-officer: For, not to mention ſome expertneſs in geography, geometry and aſtronomy, which it would be diſhonourable for him to be without, (as his journal and his eſtimate of the daily poſition of the ſhip are founded on particular branches of theſe arts) it may be well ſuppoſed, that the management and working of a ſhip, the diſcovery of her moſt eligible poſition in the water, (uſually ſtiled her Trim) and the

diſpoſition of her ſails in the moſt advantageous manner, are articles, wherein the knowledge of mechanics cannot but be greatly aſſiſtant. And perhaps the application of this kind of knowledge to naval ſubjects may produce as great improvements in ſailing and working a ſhip, as it has already done in many other matters conducive to the eaſe and convenience of human life. Since, when the fabric of a ſhip, and the variety of her ſails are conſidered, together with the artificial contrivances for adapting them to her different motions, as it cannot be doubted, but theſe things have been brought about by more than ordinary ſagacity and invention, ſo neither can it be doubted, but that, in ſome conjunctures, a ſpeculative and ſcientific turn of mind may find out the means of directing and diſpoſing this complicated mechaniſm much more advantageouſly than can be done by mere habit, or by a ſervile copying of what others may perhaps have erroneouſly practiſed in ſimilar emergencies. But it is time to finiſh this digreſſion, and to leave the reader to the peruſal of the enſuing work; which, with how little art ſoever it may be executed, will yet, from the importance of the ſubject, and the utility and excellence of the materials, merit ſome ſhare of the Public attention.

A

VOYAGE

ROUND THE

WORLD,

BY

GEORGE ANSON, Eſq;

Now LORD ANSON,

Commander in Chief of a Squadron of his MAJESTY's Ships.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Of the equipment of the ſquadron: The incidents relating thereto, from its firſt appointment, to its ſetting ſail from St. *Helens*.

THE ſquadron under the Command of Mr. *Anſon* (of which I here propoſe to recite the moſt material proceedings) having undergone many changes in its deſtination, its force, and its equipment, during the ten months between its original appointment and its final ſailing from St. *Helens*; I conceive the hiſtory of theſe alterations is a detail neceſſary to be made public, both for the honour of thoſe who firſt planned and promoted this enterprize, and for the juſtification of thoſe who have been en-

trusted with its execution. Since it will from hence appear, that the accidents the expedition was afterwards exposed to, and which prevented it from producing all the national advantages the strength of the squadron, and the expectation of the public, seemed to presage, were principally owing to a series of interruptions, which delayed the Commander in the course of his preparations, and which it exceeded his utmost industry either to avoid or to get removed.

When in the latter end of the summer of the year 1739, it was foreseen that a war with *Spain* was inevitable, it was the opinion of some considerable persons then trusted with the administration of affairs, that the most prudent step the Nation could take, on the breaking out of the war, was attacking that Crown in her distant settlements; for by this means (as at that time there was the greatest probability of success) it was supposed that we should cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely desiring a peace, as they would hereby be deprived of the returns of that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.

In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and several resolutions were taken by the Council. And in all these deliberations it was from the first determined, that *George Anson*, Esq; then Captain of the *Centurion*, should be employed as Commander in Chief of an expedition of this kind: And he at that time being absent on a cruize, a vessel was dispatched to his station so early as the beginning of *September*, to order him to return with his ship to *Portsmouth*. And soon after he came there, that is, on the 10th of *November* following, he received a letter from Sir *Charles Wager*, directing him to repair to *London*, and to attend the board of Admiralty: Where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir *Charles*, that two Squadrons would be immediately fitted out for two secret expeditions, which however would have some connexion with each other: That he, Mr. *Anson*, was intended to command one of them, and Mr. *Cornwall* (who hath since lost his life gloriously in the defence of his country's honour) the other:

That the ſquadron under Mr. *Anſon* was to take on board three Independent Companies of a hundred men each, and *Bland*'s regiment of Foot: That Colonel *Bland* was likewiſe to imbark with his regiment, and to command the land-forces: And that, as ſoon as this ſquadron could be fitted for the ſea, they were to ſet ſail, with expreſs orders to touch at no place till they came to *Java Head* in the *Eaſt-Indies*: That there they were only to ſtop to take in water, and thence to proceed directly to the city of *Manila*, ſituated on *Luconia*, one of the *Philippine* Iſlands: That the other ſquadron was to be of equal force with this commanded by Mr. *Anſon*, and was intended to paſs round Cape *Horn* into the *South-Seas*, to range along that coaſt; and after cruizing upon the enemy in thoſe parts, and attempting their ſettlements, this ſquadron in its return was to rendezvous at *Manila*, there to join the ſquadron under Mr. *Anſon*, where they were to refreſh their men, and refit their ſhips, and perhaps receive orders for other conſiderable enterprizes.

This ſcheme was doubtleſs extremely well projected, and could not but greatly advance the Public Service, and the reputation and fortune of thoſe concerned in its execution; for had Mr. *Anſon* proceeded for *Manila* at the time and in the manner propoſed by Sir *Charles Wager*, he would, in all probability, have arrived there before they had received any advice of the war between us and *Spain*, and conſequently before they had been in the leaſt prepared for the reception of an enemy, or had any apprehenſions of their danger. The city of *Manila* might well be ſuppoſed to have been at that time in the ſame defenceleſs condition with all the other *Spaniſh* ſettlements, juſt at the breaking out of the war: That is to ſay, their fortifications neglected, and in many places decayed; their cannon diſmounted, or rendred uſeleſs by the mouldring of their carriages; their magazines, whether of military ſtores or proviſion, all empty; their garriſons unpaid, and conſequently thin, ill-affected, and diſpirited; and the royal cheſts in *Peru*, whence alone all theſe diſorders could receive their redreſs, drained to the very bottom: This, from the intercepted letters of their Viceroys

and Governors, is well known to have been the defenceleſs ſtate of *Panama*, and the other *Spaniſh* places on the coaſt of the *South-Sea*, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war. And it cannot be ſuppoſed that the city of *Manila*, removed ſtill farther by almoſt half the circumference of the globe, ſhould have experienced from the *Spaniſh* Government, a greater ſhare of attention and concern for its ſecurity, than *Panama*, and the other important ports in *Peru* and *Chili*, on which their poſſeſſion of that immenſe Empire depends. Indeed, it is well known, that *Manila* was at that time incapable of making any conſiderable defence, and in all probability would have ſurrendered only on the appearance of our ſquadron before it. The conſequence of this city, and the iſland it ſtands on, may be in ſome meaſure eſtimated, from the known healthineſs of its air, the excellency of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its inhabitants, and the very extenſive and beneficial commerce which it carries on to the principal Ports in the *Eaſt-Indies*, and *China*, and its excluſive trade to *Acapulco*, the returns for which, being made in ſilver, are, upon the loweſt valuation, not leſs than three millions of Dollars *per annum*.

On this Scheme Sir *Charles Wager* was ſo intent, that in a few days after this firſt conference, that is, on *November* 18, Mr. *Anſon* received an order to take under his command the *Argyle*, *Severn*, *Pearl*, *Wager*, and *Tryal Sloop*; and other orders were iſſued to him in the ſame month, and in the *December* following, relating to the victualling of this ſquadron. But Mr. *Anſon* attending the Admiralty the beginning of *January*, he was informed by Sir *Charles Wager*, that for reaſons with which he, Sir *Charles*, was not acquainted, the expedition to *Manila* was laid aſide. It may be conceived, that Mr. *Anſon* was extremely chagrined at the loſing the command of ſo infallible, ſo honourable, and in every reſpect, ſo deſirable an enterprize, eſpecially too as he had already, at a very great expence, made the neceſſary proviſion for his own accommodation in this voyage, which he had reaſon to expect would prove a very long one. However, Sir *Charles*, to render this diſappointment

in ſome degree more tolerable, informed him that the expedition to the *South-Seas* was ſtill intended, and that he, Mr. *Anſon*, and his ſquadron, as their firſt deſtination was now countermanded, ſhould be employed in that ſervice. And on the 10th of *January* he received his commiſſion, appointing him Commander in chief of the forementioned ſquadron, (which the *Argyle* being in the courſe of their preparation changed for the *Glouceſter*) was the ſame he ſailed with above eight months after from St. *Helens*. On this change of deſtination, the equipment of the ſquadron was ſtill proſecuted with as much vigour as ever, and the victualling, and whatever depended on the Commodore, was ſoon ſo far advanced, that he conceived the ſhips might be capable of putting to ſea the inſtant he ſhould receive his final orders, of which he was in daily expectation. And at laſt, on the 28th of *June* 1740, the Duke of *Newcaſtle*, Principal Secretary of State, delivered to him his Majeſty's inſtructions, dated *January* 31, 1739, with an additional inſtruction from the Lords Juſtices, dated *June* 19, 1740. On the receipt of theſe, Mr. *Anſon* immediately repaired to *Spithead*, with a reſolution to ſail with the firſt fair wind, flattering himſelf that all his difficulties were now at an end. For though he knew by the muſters that his ſquadron wanted three hundred ſeamen of their complement, (a deficiency, which, with all his aſſiduity, he had not been able to get ſupplied) yet, as Sir *Charles Wager* informed him, that an order from the board of Admiralty was diſpatched to Sir *John Norris*, to ſpare him the numbers which he wanted, he doubted not of its being complied with. But on his arrival at *Portſmouth*, he found himſelf greatly miſtaken, and diſappointed in this perſuaſion; for on his application, Sir *John Norris* told him, he could ſpare him none, for he wanted men for his own fleet. This occaſioned an inevitable and a very conſiderable delay; for it was the end of *July* before this deficiency was by any means ſupplied, and all that was then done was extremely ſhort of his neceſſities and expectation. For Admiral *Balchen*, who ſucceeded to the command at *Spithead*, after Sir *John Norris* had ſailed to the weſt-

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ward, inſtead of three hundred able ſailors, which Mr. *Anſon* wanted of his complement, ordered on board the ſquadron a hundred and ſeventy men only; of which thirty-two were from the hoſpital and ſick quarters, thirty-ſeven from the *Saliſbury*, with three officers of Colonel *Lowther*'s regiment, and ninety-eight marines, and theſe were all that ever were granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.

But the Commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already obſerved, that it was at firſt intended that Colonel *Bland*'s regiment, and three independent companies of a hundred men each, ſhould embark as land-forces on board the ſquadron. But this diſpoſition was now changed, and all the land-forces that were to be allowed, were five hundred invalids to be collected from the out-penſioners of *Chelſea* college. As theſe out-penſioners conſiſt of ſoldiers, who from their age, wounds, or other infirmities, are incapable of ſervice in marching regiments, Mr. *Anſon* was greatly chagrined at having ſuch a decrepid detachment allotted him; for he was fully perſuaded that the greateſt part of them would periſh long before they arrived at the ſcene of action, ſince the delays he had already encountered, neceſſarily confined his paſſage round Cape *Horn* the moſt rigorous ſeaſon of the year. Sir *Charles Wager* too joined in opinion with the Commodore, that invalids were no way proper for this ſervice, and ſolicited ſtrenuouſly to have them exchanged; but he was told, that perſons, who were ſuppoſed to be better judges of ſoldiers than he or Mr. *Anſon*, thought them the propereſt men that could be employed on this occaſion. And upon this determination they were ordered on board the ſquadron on the 5th of *Auguſt*: But inſtead of five hundred, there came on board no more than two hundred and fifty-nine; for all thoſe who had limbs and ſtrength to walk out of *Portſmouth* deſerted, leaving behind them only ſuch as were literally invalids, moſt of them being ſixty years of age, and ſome of them upwards of ſeventy. Indeed it is difficult to conceive a more moving ſcene than the imbarkation of theſe unhappy veterans: They were them-

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ſelves extremely averſe to the ſervice they were engaged in, and fully appriſed of all the diſaſters they were afterwards expoſed to; the apprehenſions of which were ſtrongly mark'd by the concern that appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no ſmall degree of indignation, to be thus hurried from their repoſe into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the ſtrength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any way proportioned, and where, without ſeeing the face of an enemy, or in the leaſt promoting the ſucceſs of the enterprize, they would in all probability uſeleſsly periſh by lingering and painful diſeaſes; and this too, after they had ſpent the activity and ſtrength of their youth in their Country's ſervice.

I cannot but obſerve, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diſeaſed detachment, and to the expedition they were employed in; that amongſt all the out-penſioners of *Chelſea* Hoſpital, which were ſuppoſed to amount to two thouſand men, the moſt crazy and infirm only ſhould be culled out for ſo laborious and perilous an undertaking. For it was well known, that however unfit, invalids in general might be for this ſervice, yet by a prudent choice, there might have been found amongſt them five hundred men who had ſome remains of vigour left: And Mr. *Anſon* fully expected, that the beſt of them would have been allotted him; whereas the whole detachment that was ſent to him, ſeemed to be made up of the moſt decripid and miſerable objects, that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the deſertion abovementioned, theſe were a ſecond time cleared of that little health and ſtrength which were to be found amongſt them, and he was to take up with ſuch as were much fitter for an infirmary, than for any military duty.

And here it is neceſſary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this ſquadron. It was propoſed to Mr. *Anſon*, after it was reſolved that he ſhould be ſent to the *South-Seas*, to take with him two perſons under the denomination of Agent Victuallers. Thoſe who were mentioned for this employment had formerly been

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in the *Spanish West Indies*, in the *South-Sea* Company's ſervice, and it was ſuppoſed that by their knowledge and intelligence on that coaſt, they might often procure proviſions for him by compact with the inhabitants, when it was not to be got by force of arms: Theſe Agent Victuallers were, for this purpoſe, to be allowed to carry to the value of 15,000*l.* in merchandiſe on board the ſquadron; for they had repreſented, that it would be much eaſier for them to procure proviſions with goods, than with the value of the ſame goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this ſcheme, it was difficult to perſuade the generality of mankind, that it was not principally intended for the enrichment of the Agents, by the beneficial commerce they propoſed to carry on upon that coaſt. Mr. *Anſon*, from the beginning, objected both to the appointment of Agent Victuallers, and the allowing them to carry a cargo on board the ſquadron: For he conceived, that in thoſe few amicable ports where the ſquadron might touch, he needed not their aſſiſtance to contract for any proviſions the place afforded; and on the enemy's coaſt, he did not imagine that they could ever procure him the neceſſaries he ſhould want, unleſs (which he was reſolved not to comply with) the military operations of his ſquadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects. All that he thought the Government ought to have done on this occaſion, was to put on board to the value of 2 or 3000*l.* only of ſuch goods, as the *Indians*, or the *Spaniſh* Planters in the leſs cultivated part of the coaſt, might be tempted with; ſince it was in ſuch places only that he imagined it would be worth while to truck with the enemy for proviſions: And in theſe places it was ſufficiently evident, a very ſmall cargo would ſuffice.

But though the Commodore objected both to the appointment of theſe officers, and to their project, of the ſucceſs of which he had no opinion; yet, as they had inſinuated that their ſcheme, beſides victualling the ſquadron, might contribute to ſettling a trade upon that coaſt, which might be afterwards carried on without difficulty, and might thereby prove a very conſiderable national advantage, they were much liſtened to by ſome conſi-

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derable perſons: And of the 15,000 *l.* which was to be the amount of their cargo, the Government agreed to advance them 10,000 upon impreſt, and the remaining 5000 they raiſed on bottomry bonds; and the goods purchaſed with this ſum, were all that were taken to ſea by the ſquadron, how much ſoever the amount of them might be afterwards magnified by common report.

This cargo was at firſt ſhipped on board the *Wager* Store Ship, and one of the Victuallers; no part of it being admitted on board the men of war. But when the Commodore was at St. *Catharine's*, he conſidered, that in caſe the ſquadron ſhould be ſeparated, it might be pretended that ſome of the ſhips were diſappointed of proviſions for want of a cargo to truck with, and therefore he diſtributed ſome of the leaſt bulky commodities on board the men of war, leaving the remainder principally on board the *Wager*, where it was loſt: And more of the goods periſhing by various accidents to be recited hereafter, and no part of them being diſpoſed of upon the coaſt, the few that came home to *England*, did not produce, when ſold, above a fourth part of the original price. So true was the Commodore's judgment of the event of this project, which had been by many conſidered as infallibly productive of immenſe gains. But to return to the tranſactions at *Portſmouth*.

To ſupply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids which had deſerted, as is mentioned above, there were ordered on board two hundred and ten marines detached from different regiments: Theſe were raw and undiſciplined men, for they were juſt raiſed, and had ſcarcely any thing more of the ſoldier than their regimentals, none of them having been ſo far trained, as to be permitted to fire. The laſt detachment of theſe marines came on board the 8th of *Auguſt*, and on the 10th the ſquadron ſailed from *Spithead* to St. *Helens*, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition.

But the delays we had already ſuffered had not yet ſpent all their influence, for we were now advanced into a ſeaſon of the year, when the weſterly winds are uſually very conſtant, and very violent; and it was thought proper that we ſhould put to ſea in com-

pany with the fleet commanded by Admiral *Balchen*, and the expedition under Lord *Cathcart*. As we made up in all twenty-one men of war, and a hundred and twenty-four ſail of merchantmen and tranſports, we had no hopes of getting out of the Channel with ſo large a number of ſhips, without the continuance of a fair wind, for ſome conſiderable time. This was what we had every day leſs and leſs reaſon to expect, as the time of the equinox drew near; ſo that our golden dreams, and our ideal poſſeſſion of the *Peruvian* treaſures, grew each day more faint, and the difficulties and dangers of the paſſage round Cape *Horn* in the winter ſeaſon filled our imaginations in their room. For it was forty days from our arrival at St. *Helens*, to our final departure from thence: And even then (having orders to proceed without Lord *Cathcart*) we tided it down the Channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the diſpleaſing fatigue of often ſetting ſail, and being as often obliged to return; nor exempt from dangers, greater than have been ſometimes undergone in ſurrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the firſt time, on the 23d of *Auguſt*, we got under ſail, and Admiral *Balchen* ſhewed himſelf truly ſolicitous to have proceeded to ſea, but the wind ſoon returning to its old quarter, obliged us to put back to St. *Helens*, not without conſiderable hazard, and ſome damage received by two of the tranſports, who, in tacking, ran foul of each other. Beſides this, we made two or three more attempts to ſail, but without any better ſucceſs. And, on the 6th of *September*, being returned to an anchor at St. *Helens*, after one of theſe fruitleſs efforts, the wind blew ſo freſh, that the whole fleet ſtruck their yards and topmaſts to prevent driving: Yet, notwithſtanding this precaution, the *Centurion* drove the next evening, and brought both cables a-head, and we were in no ſmall danger of driving foul of the Prince *Frederick*, a ſeventy-gun ſhip, moored at a ſmall diſtance under our ſtern; though we happily eſcaped, by her driving at the ſame time, and ſo preſerving her diſtance: But we did not think ourſelves ſecure, till we at laſt let go the ſheet anchor, which fortunately brought us up.

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However, on the 9th of *September*, we were in ſome degree relieved from this lingering vexatious ſituation, by an Order which Mr. *Anſon* received from the Lords Juſtices, to put to ſea the firſt opportunity with his own ſquadron only, if Lord *Cathcart* ſhould not be ready. Being thus freed from the troubleſome company of ſo large a fleet, our Commodore reſolved to weigh and tide it down the Channel, aſſoon as the weather ſhould become ſufficiently moderate; and this might eaſily have been done with our own ſquadron alone full two months ſooner, had the orders of the Admiralty, for ſupplying us with ſeamen, been punctually complied with, and had we met with none of thoſe other delays mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a ſpeedy departure were even now ſomewhat damped, by a ſubſequent order which Mr. *Anſon* received on the 12th of *September*; for by that he was required to take under his convoy the St. *Albans* with the *Turkey* fleet, and to join the *Dragon* and the *Wincheſter*, with the *Streights* and the *American* trade at *Torbay* or *Plymouth*, and to proceed with them to ſea as far as their way and ours lay together: This incumbrance of a convoy gave us ſome uneaſineſs, as we feared it might prove the means of lengthening our paſſage to the *Maderas*. However, Mr. *Anſon*, now having the command himſelf, reſolved to adhere to his former determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the firſt moderate weather; and that the junction of his Convoy might occaſion as little loſs of time as poſſible, he immediately ſent directions to *Torbay*, that the fleets he was there to take under his care, might be in a readineſs to join him inſtantly on his approach. And at laſt, on the 18th of *September*, he weighed from St. *Helens*; and though the wind was at firſt contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the enſuing chapter.

Having thus gone through the reſpective ſteps taken in the equipment of this ſquadron, it is ſufficiently obvious how different an aſpect this expedition bore at its firſt appointment in the beginning of

January, from what it had in the latter end of *September*, when it left the Channel; and how much its numbers, its ſtrength, and the probability of its ſucceſs were diminiſhed, by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For inſtead of having all our old and ordinary ſeamen exchanged for ſuch as were young and able, (which the Commodore was at firſt promiſed) and having our numbers compleated to their full complement, we were obliged to retain our firſt crews, which were very indifferent; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was no otherwiſe made up to us, than by ſending us on board a hundred and ſeventy men, the greateſt part compoſed of ſuch as were diſcharged from hoſpitals, or new-raiſed marines who had never been at ſea before. And in the land-forces allotted us, the change was ſtill more diſadvantageous; for there, inſtead of three independent companies of a hundred men each, and *Bland*'s regiment of foot, which was an old one, we had only four hundred and ſeventy invalids and marines, one part of them incapable of action by their age and infirmities, and the other part uſeleſs by their ignorance of their duty. But the diminiſhing the ſtrength of the ſquadron was not the greateſt inconveniency which attended theſe alterations; for the conteſts, repreſentations, and difficulties which they continually produced, (as we have above ſeen, that in theſe caſes the authority of the Admiralty was not always ſubmitted to) occaſioned a delay and waſte of time, which in its conſequences was the ſource of all the diſaſters to which this enterprize was afterwards expoſed: For by this means we were obliged to make our paſſage round Cape *Horn* in the moſt tempeſtuous ſeaſon of the year; whence proceeded the ſeparation of our ſquadron, the loſs of numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of our total deſtruction. By this delay too, the enemy had been ſo well informed of our deſigns, that a perſon who had been employed in the *South-Sea* Company's ſervice, and arrived from *Panama* three or four days before we left *Portſmouth*, was able to relate to Mr. *Anſon* moſt of the particulars

ticulars of the deſtination and ſtrength of our ſquadron, from what he had learned amongſt the *Spaniards* before he left them. And this was afterwards confirmed by a more extraordinary circumſtance: For we ſhall find, that when the *Spaniards* (fully ſatisfied that our expedition was intended for the *South-Seas*) had fitted out a ſquadron to oppoſe us, which had ſo far got the ſtart of us, as to arrive before us off the iſland of *Madera*, the Commander of this ſquadron was ſo well inſtructed in the form and make of Mr. *Anſon*'s broad pendant, and had imitated it ſo exactly, that he thereby decoyed the *Pearl*, one of our ſquadron, within gun-ſhot of him, before the Captain of the *Pearl* was able to diſcover his miſtake.

CHAP. II.

The paſſage from St. *Helens* to the Iſland of *Madera*; with a ſhort account of that Iſland, and of our ſtay there.

ON the 18th of *September*, 1740, the ſquadron, as we have obſerved in the preceeding chapter, weighed from St. *Helens* with a contrary wind, the Commodore propoſing to tide it down the Channel, as he dreaded leſs the inconveniences he ſhould thereby have to ſtruggle with, than the riſk he ſhould run of ruining the enterprize, by an uncertain, and, in all probability, a tedious attendance for a fair wind.

The ſquadron allotted to this ſervice conſiſted of five men of war, a ſloop of war, and two victualling ſhips. They were the *Centurion* of ſixty guns, four hundred men, *George Anſon*, Eſq; Commander; the *Glouceſter* of fifty guns, three hundred men, *Richard Norris* Commander; the *Severn* of fifty guns, three hundred men, the Honourable *Edward Legg* Commander; the *Pearl* of forty guns, two hundred and fifty men, *Matthew Mitchel* Commander; the *Wager* of twenty-eight guns, one hundred and ſixty men, *Dandy Kidd* Commander; and the *Tryal* Sloop of eight guns, one hundred men, the Honourable *John Murray* Commander; the two victuallers were Pinks, the largeſt of about four hundred, and the other of about two hundred tons burthen, theſe were to attend us, till the proviſions we had taken on board were ſo far conſumed, as to make room for the additional quantity they carried with them, which, when we had taken into our ſhips, they were to be diſcharged. Beſides the complement of men born by the abovementioned ſhips as their crews, there were embarked on board the ſquadron about four hundred and ſeventy invalids and marines,

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under the denomination of land-forces, (as has been particularly mentioned in the preceeding chapter) which were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel *Cracherode*. With this ſquadron, together with the St. *Albans* and the *Lark*, and the trade under their convoy, Mr. *Anſon*,after weighing from St. *Helens*, tided it down the Channel for the firſt forty-eight-hours; and, on the 20th, in the morning, we diſcovered off the *Ram-Head*, the *Dragon*, *Wincheſter*, *South-Sea Caſtle*, and *Rye*, with a number of merchantmen under their convoy: Theſe we joined about noon the ſame day, our Commodore having orders to ſee them (together with the St. *Albans* and *Lark*) as far into the ſea as their courſe and ours lay together. When we came in ſight of this laſt mentioned fleet, Mr. *Anſon* firſt hoiſted his broad pendant, and was ſaluted by all the men of war in company.

When we had joined this laſt Convoy, we made up eleven men of war, and about one hundred and fifty ſail of merchantmen, conſiſting of the *Turkey*, the *Streights*, and the *American* trade. Mr. *Anſon*, the ſame day, made a ſignal for all the Captains of the men of war to come on board him, where he delivered them their fighting and ſailing inſtructions, and then with a fair wind we all ſtood towards the South-Weſt; and the next day at noon, being the 21ſt, we had run forty leagues from the *Ram-Head*. Being now clear of the land, our Commodore, to render our view more extenſive, ordered Captain *Mitchel*, in the *Pearl*, to make ſail two leagues a-head of the fleet every morning, and to repair to his ſtation every evening. Thus we proceeded till the 25th, when the *Wincheſter* and the *American* Convoy made the concerted ſignal for leave to ſeparate, which being anſwered by the Commodore, they left us: As the St. *Albans* and the *Dragon*, with the *Turkey* and *Streights* Convoy, did on the 29th. After which ſeparation, there remained in company only our own ſquadron and our two victuallers, with which we kept on our courſe for the Iſland of *Madera*. But the winds were ſo contrary, that we had the mortification to be forty days in our paſſage thither from St. *Helens*, though it is known to be often

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done in ten or twelve. This delay was a moſt unpleaſing circumſtance, productive of much diſcontent and ill-humour amongſt our people, of which thoſe only can have a tolerable idea, who have had the experience of a like ſituation. For beſides the peeviſhneſs and deſpondency which foul and contrary winds, and a lingering voyage never fail to create on all occaſions, we, in particular, had very ſubſtantial reaſons to be greatly alarmed at this unexpected impediment. Since as we had departed from *England* much later than we ought to have done, we had placed almoſt all our hopes of ſucceſs in the chance of retrieving in ſome meaſure at ſea, the time we had ſo unhappily waſted at *Spithead* and St. *Helens*. However, at laſt, on *Monday*, *October* the 25th, at five in the morning, we, to our great joy, made the land, and in the afternoon came to an anchor in *Madera Road*, in forty fathom water; the *Brazen-Head* bearing from us E by S, the *Loo* N N W, and the great Church N N E. We had hardly let go our anchor, when an *Engliſh* privateer ſloop ran under our ſtern, and ſaluted the Commodore with nine guns, which we returned with five. And, the next day, the Conſul of the Iſland viſiting the Commodore, we ſaluted him with nine guns on his coming on board.

This Iſland of *Madera*, where we are now arrived, is famous through all our *American* ſettlements for its excellent wines, which ſeem to be deſigned by Providence for the refreſhment of the inhabitants of the Torrid Zone. It is ſituated in a fine climate, in the latitude of 32: 27 North; and in the longitude from *London* (by our different reckonings,) of 18° ½ to 19° ½ Weſt, though laid down in the charts in 17°. It is compoſed of one continued hill, of a conſiderable height, extending itſelf from Eaſt to Weſt: The declivity of which, on the South-ſide, is cultivated and interſperſed with vineyards; and in the midſt of this ſlope the Merchants have fixed their country ſeats, which help to form a very agreeable proſpect. There is but one conſiderable town in the whole Iſland, it is named *Fonchiale*, and is ſeated on the South part of the Iſland, at the bot-

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tom of a large bay. Towards the ſea, it is defended by a high wall, with a battery of cannon, beſides a caſtle on the *Loo*, which is a rock ſtanding in the water at a ſmall diſtance from the ſhore. *Fonchiale* is the only place of trade, and indeed, the only place where it is poſſible for a boat to land. And even here the beach is covered with large ſtones, and a violent ſurf continually beats upon it; ſo that the Commodore did not care to venture the ſhips long boats to fetch the water off, there was ſo much danger of their being loſt; and therefore ordered the Captains of the ſquadron to employ *Portugueſe* boats on that ſervice.

We continued about a week at this Iſland, watering our ſhips, and providing the ſquadron with wine and other refreſhments. Here on the 3d of *November*, Captain *Richard Norris* ſignified by a letter to the Commodore, his deſire to quit his command on board the *Glouceſter*, in order to return to *England* for the recovery of his health, this requeſt the Commodore complied with; and thereupon was pleaſed to appoint Captain *Matthew Mitchell* to command the *Glouceſter* in his room, and to remove Captain *Kidd* from the *Wager* to the *Pearl*, and Captain *Murray* from the *Tryal* Sloop to the *Wager*, giving the command of the *Tryal* to Lieutenant *Cheap*. Theſe promotions being ſettled, with other changes in the Lieutenancies, the Commodore, on the following day, gave to the Captains their orders, appointing St. *Jago*, one of the *Cape de Verd* Iſlands, to be the firſt place of rendezvous in caſe of ſeparation; and directing them, if they did not meet the *Centurion* there, to make the beſt of their way to the Iſland of St. *Catherine's*, on the coaſt of *Brazil*. The water for the ſquadron being the ſame day compleated, and each ſhip ſupplied with as much wine and other refreſhments as they could take in, we weighed anchor in the afternoon, and took our leave of the Iſland of *Madera*. But before I go on with the narration of our own tranſactions, I think it neceſſary to give ſome account of the proceedings of the enemy, and of the meaſures they had taken to render all our deſigns abortive.

When Mr. *Anſon* viſited the Governor of *Madera*, he received information from him, that for three or four days, in the latter end of *October*, there had appeared, to the weſtward of that Iſland, ſeven or eight ſhips of the line, and a Patache, which laſt was ſent every day cloſe in to make the land. The Governor aſſured the Commodore, upon his honour, that none upon the Iſland had either given them intelligence, or had in any ſort communicated with them, but that he believed them to be either *French* or *Spaniſh*, but was rather inclined to think them *Spaniſh*. On this intelligence, Mr. *Anſon* ſent an Officer in a clean ſloop, eight leagues to the weſtward, to reconnoitre them, and, if poſſible, to diſcover what they were: But the Officer returned without being able to get a ſight of them, ſo that we ſtill remained in uncertainty. However, we could not but conjecture, that this fleet was intended to put a ſtop to our expedition, which, had they cruiſed to the eaſtward of the Iſland inſtead of the weſtward, they could not but have executed with great facility. For as, in that caſe, they muſt have certainly fallen in with us, we ſhould have been obliged to throw overboard vaſt quantities of proviſion to clear our ſhips for an engagement, and this alone, without any regard to the event of the action, would have effectually prevented our progreſs. This was ſo obvious a meaſure, that we could not help imagining reaſons which might have prevented them from purſuing it. And we therefore ſuppoſed, that this *French* or *Spaniſh* ſquadron was ſent out, upon advice of our ſailing in company with Admiral *Balchen* and Lord *Cathcart*'s expedition: And thence, from an apprehenſion of being over-matched, they might not think it adviſeable to meet with us, till we had parted company, which they might judge would not happen, before our arrival at this Iſland. Theſe were our ſpeculations at that time; and from hence we had reaſon to ſuppoſe, that we might ſtill fall in with them, in our way to the *Cape de Verd* Iſlands. We afterwards, in the courſe of our expedition, were perſuaded, that this was the

Spaniſh

Spanish squadron commanded by Don *Joseph Pizarro* which was sent out purposely to traverse the views and enterprizes of our squadron, to which, in strength, they were greatly superior. As this *Spanish* armament then was so nearly connected with our expedition, and as the catastrophe it underwent, though not effected by our force, was yet a considerable advantage to this nation, produced in consequence of our equipment, I have, in the following chapter given a summary account of their proceedings, from their first setting out from *Spain* in the year 1740, till the *Asia*, the only ship of the whole squadron which returned to *Europe*, arrived at the *Groyne* in the beginning of the year 1746.

CHAP. III.

The hiſtory of the *Spaniſh* ſquadron commanded by Don *Joſeph Pizarro.*

THE ſquadron fitted out by the Court of *Spain*, to attend our motions, and traverſe our projects, we ſuppoſed to have been the ſhips ſeen off *Madera*, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. As this force was ſent out particularly againſt our expedition, I cannot but imagine, that the following hiſtory of the caſualties it met with, as far as by intercepted letters and other information the ſame has come to my knowledge, is a very eſſential part of the preſent work. For hence it will appear, that we were the occaſion, that a conſiderable part of the naval power of *Spain* was diverted from the proſecution of the ambitious Views of that Court in *Europe*. And whatever men and ſhips were loſt by the enemy in this undertaking, were loſt in conſequence of the precautions they took to ſecure themſelves againſt our enterprizes.

This ſquadron (beſides two ſhips intended for the *Weſt-Indies*, which did not part company till after they had left the *Maderas*) was compoſed of the following men of war, commanded by Don *Joſeph Pizarro*:

The *Aſia* of ſixty-ſix guns, and ſeven hundred men; this was the Admiral's ſhip.
The *Guipuſcoa* of ſeventy-four guns, and ſeven hundred men.
The *Herminona* of fifty-four guns, and five hundred men.
The *Eſperanza* of fifty guns, and four hundred and fifty men.
The St. *Eſtevan* of forty guns, and three hundred and fifty men.
And a Patache of twenty guns.

Theſe ſhips, over and above their complement of ſailors and marines, had on board an old *Spaniſh* regiment of foot, intended to

reinforce the garrisons on the coast of the *South-Seas*. When this fleet had cruised for some days to the leeward of the *Maderas*, as is mentioned in the preceding chapter, they left that station in the beginning of *November*, and steered for the river of *Plate*, where they arrived the 5th of *January*, *O. S.* and coming to an anchor in the bay of *Maldonado*, at the mouth of that river, their Admiral *Pizarro* sent immediately to *Buenos Ayres* for a supply of provisions; for they had departed from *Spain* with only four months provisions on board. While they lay here expecting this supply, they received intelligence, by the Treachery of the *Portuguese* Governor of St. *Catherine's*, of Mr. *Anson's* having arrived at that Island on the 21st of *December* preceding, and of his preparing to put to sea again with the utmost expedition. *Pizarro*, notwithstanding his superior force, had his reasons (and as some say his orders likewise) for avoiding our squadron any where short of the *South-Seas*. He was besides extremely desirous of getting round Cape *Horn* before us, as he imagined that step alone would effectually baffle all our designs; and therefore, on hearing that we were in his neighbourhood, and that we should soon be ready to proceed for Cape *Horn*, he weighed anchor with the five large ships, (the Patache being disabled and condemned, and the men taken out of her) after a stay of seventeen days only, and got under sail without his provisions, which arrived at *Maldonado* within a day or two after his departure. But notwithstanding the precipitation, with which he departed, we put to sea from St. *Catherine's* four days before him, and in some part of our passage to Cape *Horn*, the two squadrons were so near together, that the *Pearl*, one of our ships, being separated from the rest, fell in with the *Spanish* Fleet, and mistaking the *Asia* for the *Centurion*, had got within gun-shot of *Pizarro*, before she discovered her error, and narrowly escaped being taken.

It being the 22d of *January* when the *Spaniards* weighed from *Maldonado*, (as has been already mentioned) they could not expect to get into the latitude of Cape *Horn* before the equinox; and as they had reason to apprehend very tempestuous weather in doubling

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it at that feafon, and as the *Spanifh* failors, being for the moft part accuftomed to a fair weather country, might be expected to be very averfe to fo dangerous and fatiguing a navigation, the better to encourage them, fome part of their pay was advanced to them in *European* goods, which they were to be permitted to difpofe of in the *South-Seas*, that fo the hopes of the great profit, each man was to make on his venture, might animate him in his duty, and render him lefs difpofed to repine at the labour, the hardfhips and the perils he would in all probability meet with before his arrival on the coaft of *Peru*.

Pizarro with his fquadron having, towards the latter end of *February*, run the length of Cape *Horn*, he then ftood to the weftward in order to double it; but in the night, of the laft day of *February*, O. S. while with this view they were turning to windward, the *Guipufcoa*, the *Hermiona*, and the *Efperanza*, were feparated from the Admiral; and, on the 6th of *March* following, the *Guipufcoa* was feparated from the other two; and, on the 7th (being the day after we had paffed *Streights le Maire)* there came on a moft furious ftorm at N W, which in defpight of all their efforts, drove the whole fquadron to the eaftward, and after feveral fruitlefs attempts, obliged them to bear away for the river of *Plate*, where *Pizarro* in the *Afia* arrived about the middle of *May*, and a few days after him the *Efperanza* and the *Eftevan*. The *Hermiona* was fuppofed to founder at fea, for fhe was never heard of more; and the *Guipufcoa* was run a-fhore, and funk on the coaft of *Brazil*. The calamities of all kinds, which this fquadron underwent in this unfuccefsful navigation, can only be paralleled by what we ourfelves experienced in the fame climate, when buffeted by the fame ftorms. There was indeed fome diverfity in our diftreffes, which rendered it difficult to decide, whofe fituation was moft worthy of commiferation. For to all the misfortunes we had in common with each other, as fhattered rigging, leaky fhips, and the fatigues and defpondency, which neceffarily attend thefe difafters, there was fuperadded on board our fqua-

dron the ravage of a moſt deſtructive and incurable diſeaſe, and on board the *Spaniſh* ſquadron the devaſtation of famine.

For this ſquadron, either from the hurry of their outſet, their preſumption of a ſupply at *Buenos Ayres*, or from other leſs obvious motives, departed from *Spain*, as has been already obſerved, with no more than four months proviſion on board, and even that, as it is ſaid, at ſhort allowance only; ſo that, when by the ſtorms they met with off Cape *Horn*, their continuance at ſea was prolonged a month or more beyond their expectation, they were reduced to ſuch infinite diſtreſs, that rats, when they could be caught, were ſold for four dollars a-piece; and a ſailor, who died on board, had his death concealed for ſome days by his brother, who, during that time, lay in the ſame hammock with the corpſe, only to receive the dead man's allowance of proviſions. In this dreadful ſituation they were alarmed (if their horrors were capable of augmentation) by the diſcovery of a conſpiracy among the marines, on board the *Aſia*, the Admiral's ſhip. This had taken its riſe chiefly from the miſeries they endured: For though no leſs was propoſed by the conſpirators than the maſſacring the officers and the whole crew, yet their motive for this bloody reſolution ſeemed to be no more than their deſire of relieving their hunger, by appropriating the whole ſhip's proviſions to themſelves. But their deſigns were prevented, when juſt upon the point of execution, by means of one of their confeſſors, and three of their ringleaders were immediately put to death. However, though the conſpiracy was ſuppreſſed, their other calamities admitted of no alleviation, but grew each day more and more deſtructive. So that by the complicated diſtreſs of fatigue, ſickneſs, and hunger, the three ſhips which eſcaped loſt the greateſt part of their men: The *Aſia*, their Admiral's ſhip, arrived at *Monte Vedio* in the river of *Plate*, with half her crew only; the St. *Eſtevan* had loſt in like manner half her hands, when ſhe anchored in the bay of *Barragan*; the *Eſperanza*, a fifty gun ſhip, was ſtill more unfortunate, for of four hundred and fifty hands which ſhe brought from *Spain*, only fifty-eight remained alive, and the whole regiment of foot periſhed

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except ſixty men. But to give the reader a more diſtinct and particular idea of what they underwent upon this occaſion, I ſhall lay before him a ſhort account of the fate of the *Guipuſcoa*, extracted from a letter written by Don *Joſeph Mendinuetta* her Captain, to a perſon of diſtinction at *Lima*; a copy of which fell into our hands afterwards in the *South-Seas*.

He mentions, that he ſeparated from the *Hermiona* and the *Eſperanza* in a fog, on the 6th of *March*, being then, as I ſuppoſe, to the S. E. of *Staten-Land*, and plying to the weſtward; that in the night after, it blew a furious ſtorm at N. W, which, at half an hour after ten, ſplit his mainſail, and obliged him to bear away with his foreſail; that the ſhip went ten knots an hour with a prodigious ſea, and often ran her gangway under water; that he likewiſe ſprung his main-maſt; and the ſhip made ſo much water, that with four pumps and bailing he could not free her. That on the 19th it was calm, but the ſea continued ſo high, that the ſhip in rolling opened all her upper works and ſeams, and ſtarted the butt ends of her planking, and the greateſt part of her top timbers, the bolts being drawn by the violence of her roll: That in this condition, with other additional diſaſters to the hull and rigging, they continued beating to the weſtward till the 12th: That they were then in ſixty degrees of ſouth latitude, in great want of proviſions, numbers every day periſhing by the fatigue of pumping, and thoſe who ſurvived, being quite diſpirited by labour, hunger, and the ſeverity of the weather, they having two ſpans of ſnow upon the decks: That then finding the wind fixed in the weſtern quarter, and blowing ſtrong, and conſequently their paſſage to the weſtward impoſſible, they reſolved to bear away for the river of *Plate*: That on the 22d, they were obliged to throw overboard all the upper-deck guns, and an anchor, and to take ſix turns of the cable round the ſhip to prevent her opening: That on the 4th of *April*, it being calm, but a very high ſea, the ſhip rolled ſo much, that the main-maſt came by the board, and in a few hours after ſhe loſt, in like manner, her fore-maſt and her mizen-maſt; and that, to accumu-

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late their misfortunes, they were soon obliged to cut away their bowsprit, to diminish, if possible, the leakage at her head: That by this time he had lost two hundred and fifty men by hunger and fatigue; for those who were capable of working at the pumps, (at which every Officer without exception took his turn) were allowed only an ounce and half of biscuit *per diem*; and those who were so sick or weak, that they could not assist in this necessary labour, had no more than an ounce of wheat; so that it was common for the men to fall down dead at the pumps: That, including the Officers, they could only muster from eighty to a hundred persons capable of duty: That the South-West winds blew so fresh, after they had lost their masts, that they could not immediately set up jury masts, but were obliged to drive like a wreck, between the latitudes of 32 and 38, till the 24th of *April*, when they made the coast of *Brazil* at *Rio de Patas*, ten leagues to the southward of the Island of St. *Catherine's*; that here they came to an anchor, and that the Captain was very desirous of proceeding to St. *Catherine's* if possible, in order to save the hull of the ship, and the guns and stores on board her; but the crew instantly left off pumping, and being enraged at the hardships they had suffered, and the numbers they had lost, (there being at that time no less than thirty dead bodies lying on the deck) they all with one voice cried out ON SHORE, ON SHORE, and obliged the Captain to run the ship in directly for the land, where, the 5th day after, she sunk with her stores, and all her furniture on board her, but the remainder of the crew, whom hunger and fatigue had spared, to the number of four hundred, got safe on shore.

From this account of the adventures and catastrophe of the *Guipuscoa*, we may form some conjecture of the manner in which the *Hermiona* was lost, and of the distresses endured by the three remaining ships of the squadron, which got into the river of *Plate*. These last being in great want of masts, yards, rigging, and all kind of naval stores, and having no supply at *Buenos Ayres*, nor in any of their neighbouring settlements, *Pizarro* dispatched an advice-boat with

a letter of credit to *Rio Janeiro*, to purchase what was wanting from the *Portuguese*. He at the same time, sent an express across the continent to *St. Jago* in *Chili*, to be thence forwarded to the Viceroy of *Peru*, informing him of the disasters that had befallen his squadron, and desiring a remittance of 200,000 dollars from the royal chests at *Lima*, to enable him to victual and refit his remaining ships, that he might be again in a condition to attempt the passage to the *South-Seas*, as soon as the season of the year should be more favourable. It is mentioned by the *Spaniards* as a most extraordinary circumstance, that the *Indian* charged with this express (though it was then the depth of winter, when the *Cordilleras* are esteemed impassable on account of the snow) was only thirteen days in his journey from *Buenos Ayres* to St. *Jago* in *Chili*; though these places are distant three hundred *Spanish* leagues, near forty of which are amongst the snows and precipices of the *Cordilleras*.

The return to this dispatch of *Pizarro's* from the Viceroy of *Peru* was no ways favourable; instead of 200,000 dollars, the sum demanded, the Viceroy remitted him only 100,000, telling him, that it was with great difficulty he was able to procure him even that: Though the inhabitants at *Lima*, who considered the presence of *Pizarro* as absolutely necessary to their security, were much discontented at this procedure, and did not fail to assert, that it was not the want of money, but the interested views of some of the Viceroy's confidents, that prevented *Pizarro* from having the whole sum he had asked for.

The advice-boat sent to *Rio Janeiro* also executed her commission but imperfectly; for though she brought back a considerable quantity of pitch, tar and cordage, yet she could not procure either masts or yards: And as an additional misfortune, *Pizarro* was disappointed of some masts, he expected from *Paraguay*; for a carpenter whom he entrusted with a large sum of money, and had sent there to cut masts, instead of prosecuting the business he was employed in, had married in the country, and refused to return. However, by removing the masts of the *Esperanza* into the *Asia*, and

and making use of what ſpare maſts and yards they had on board, they made a ſhift to refit the *Aſia* and the St. *Eſtevan*. And in the *October* following, *Pizarro* was preparing to put to ſea with theſe two ſhips, in order to attempt the paſſage round Cape *Horn* a ſecond time; but the St. *Eſtevan*, in coming down the river *Plate*, ran on a ſhoal, and beat off her rudder, on which, and other damages ſhe received, ſhe was condemned and broke up, and *Pizarro* in the *Aſia* proceeded to ſea without her. Having now the ſummer before him, and the winds favourable, no doubt was made of his having a fortunate and ſpeedy paſſage; but being off Cape *Horn*, and going right before the wind in very moderate weather, though in a ſwelling ſea, by ſome miſconduct of the officer of the watch the ſhip rolled away her maſts, and was a ſecond time obliged to put back to the river *Plate* in great diſtreſs.

The *Aſia* having conſiderably ſuffered in this ſecond unfortunate expedition, the *Eſperanza*, which had been left behind at *Monte Vedio*, was ordered to be refitted, the command of her being given to *Mindinuetta*, who was Captain of the *Guipuſcoa*, when ſhe was loſt. He, in the *November* of the ſucceeding year, that is, in *November* 1742, ſailed from the river of *Plate* for the *South-Seas*, and arrived ſafe on the coaſt of *Chili*; where his Commodore *Pizarro* paſſing over land from *Buenos Ayres* met him. There were great animoſities and conteſts between theſe two Gentlemen at their meeting, occaſioned principally by the claim of *Pizarro* to command the *Eſperanza*, which *Mindinuetta* had brought round: For *Mindinuetta* refuſed to deliver her up to him; inſiſting, that as he came into the *South-Seas* alone, and under no ſuperior, it was not now in the power of *Pizarro* to reſume that authority, which he had once parted with. However, the Preſident of *Chili* interpoſing, and declaring for *Pizarro*, *Mindinuetta*, after a long and obſtinate ſtruggle, was obliged to ſubmit.

But *Pizarro* had not yet compleated the ſeries of his adventures; for when he and *Mindinuetta* came back by land from *Chili* to *Buenos Ayres*, in the year 1745, they found at *Monte Vedio* the

Asia, which near three years before they had left there. This ſhip they reſolved, if poſſible, to carry to *Europe*, and with this view they refitted her in the beſt manner they could: But their great difficulty was to procure a ſufficient number of hands to navigate her, for all the remaining ſailors of the ſquadron to be met with in the neighbourhood of *Buenos Ayres*, did not amount to a hundred men. They endeavoured to ſupply this defect by preſſing many of the inhabitants of *Buenos Ayres*, and putting on board beſides all the *Engliſh* priſoners then in their cuſtody, together with a number of *Portugueſe* ſmugglers, which they had taken at different times, and ſome of the *Indians* of the country. Among theſe laſt there was a Chief and ten of his followers, which had been ſurprized by a party of *Spaniſh* ſoldiers about three months before. The name of this Chief was *Orellana*, he belonged to a very powerful Tribe, which had committed great ravages in the neighbourhood of *Buenos Ayres*. With this motley crew (all of them, except the *European Spaniards*, extremely averſe to the voyage) *Pizarro* ſet ſail from *Monte Vedio* in the river of *Plate*, about the beginning of *November* 1745, and the native *Spaniards* being no ſtrangers to the diſſatisfaction of their forced men, treated both thoſe, the *Engliſh* priſoners and the *Indians*, with great inſolence and barbarity; but more particularly the *Indians*, for it was common for the meaneſt officers in the ſhip to beat them cruelly on the ſlighteſt pretences, and oftentimes only to exert their ſuperiority. *Orellana* and his followers, though in appearance ſufficiently patient and ſubmiſſive, meditated a ſevere revenge for all theſe inhumanities. As he converſed very well in *Spaniſh*, (theſe *Indians* having in time of peace a great intercourſe with *Buenos Ayres*) he affected to talk with ſuch of the *Engliſh* as underſtood that language, and ſeemed very deſirous of being informed how many *Engliſhmen* there were on board, and which they were. As he knew that the *Engliſh* were as much enemies to the *Spaniards* as himſelf, he had doubtleſs an intention of diſcloſing his purpoſes to them, and making them partners in the ſcheme he had projected for revenging his wrongs, and recovering his liberty; but having

having founded them at a diftance, and not finding them fo precipitate and vindictive as he expected, he proceeded no further with them, but refolved to truft alone to the refolution of his ten faithful followers. Thefe, it fhould feem, readily engaged to obferve his directions, and to execute whatever commands he gave them; and having agreed on the meafures neceffary to be taken, they firft furnifhed themfelves with *Dutch* knives fharp at the point, which being the common knives ufed in the fhip, they found no difficulty in procuring: Befides this, they employed their leifure in fecretly cutting out thongs from raw hides, of which there were great numbers on board, and in fixing to each end of thefe thongs the double-headed fhot of the fmall quarter-deck guns; this, when fwung round their heads, according to the practice of their country, was a moft mifchievous weapon, in the ufe of which the *Indians* about *Buenos Ayres* are trained from their infancy, and confequently are extremely expert. Thefe particulars being in good forwardnefs, the execution of their fcheme was perhaps precipitated by a particular outrage committed on *Orellana* himfelf. For one of the Officers, who was a very brutal fellow, ordered *Orellana* aloft, which being what he was incapable of performing, the officer, under pretence of his difobedience, beat him with fuch violence, that he left him bleeding on the deck, and ftupified for fome time with his bruifes and wounds. This ufage undoubtedly heightened his thirft for revenge, and made him eager and impatient, till the means of executing it were in his power; fo that within a day or two after this incident, he and his followers opened their defperate refolves in the enfuing manner.

It was about nine in the evening, when many of the principal Officers were on the quarter-deck, indulging in the frefhnefs of the night air; the wafte of the fhip was filled with live cattle, and the forecaftle was manned with its cuftomary watch. *Orellana* and his companions, under cover of the night, having prepared their weapons, and thrown off their trouzers and the more cumbrous part of their drefs, came all together on the quarter-deck, and drew towards

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the door of the great cabbin. The Boatſwain immediately reprimanded them, and ordered them to be gone. On this *Orellana* ſpoke to his followers in his native language, when four of them drew off, two towards each gangway, and the Chief and the ſix remaining *Indians* ſeemed to be ſlowly quitting the quarter-deck. When the detached *Indians* had taken poſſeſſion of the gangway, *Orellana* placed his hands hollow to his mouth, and bellowed out the war-cry uſed by thoſe ſavages, which is ſaid to be the harſheſt and moſt terrifying ſound known in nature. This hideous yell was the ſignal for beginning the maſſacre: For on this they all drew their knives, and brandiſhed their prepared double-headed ſhot, and the ſix with their Chief, which remained on the quarter-deck, immediately fell on the *Spaniards*, who were intermingled with them, and laid near forty of them at their feet, of which above twenty were killed on the ſpot, and the reſt diſabled. Many of the Officers, in the beginning of the tumult, puſhed into the great cabbin, where they put out the lights, and barricadoed the door: Whilſt of the others, who had avoided the firſt fury of the *Indians*, ſome endeavoured to eſcape along the gangways into the forecaſtle, where the *Indians*, placed on purpoſe, ſtabbed the greateſt part of them as they attempted to paſs by, or forced them off the gangways into the waſte: Some threw themſelves voluntarily over the barricadoes into the waſte, and thought themſelves fortunate to lie concealed amongſt the cattle: But the greateſt part eſcaped up the main ſhrouds, and ſheltered themſelves either in the tops or rigging. And though the *Indians* attacked only the quarter-deck, yet the watch in the forecaſtle finding their communication cut off, and being terrified by the wounds of the few, who not being killed on the ſpot, had ſtrength ſufficient to force their paſſage, and not knowing either who their enemies were, or what were their numbers, they likewiſe gave all over for loſt, and in great confuſion ran up into the rigging of the fore-maſt and bowſprit.

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Thus these eleven *Indians*, with a resolution perhaps without example, possessed themselves almost in an instant of the quarter-deck of a ship, mounting sixty-six guns, and mann'd with near five hundred hands, and continued in peaceable possession of this post a considerable time. For the officers in the great cabbin, (amongst whom were *Pizarro* and *Mindinuetta*) the crew between decks, and those who had escaped into the tops and rigging, were only anxious for their own safety, and were for a long time incapable of forming any project for suppressing the insurrection, and recovering the possession of the ship. It is true, the yells of the *Indians*, the groans of the wounded, and the confused clamours of the crew, all heightned by the obscurity of the night, had at first greatly magnified their danger, and had filled them with the imaginary terrors, which darkness, disorder, and an ignorance of the real strength of an enemy never fail to produce. For as the *Spaniards* were sensible of the disaffection of their prest hands, and were also conscious of their barbarity to their prisoners, they imagined, the conspiracy was general, and considered their own destruction as infallible; so that, it is said, some of them had once taken the resolution of leaping into the sea, but were prevented by their companions.

However, when the *Indians* had entirely cleared the quarter-deck, the tumult in a great measure subsided; for those who had escaped, were kept silent by their fears, and the *Indians* were incapable of pursuing them to renew the disorder. *Orellana*, when he saw himself master of the quarter-deck, broke open the arm-chest, which, on a slight suspicion of mutiny, had been ordered there a few days before, as to a place of the greatest security. Here he took it for granted, he should find cutlasses sufficient for himself and his companions, in the use of which weapon they were all extremely skilful, and with these, it was imagined, they proposed to have forced the great cabbin: But on opening the chest, there appeared nothing but fire-arms, which to them were of no use. There were indeed cutlasses in the chest, but they were hid by the fire-arms being laid over them. This was a sensible disappointment to

them, and by this time *Pizarro* and his companions in the great cabbin were capable of converſing aloud, through the cabbin windows and port-holes, with thoſe in the gun-room and between decks, and from hence they learnt, that the *Engliſh* (whom they principally ſuſpected) were all ſafe below, and had not intermeddled in this mutiny; and by other particulars they at laſt diſcovered, that none were concerned in it but *Orellana* and his people. On this *Pizarro* and the Officers reſolved to attack them on the quarter-deck, before any of the diſcontented on board ſhould ſo far recover their firſt ſurprize, as to reflect on the facility and certainty of ſeizing the ſhip by a junction with the *Indians* in the preſent emergency. With this view *Pizarro* got together what arms were in the cabbin, and diſtributed them to thoſe who were with him: But there were no other fire-arms to be met with but piſtols, and for theſe they had neither powder nor ball. However, having now ſettled a correſpondence with the gun-room, they lowered down a bucket out of the cabbin-window, into which the gunner, out of one of the gun-room ports, put a quantity of piſtol cartridges. When they had thus procured ammunition, and had loaded their piſtols, they ſet the cabbin-door partly open, and fired ſeveral ſhot amongſt the *Indians* on the quarter-deck, tho' at firſt without effect: But at laſt *Mindinuetta*, whom we have often mentioned, had the good fortune to ſhoot *Orellana* dead on the ſpot; on which his faithful companions abandoning all thoughts of farther reſiſtance, inſtantly leaped into the ſea, where they every man periſhed. Thus was this inſurrection quelled, and the poſſeſſion of the quarter-deck regained, after it had been full two hours in the power of this great and daring Chief, and his gallant unhappy countrymen.

Pizarro having eſcaped this imminent peril ſteered for *Europe*, and arrived ſafe on the coaſt of *Gallicia* in the beginning of the year 1746, after having been abſent between four and five years, and having, by his attendance on our expedition, diminiſhed the naval power of *Spain* by above three thouſand hands, (the flower of their ſailors) and by four conſiderable ſhips of war and a Patache. For

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we have ſeen, that the *Hermiona* foundered at ſea; the *Guipuſcoa* was ſtranded, and ſunk on the coaſt of *Brazil*; the St. *Eſtevan* was condemned and broke up in the river of *Plate*; and the *Eſperanza* being left in the *South-Seas*, is doubtleſs by this time incapable of returning to *Spain*. So that the *Aſia* only, with leſs than one hundred hands, may be regarded as all the remains of that ſquadron, with which *Pizarro* firſt put to ſea. And whoever conſiders the very large proportion, which this ſquadron bore to the whole navy of *Spain*, will, I believe, confeſs, that had our undertaking been attended with no other advantages than that of ruining ſo great a part of the ſea-force of ſo dangerous an enemy, this alone would be a ſufficient equivalent for our equipment, and an inconteſtable proof of the ſervice, which the Nation has thence received. Having thus concluded this ſummary of *Pizarro*'s adventures, I ſhall now return again to the narration of our own tranſactions.

CHAP. IV.

From *Madera* to St. *Catherine's*.

I HAVE already mentioned, that on the 3d of *November* we weighed from *Madera*, after orders had been given to the Captains to rendezvous at St. *Jago*, one of the *Cape de Verd* Islands, in case the squadron was separated. But the next day, when we were got to sea, the Commodore considering that the season was far advanced, and that touching at St. *Jago* would create a new delay, he for this reason thought proper to alter his rendezvous, and to appoint the Island of St. *Catherine*'s, on the coast of *Brazil*, to be the first place to which the ships of the squadron were to repair in case of separation.

In our passage to the Island of St. *Catherine's*, we found the direction of the trade-winds to differ considerably from what we had reason to expect, both from the general histories given of these winds, and the experience of former navigators. For the learned Dr. *Halley*, in his account of the trade-winds, which take place in the *Ethiopic* and *Atlantic* Ocean, tells us, that from the latitude of 28° N, to the latitude of 10° N, there is generally a fresh gale of N. E. wind, which towards the *African* side rarely comes to the eastward of E. N. E, or passes to the northward of N. N. E: But on the *American* side, the wind is somewhat more easily, though most commonly even there it is a point or two to the northward of the East: That from 10° N. to 4° N, the calms and tornadoes take place; and from 4° N. to 30° S, the winds are generally and perpetually between the South and the East. This account we expected to have verified by our own experience; but we found considerable variations from it, both in respect to the steadiness of the winds, and the quarter from whence they blew. For though we met with a N. E. wind about the latitude of 28° N, yet from the latitude

latitude of 25° to the latitude of 18° N, the wind was never once to the northward of the Eaſt, but on the contrary, almoſt conſtantly to the ſouthward of it. However, from thence to the latitude of 6° : 20′ N, we had it uſually to the northward of the Eaſt, though not entirely, it having for a ſhort time changed to E. S. E. From hence, to about 4° 46′ N, the weather was very unſettled; ſometimes the wind was N. E. then changed to S. E, and ſometimes we had a dead calm, attended with ſmall rain and lightning. After this, the wind continued almoſt invariably between the S. and E, to the latitude of 7° : 30′ S; and then again as invariably between the N. and E, to the latitude of 15° : 30′ S; then E. and S. E, to 21° : 37′ S. But after this, even to the latitude of 27° : 44′ S, the wind was never once between the S. and the E, though we had it at all times in all the other quarters of the compaſs. But this laſt circumſtance may be in ſome meaſure accounted for, from our approach to the main continent of the *Brazils*. I mention not theſe particulars with a view of cavilling at the received accounts of theſe trade-winds, which I doubt not are in general ſufficiently accurate; but I thought it a matter worthy of public notice, that ſuch deviations from the eſtabliſhed rules do ſometimes take place. Beſides this obſervation may not only be of ſervice to Navigators, by putting them on their guard againſt theſe hitherto unexpected irregularities, but is a circumſtance neceſſary to be attended to in the ſolution of that great queſtion about the cauſes of trade-winds and monſoons, a queſtion, which, in my opinion, has not been hitherto diſcuſſed with that clearneſs and accuracy, which its importance (whether it be conſidered as a naval or philoſophical inquiry) ſeems to demand.

On the 16th of *November*, one of our Victuallers made a ſignal to ſpeak with the Commodore, and we ſhortened ſail for her to come up with us. The Maſter came on board, and acquainted Mr. *Anſon*, that he had complied with the terms of his charter-party, and deſired to be unloaded and diſmiſſed. Mr. *Anſon*, on conſulting the Captains of the ſquadron, found all the ſhips had ſtill ſuch quantities of proviſion between their decks, and were withal ſo deep,

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that they could not without great difficulty take in their several proportions of brandy from the *Induſtry Pink*, one of the Victuallers only: Conſequently he was obliged to continue the other of them, the *Anna Pink*, in the ſervice of attending the ſquadron. This being reſolved on, the Commodore the next day made a ſignal for the ſhips to bring too, and to take on board their ſhares of the brandy from the *Induſtry Pink*; and in this the long boats of the ſquadron were employed the three following days, that is, till the 19th in the evening, when the *Pink* being unloaded, ſhe parted company with us, being bound for *Barbadoes*, there to take in a freight for *England*. Moſt of the Officers of the ſquadron took the opportunity of writing to their friends at home by this ſhip; but ſhe was afterwards, as I have been ſince informed, unhappily taken by the *Spaniards*.

On the 20th of *November*, the Captains of the ſquadron repreſented to the Commodore, that their ſhips companies were very ſickly, and that it was their own opinion as well as their ſurgeons, that it would tend to the preſervation of the men to let in more air between decks; but that their ſhips were ſo deep, they could not poſſibly open their lower ports. On this repreſentation, the Commodore ordered ſix air ſcuttles to be cut in each ſhip, in ſuch places where they would leaſt weaken it.

And on this occaſion I cannot but obſerve, how much it is the duty of all thoſe, who either by office or authority, have any influence in the direction of our naval affairs, to attend to this important article, the preſervation of the lives and health of our ſeamen. If it could be ſuppoſed, that the motives of humanity were inſufficient for this purpoſe, yet policy, and a regard to the ſucceſs of our arms, and the intereſt and honour of each particular Commander, ſhould naturally lead us to a careful and impartial examination of every probable method propoſed for maintaining a ſhip's crew in health and vigour. But hath this been always done? Have the late invented plain and obvious methods of keeping our ſhips ſweet and clean, by a conſtant ſupply of freſh air, been conſidered with that candour and temper, which the great benefits promiſed hereby

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ought naturally to have inſpired? On the contrary, have not theſe ſalutary ſchemes been often treated with neglect and contempt? And have not ſome of thoſe who have been entruſted with experimenting their effects, been guilty of the moſt indefenſible partiality, in the accounts they have given of theſe trials? Indeed, it muſt be confeſſed, that many diſtinguiſhed perſons, both in the direction and command of our fleets, have exerted themſelves on theſe occaſions with a judicious and diſpaſſionate examination, becoming the intereſting nature of the inquiry; but the wonder is, that any could be found irrational enough to act a contrary part, in deſpight of the ſtrongeſt dictates of prudence and humanity. I muſt however own, that I do not believe this conduct to have ariſen from motives ſo ſavage, as the firſt reflection thereon does naturally ſuggeſt: But I rather impute it to an obſtinate, and in ſome degree, ſuperſtitious attachment to ſuch practices as have been long eſtabliſhed, and to a ſettled contempt and hatred of all kinds of innovations, eſpecially ſuch as are projected by landmen and perſons reſiding on ſhore. But let us return from this, I hope not, impertinent digreſſion.

We croſſed the equinoctial with a fine freſh gale at S. E, on *Friday* the 28th of *November*, at four in the morning, being then in the longitude of 27°: 59′ W. from *London*. And on the 2d of *December*, in the morning, we ſaw a ſail in the N. W. quarter, and made the *Glouceſter*'s and *Tryal*'s ſignals to chaſe; and half an hour after, we let out our reefs and chaſed with the ſquadron; and about noon a ſignal was made for the *Wager* to take our remaining Victualler, the *Anna Pink*, in tow. But at ſeven in the evening, finding we did not near the chace, and that the *Wager* was very far a-ſtern, we ſhortened ſail, and made a ſignal for the cruizers to join the ſquadron. The next day but one we again diſcovered a ſail, which, on a nearer approach, we judged to be the ſame veſſel. We chaſed her the whole day, and though we rather gained upon her, yet night came on before we could overtake her, which obliged us to give over the chace, to collect our ſcattered ſquadron. We were

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much chagrined at the eſcape of this veſſel, as we then apprehended her to be an advice-boat ſent from *Old Spain* to *Buenos Ayres*, with notice of our expedition. But we have ſince learnt, that we were deceived in this conjecture, and that it was our *Eaſt-India* Company's Packet bound to St. *Helena*.

On the 10th of *December*, being, by our accounts, in the latitude of 20° S, and 36°: 30′ longitude Weſt from *London*, the *Tryal* fired a gun to denote ſoundings. We immediately ſounded, and found ſixty fathom water, the bottom coarſe ground with broken ſhells. The *Tryal* being a-head of us, had at one time thirty-ſeven fathom, which afterwards increaſed to 90: And then ſhe found no bottom, which happened to us too at our ſecond trial, though we ſounded with a hundred and fifty fathom of line. This is the ſhoal which is laid down in moſt charts by the name of the *Abrollos*; and it appeared we were upon the very edge of it; perhaps farther in, it may be extremely dangerous. We were then, by our different accounts, from ninety to ſixty leagues Eaſt of the coaſt of *Brazil*. The next day but one we ſpoke with a *Portugueſe* Brigantine from *Rio Janeiro*, bound to *Bahia del todos Santos*, who informed us, that we were thirty four leagues from Cape St. *Thomas*, and forty leagues from Cape *Frio*, which laſt bore from us W. S. W. By our accounts we were near eighty leagues from Cape *Frio*; and though, on the information of this Brigantine, we altered our courſe, and ſtood more to the ſouthward, yet by our coming in with the land afterwards, we were fully convinced that our reckoning was much correcter than our *Portugueſe* intelligence. We found a conſiderable current ſetting to the ſouthward, after we had paſſed the latitude of 16° S. And the ſame took place all along the coaſt of *Brazil*, and even to the ſouthward of the river of *Plate*, it amounting ſometimes to thirty miles in twenty-four hours, and once to above forty miles.

If this current is occaſioned (as it is moſt probable) by the running off of the water, accumulated on the coaſt of *Brazil* by the conſtant ſweeping of the eaſtern trade-wind over the *Ethiopic* Ocean,

Ocean, then it is moſt natural to ſuppoſe, that its general courſe is determined by the bearings of the adjacent ſhore. Perhaps too, in almoſt every other inſtance of currents, the ſame may hold true, as I believe no examples occur of conſiderable currents being obſerved at any great diſtance from land. If this then could be laid down for a general principle, it would be always eaſy to correct the reckoning by the obſerved latitude. But it were much to be wiſhed, for the general intereſts of navigation, that the actual ſettings of the different currents which are known to take place in various parts of the world, were examined more frequently and accurately than hitherto appears to have been done.

We now began to grow impatient for a ſight of land, both for the recovery of our ſick, and for the refreſhment and ſecurity of thoſe who as yet continued healthy. When we departed from St. *Helens*, we were in ſo good a condition, that we loſt but two men on board the *Centurion*, in our long paſſage to *Madera*. But in this preſent run between *Madera* and St. *Catherine's*, we were remarkably ſickly, ſo that many died, and great numbers were confined to their hammocks, both in our own ſhip, and in the reſt of the ſquadron, and ſeveral of theſe paſt all hopes of recovery. The diſorders they in general laboured under were ſuch as are common to the hot climates, and what moſt ſhips bound to the ſouthward experience in a greater or leſs degree. Theſe are thoſe kind of fevers, which they uſually call Calentures: A diſeaſe, which was not only terrible in its firſt inſtance, but even the remains of it often proved fatal to thoſe who conſidered themſelves as recovered from it. For it always left them in a very weak and helpleſs condition, and uſually afflicted either with fluxes or teneſmus's. By our continuance at ſea all theſe complaints were every day increaſing, ſo that it was with great joy we diſcovered the coaſt of *Brazil* on the 18th of *December*, at ſeven in the morning.

The coaſt of *Brazil* appeared high and mountainous land, extending from the W. to W. S. W, and when we firſt ſaw it, it was

about feventeen leagues diftant. At noon we perceived a low double land, bearing W. S. W. about ten leagues diftant, which we took to be the Ifland of St. *Catherine's*. That afternoon and the next morning, the wind being N. N. W, we gained very little to windward, and were apprehenfive of being driven to the leeward of the Ifland; but a little before noon, the next day, the wind came about to the fouthward, and enabled us to fteer in between the North point of St. *Catherine's*, and the neighbouring Ifland of *Alvoredo*. As we ftood in for the land, we had regular foundings gradually decreafing, from thirty-fix to twelve fathom, all muddy ground. In this laft depth of water we let go our anchor at five o'clock in the evening of the 18th, the North Weft point of the Ifland of St. *Catherine's* bearing S. S. W, diftant three miles; and the Ifland *Alvoredo* N.N.E, diftant two leagues. Here we found the tide to fet S.S.E. and N. N. W, at the rate of two knots, the tide of flood coming from the fouthward. We could from our fhips obferve two fortifications at a confiderable diftance within us, which feemed defigned to prevent the paffage of an enemy between the Ifland of St. *Catherine's* and the main. And we could foon perceive that our fquadron had alarmed the coaft, for we faw the two forts hoift their colours, and fire feveral guns, which we fuppofed were fignals for affembling the inhabitants. To prevent any confufion, the Commodore immediately fent a boat with an officer on fhore, to compliment the Governor, and to defire a Pilot to carry us into the road. The Governor returned a very civil anfwer, and ordered us a Pilot. On the morning of the 20th we weighed and ftood in, and towards noon the Pilot came on board us, who, the fame afternoon, brought us to an anchor in five fathom and an half, in a large commodious bay on the continent fide, called by the *French*, *Bon Port*. In ftanding from our laft anchorage to this place, we every where found an ouzy bottom, with a depth of water firft regularly decreafing to five fathom, and then increafing to feven, after which we had fix and five fathom alternately. The next morning

ing we weighed again with the ſquadron, in order to run above the two fortifications we have mentioned, which are called the caſtles of *Santa Cruiz*, and St. *Juan*. Our ſoundings now between the Iſland and the Main, were four, five and ſix fathom, with muddy ground. As we paſſed by the caſtle of *Santa Cruiz* we ſaluted it with eleven guns, and were anſwered by an equal number; and at one in the afternoon, the ſquadron came to an anchor in five fathom and a half, the Governor's Iſland bearing N. N. W, St. *Juan's* Caſtle N.E. ½ E, and the Iſland of St. *Antonio* South. In this poſition we moored at the Iſland of St. *Catherine's* on *Sunday* the 21ſt of *December*, the whole ſquadron being, as I have already mentioned, ſickly, and in great want of refreſhments: Both which inconveniencies we hoped to have ſoon removed at this ſettlement, celebrated by former Navigators for its healthineſs, and the plenty of its proviſions, and for the freedom, indulgence, and friendly aſſiſtance there given to the ſhips of all *European* Nations, in amity with the Crown of *Portugal*.

CHAP. V.

Proceedings at St. *Catherine's*, and a description of the place, with a short account of *Brazil*.

OUR first care, after having moored our ships, was to get our sick men on shore, preparatory to which, each ship was ordered by the Commodore to erect two tents: One of them for the reception of the diseased, and the other for the accommodation of the surgeon and his assistants. We sent about eighty sick from the *Centurion*, and the other ships, I believe, sent nearly as many, in proportion to the number of their hands. As soon as we had performed this necessary duty, we scraped our decks, and gave our ship a thorough cleansing; then smoked it between decks, and after all washed every part well with vinegar. These operations were extremely necessary for correcting the noisome stench on board, and destroying the vermin; for from the number of our men, and the heat of the climate, both these nuisances had increased upon us to a very loathsome degree, and besides being most intolerably offensive, they were doubtless in some sort productive of the sickness we had laboured under for a considerable time, before our arrival at this Island.

Our next employment was wooding and watering our squadron, caulking our ships sides and decks, overhaling our rigging, and securing our masts against the tempestuous weather we were, in all probability, to meet with in our passage round Cape *Horn*, in so advanced and inconvenient a season. But before I engage in the particulars of these transactions, it will not be improper to give some account of the present state of this Island of St. *Catherine's*, and of the neighbouring country; both as the circumstances of this place are now greatly changed from what they were in the time of former writers, and as these changes laid us under many more difficulties

and perplexities than we had reaſon to expect, or than other *Britiſh* ſhips, hereafter bound to the *South-Seas*, may perhaps think it prudent to ſtruggle with.

This Iſland is eſteemed by the natives to be no where above two leagues in breadth, though about nine in length; it lies in 49° : 45′ of Weſt longitude from *London*, and extends from the South latitude of 27° 35′, to that of 28°. Although it be of a conſiderable height, yet it is ſcarce diſcernible at the diſtance of ten leagues, being then obſcured under the continent of *Brazil*, whoſe mountains are exceeding high; but on a nearer approach it is eaſy to be diſtinguiſhed, and may be readily known by a number of ſmall Iſlands lying at each end, and ſcattered along the Eaſt ſide of it. In the annexed plate there is exhibited a very exact view of the N. E. end of the Iſland, where (*a*) is its N. E. point, as it appears when it bears N. W. And (*b*) is the ſmall Iſland of *Alvoredo*, bearing N. N. W, at the diſtance of 7 leagues. The beſt entrance to the harbour is between the point (*a*) and the Iſland of *Alvoredo*, where ſhips may paſs under the guidance of their lead, without the leaſt apprehenſions of danger. The view of this North entrance of the harbour is repreſented in the ſecond plate, where (*a*) is the N. W. end of St. *Catherine's* Iſland, (*b*) *Parrot* Iſland, (*c*) a battery on St. *Catherine's*, and (*d*) a battery on a ſmall Iſland near the continent. *Frezier* has given a draught of this Iſland of St. *Catherine's*, and of the neighbouring coaſt, and the minuter Iſles adjacent; but he has by miſtake called the Iſland of *Alvoredo* the Iſle *de Gal*, whereas the true Iſle *de Gal* lies ſeven or eight miles to the North-weſtward of it, and is much ſmaller. He has alſo called an Iſland, to the ſouthward of St. *Catherine's*, *Alvoredo*, and has omitted the Iſland *Maſaqura*; in other reſpects his plan is ſufficiently exact.

The North entrance of the harbour is in breadth about five miles, and the diſtance from thence to the Iſland of St. *Antonio* is eight miles, and the courſe from the entrance to St. *Antonio* is S. S. W. ½ W. About the middle of the Iſland the harbour is contracted by two points of land to a narrow channel, no more than a quarter of a

mile broad; and to defend this paſſage, a battery was erecting on the point of land on the Iſland ſide. But this ſeems to be a very uſeleſs work, as the channel has no more than two fathom water, and conſequently is navigable only for barks and boats, and therefore ſeems to be a paſſage that an enemy could have no inducement to attempt, eſpecially as the common paſſage at the North end of the Iſland is ſo broad and ſafe, that no ſquadron can be prevented from coming in by any of their fortifications, when the ſea-breeze is made. However, the Brigadier Don *Joſe Sylva de Paz*, the Governor of this ſettlement, is eſteemed an expert Engineer, and he doubtleſs underſtands one branch of his buſineſs very well, which is the advantages which new works bring to thoſe who are entruſted with the care of erecting them: For beſides the battery mentioned above, there are three other forts carrying on for the defence of the harbour, none of which are yet compleated. The firſt of theſe, called St. *Juan*, is built on a point of St. *Catherine's* near *Parrot* Iſland; the ſecond, in form of a half moon, is on the Iſland of St. *Antonio*; and the third, which ſeems to be the chief, and has ſome appearance of a regular fortification, is on an Iſland near the continent, where the Governor reſides.

The ſoil of the Iſland is truly luxuriant, producing fruits of many kinds ſpontaneouſly; and the ground is covered over with one continued foreſt of trees of a perpetual verdure, which from the exuberance of the ſoil, are ſo entangled with briars, thorns, and underwood, as to form a thicket abſolutely impenetrable, except by ſome narrow pathways which the inhabitants have made for their own convenience. Theſe, with a few ſpots cleared for plantations along the ſhore facing the continent, are the only uncovered parts of the Iſland. The woods are extremely fragrant, from the many aromatick trees and ſhrubs with which they abound; and the fruits and vegetables of all climates thrive here, almoſt without culture, and are to be procured in great plenty; ſo that here is no want of pine-apples, peaches, grapes, oranges, lemons, citrons, melons, apricots, nor plantains. There are beſides great abundance of two

other productions of no ſmall conſideration for a ſea-ſtore, I mean onions and potatoes. The fleſh proviſions are however much inferior to the vegetables: There are indeed ſmall wild cattle to be purchaſed, ſomewhat like buffaloes, but theſe are very indifferent food, their fleſh being of a looſe contexture, and generally of a diſagreeable flavour, which is probably owing to the wild calabaſh on which they feed. There are likewiſe great plenty of pheaſants, but they are not to be compared in taſte to thoſe we have in *England*. The other proviſions of the place are monkeys, parrots, and above all fiſh of various ſorts, theſe abound in the harbour, are exceeding good, and are eaſily catched, for there are a great number of ſmall ſandy bays very convenient for haling the *Seyne*.

The water both on the Iſland and the oppoſite continent is excellent, and preſerves at ſea as well as that of the *Thames*. For after it has been in the caſk a day or two it begins to purge itſelf, and ſtinks moſt intolerably, and is ſoon covered over with a green ſcum: But this in a few days ſubſides to the bottom, and leaves the water as clear as chryſtal, and perfectly ſweet. The *French* (who, during their *South-Sea* trade in Queen *Anne*'s reign firſt brought this place into repute) uſually wooded and watered in *Bon Port*, on the continent ſide, where they anchored with great ſafety in ſix fathom water; and this is doubtleſs the moſt commodious road for ſuch ſhips as intend to make only a ſhort ſtay. But we watered on the St. *Catherine's* ſide, at a plantation oppoſite to the Iſland of St. *Antonio*.

Theſe are the advantages of this Iſland of St. *Catherine's*; but there are many inconveniencies attending it, partly from its climate but more from its new regulations, and the late form of government eſtabliſhed there. With regard to the climate, it muſt be remembred, that the woods and hills which ſurround the harbour, prevent a free circulation of the air. And the vigorous vegetation which conſtantly takes place there, furniſhes ſuch a prodigious quantity of vapour, that all the night and a great part of the morning a thick fog covers the whole country, and continues till either the

ſun

ſun gathers ſtrength to diſſipate it, or it is diſperſed by a briſk ſea-breeze. This renders the place cloſe and humid, and probably occaſioned the many fevers and fluxes we were there afflicted with. To theſe exceptions I muſt not omit to add, that all the day we were peſtered with great numbers of muſcatos, which are not much unlike the gnats in *England*, but more venomous in their ſtings. And at ſun-ſet, when the muſcatos retired, they were ſucceeded by an infinity of ſand-flies, which though ſcarce diſcernible to the naked eye, make a mighty buzzing, and wherever they bite raiſe a ſmall bump in the fleſh, which is ſoon attended with a painful itching, like that ariſing from the bite of an *Engliſh* harveſt bug. But as the only light in which this place deſerves our conſideration, is its favourable ſituation for ſupplying and refreſhing our cruizers intended for the *South-Seas*: In this view its greateſt inconveniencies remain ſtill to be related; and to do this more diſtinctly, it will not be amiſs to conſider the changes which it has lately undergone, both in its inhabitants, its police, and its governor.

In the time of *Frezier* and *Shelvocke*, this place ſerved only as a retreat to vagabonds and outlaws, who fled thither from all parts of *Brazil*. They did indeed acknowledge a ſubjection to the Crown of *Portugal*, and had a perſon among them whom they called their Captain, who was conſidered in ſome ſort as their Governor. But both their allegiance to their King, and their obedience to their Captain, ſeemed to be little more than verbal. For as they had plenty of proviſions but no money, they were in a condition to ſupport themſelves without the aſſiſtance of any neighbouring ſettlements, and had not amongſt them the means of tempting any adjacent Governor to buſy his authority about them. In this ſituation they were extremely hoſpitable and friendly to ſuch foreign ſhips as came amongſt them. For theſe ſhips wanting only proviſions, of which the natives had great ſtore; and the natives wanting clothes, (for they often deſpiſed money, and refuſed to take it) which

which the ſhips furniſhed them with in exchange for their proviſions, both ſides found their account in this traffic; and their Captain or Governor had neither power nor intereſt to reſtrain it or to tax it. But of late (for reaſons which ſhall be hereafter mentioned) theſe honeſt vagabonds have been obliged to receive amongſt them a new colony, and to ſubmit to new laws and new forms of government. Inſtead of their former ragged bare legged Captain (whom however they took care to keep innocent) they have now the honour to be governed by Don *Joſe Sylva de Paz*, a Brigadier of the armies of *Portugal*. This Gentleman has with him a garriſon of ſoldiers, and has conſequently a more extenſive and a better ſupported power than any of his predeceſſors, and as he wears better clothes, and lives more ſplendidly, and has beſides a much better knowledge of the importance of money than they could ever pretend to: So he puts in practice certain methods of procuring it, with which they were utterly unacquainted. But it may be much doubted, if the inhabitants conſider theſe methods as tending to promote either their intereſts, or that of their Sovereign the King of *Portugal*. This is certain, that his behaviour cannot but be extremely embarraſſing to ſuch *Britiſh* ſhips as touch there in their way to the *South-Seas*. For one of his practices was placing centinels at all the avenues, to prevent the people from ſelling us any refreſhments, except at ſuch exorbitant rates as we could not afford to give. His pretence for this extraordinary ſtretch of power was, that he was obliged to preſerve their proviſions for upwards of an hundred families, which they daily expected to reinforce their colony. Hence he appears to be no novice in his profeſſion, by his readineſs at inventing a plauſible pretence for his intereſted management. However, this, though ſufficiently provoking, was far from being the moſt exceptionable part of his conduct. For by the neighbourhood of the river *Plate*, a conſiderable ſmuggling traffic is carried on between the *Portugueſe* and the *Spaniards*, eſpecially in the exchanging gold for ſilver, by which both Princes are defrauded of their fifths, and in this prohibited commerce Don *Joſe* was ſo deeply

engaged,

engaged, that in order to ingratiate himſelf with his *Spaniſh* correſpondents (for no other reaſon can be given for his procedure) he treacherouſly diſpatched an expreſs to *Buenos Ayres* in the river of *Plate*, where *Pizarro* then lay, with an account of our arrival, and the ſtrength of our ſquadron; particularly mentioning the number of ſhips, guns and men, and every circumſtance which he could ſuppoſe our enemy deſirous of being acquainted with. And the ſame perfidy every *Britiſh* cruizer may expect, who touches at St. *Catherine's*, while it is under the Government of Don *Joſe Sylva de Paz*.

Thus much, with what we ſhall be neceſſitated to relate in the courſe of our own proceedings, may ſuffice as to the preſent ſtate of St. *Catherine's*, and the character of its Governor. But as the reader may be deſirous of knowing to what cauſes the late new modelling of this ſettlement is owing; to ſatisfy him in this particular, it will be neceſſary to give a ſhort account of the adjacent continent of *Brazil*, and of the wonderful diſcoveries which have been made there within theſe laſt forty years, which, from a country of but mean eſtimation, has rendered it now perhaps the moſt conſiderable colony on the face of the globe.

This country was firſt diſcovered by *Americus Veſputio* a *Florentine*, who had the good fortune to be honoured with giving his name to the immenſe continent, ſome time before found out by *Columbus*. *Veſputio* being in the ſervice of the *Portugueſe*, it was ſettled and planted by that Nation, and with the other dominions of *Portugal*, devolved to the Crown of *Spain*, when that kingdom became ſubject to it. During the long war between *Spain* and the States of *Holland*, the *Dutch* poſſeſſed themſelves of the northermoſt part of *Brazil*, and were maſters of it for ſome years. But when the *Portugueſe* revolted from the *Spaniſh* Government, this country took part in the revolt, and ſoon repoſſeſſed themſelves of the places the *Dutch* had taken; ſince which time it has continued without interruption under the Crown of *Portugal*, being till the beginning of the preſent century, only productive of ſugar and tobacco, and a few other commodities of very little account.

But

But this country, which for many years was only confidered for the produce of its plantations, has been lately difcovered to abound with the two minerals, which mankind hold in the greateft efteem, and which they exert their utmoft art and induftry in acquiring, I mean, gold and diamonds. Gold was firft found in the mountains, which lie adjacent to the city of *Rio Janeiro*. The occafion of its difcovery is varioufly related, but the moft common account is, that the *Indians*, lying on the back of the *Portuguefe* fettlements, were obferved by the foldiers employed in an expedition againft them to make ufe of this metal for their fifh hooks; and their manner of procuring it being enquired into, it appeared that great quantities of it were annually wafhed from the hills, and left amongft the fand and gravel, which remained in the vallies after the running off, or evaporation of the water. It is now little more than forty years fince any quantities of gold worth notice have been imported to *Europe* from *Brazil*; but fince that time the annual imports from thence have been continually augmented by the difcovery of places in other provinces, where it is to be met with as plentifully as at firft about *Rio Janeiro*. And it is now faid, that there is a fmall flender vein of it fpread through all the country, at about twenty-four feet from the furface, but that this vein is too thin and poor to anfwer the expence of digging; however where the rivers or rains have had any courfe for a confiderable time, there gold is always to be collected, the water having feparated the metal from the earth, and depofited it in the fands, thereby faving the expences of digging: So that it is efteemed an infallible gain to be able to divert a ftream from its channel, and to ranfack its bed. From this account of gathering this metal, it fhould follow, that there are properly no gold mines in *Brazil*; and this the Governor of *Rio Grande* (who being at St. *Catherine's*, frequently vifited Mr. *Anfon*) did moft confidently affirm, affuring us, that the gold was all collected either from rivers, or from the beds of torrents after floods. It is indeed afferted, that in the mountains, large rocks are found abounding with this metal; and I myfelf have feen the fragment of one of thefe rocks with a confiderable lump of gold in-

 tangled

tangled in it; but even in this caſe, the workmen break off the rocks, and do not properly mine into them; and the great expence in ſubſiſting among theſe mountains, and afterwards in ſeparating the metal from the ſtone, makes this method of procuring gold to be but rarely put in practice.

The examining the bottoms of rivers, and the gullies of torrents, and the waſhing the gold found therein from the ſand and dirt, with which it is always mixed, are works performed by ſlaves, who are principally Negroes, kept in great numbers by the *Portugueſe* for theſe purpoſes. The regulation of the duty of theſe ſlaves is ſingular: For they are each of them obliged to furniſh their maſter with the eighth part of an ounce of gold *per diem*; and if they are either ſo fortunate or induſtrious as to collect a greater quantity, the ſurplus is conſidered as their own property, and they have the liberty of diſpoſing of it as they think fit. So that it is ſaid ſome Negroes who have accidentally fallen upon rich waſhing places have themſelves purchaſed ſlaves, and have lived afterwards in great ſplendor, their original maſter having no other demand on them than the daily ſupply of the forementioned eighth; which as the *Portugueſe* ounce is ſomewhat lighter than our troy ounce, may amount to about nine ſhillings ſterling.

The quantity of gold thus collected in the *Brazils*, and returned annually to *Liſbon*, may be in ſome degree eſtimated from the amount of the King's fifth. This hath of late been eſteemed one year with another to be one hundred and fifty arroves of 32 *l. Portugueſe* weight each, which at 4 *l*, the troy ounce, makes very near 300,000 *l.* ſterling; and conſequently the capital, of which this is the fifth, is about a million and a half ſterling. It is obvious that the annual return of gold to *Liſbon* cannot be leſs than this, though it be difficult to determine how much it exceeds it; perhaps we may not be very much miſtaken in our conjecture, if we ſuppoſe the gold exchanged for ſilver with the *Spaniards* at *Buenos Ayres*, and what is brought privily to *Europe*, and eſcapes the duty, amounts to near half a million more, which will make the whole annual produce of the *Braſilian* gold near two millions ſterling; a prodi-

gious

gious ſum to be found in a country, which a few years ſince was not known to furniſh a ſingle grain.

I have already mentioned, that beſides gold, this country does likewiſe produce diamonds. The diſcovery of theſe valuable ſtones is much more recent than that of gold, it being as yet ſcarce twenty years ſince the firſt were brought to *Europe*. They are found in the ſame manner as the gold, in the gullies of torrents and beds of rivers, but only in particular places, and not ſo univerſally ſpread through the country. They were often found in waſhing the gold before they were known to be diamonds, and were conſequently thrown away with the ſand and gravel ſeparated from it. And it is very well remembered, that numbers of very large ſtones, which would have made the fortunes of the poſſeſſors, have paſſed unregarded through the hands of thoſe, who now with impatience ſupport the mortifying reflection. However, about twenty years ſince, a perſon acquainted with the appearance of rough diamonds, conceived that theſe pebbles, as they were then eſteemed, were of the ſame kind: But it is ſaid, that there was a conſiderable interval between the firſt ſtarting of this opinion, and the confirmation of it by proper trials and examination, it proving difficult to perſuade the inhabitants, that what they had been long accuſtomed to deſpiſe could be of the importance repreſented by this diſcovery; and I have been informed, that in this interval, a Governor of one of their places procured a good number of theſe ſtones, which he pretended to make uſe of at cards to mark with, inſtead of counters. But it was at laſt confirmed by ſkilful Jewellers in *Europe*, conſulted on this occaſion, that the ſtones thus found in *Brazil* were truly diamonds, many of which were not inferior either in luſtre, or any other quality to thoſe of the *Eaſt-Indies*. On this determination the *Portugueſe*, in the neighbourhood of thoſe places where they had firſt been obſerved, ſet themſelves to ſearch for them with great aſſiduity. And they were not without great hopes of diſcovering conſiderable maſſes of them, as they found large rocks

of chriſtal in many of the mountains, from whence the ſtreams came which waſhed down the diamonds.

But it was ſoon repreſented to the King of *Portugal*, that if ſuch plenty of diamonds ſhould be met with as their ſanguine conjectures ſeemed to indicate, this would ſo debaſe their value, and diminiſh their eſtimation, that beſides ruining all the *Europeans*, who had any quantity of *Indian* diamonds in their poſſeſſion, it would render the diſcovery itſelf of no importance, and would prevent his Majeſty from receiving any advantages from it. And on theſe conſiderations his Majeſty has thought proper to reſtrain the general ſearch of diamonds, and has erected a Diamond Company for that purpoſe, with an excluſive charter. This Company, in conſideration of a ſum paid to the King, is veſted with the property of all diamonds found in *Brazil:* But to hinder their collecting too large quantities, and thereby reducing their value, they are prohibited from employing above eight hundred ſlaves in ſearching after them. And to prevent any of his other ſubjects from acting the ſame part, and likewiſe to ſecure the Company from being defrauded by the interfering of interlopers in their trade and property, he has depopulated a large town, and a conſiderable diſtrict round it, and has obliged the inhabitants, who are ſaid to amount to ſix thouſand, to remove to another part of the country; for this town being in the neighbourhood of the diamonds, it was thought impoſſible to prevent ſuch a number of people, who were on the ſpot, from frequently ſmuggling.

In conſequence of theſe important diſcoveries in *Brazil*, new laws, new governments, and new regulations have been eſtabliſhed in many parts of the country. For not long ſince, a conſiderable tract, poſſeſſed by a ſet of inhabitants, who from their principal ſettlement were called *Pauliſts*, was almoſt independent of the Crown of *Portugal*, to which it ſcarcely acknowledged more than a nominal allegiance. Theſe *Pauliſts* are ſaid to be deſcendants of thoſe *Portugueſe*, who retired from the northern part of *Brazil*, when

when it was invaded and poſſeſſed by the *Dutch*. As from the confuſion of the times they were long neglected by their ſuperiors, and were obliged to provide for their own ſecurity and defence, the neceſſity of their affairs produced a kind of government amongſt them, which they found ſufficient for the confined manner of life to which they were inured. And being thus habituated to their own regulations, they at length grew fond of their independency: So that rejecting and deſpiſing the mandates of the court of *Liſbon*, they were often engaged in a ſtate of downright rebellion: And the mountains ſurrounding their country, and the difficulty of clearing the few paſſages that open into it, generally put it in their power to make their own terms before they ſubmitted. But as gold was found to abound in this country of the *Pauliſts*, the preſent King of *Portugal* (during whoſe reign almoſt the whole diſcoveries I have mentioned were begun and compleated) thought it incumbent on him to reduce this province, which now became of great conſequence, to the ſame dependency and obedience with the reſt of the country, which I am told, he has at laſt, though with great difficulty, happily effected. And the ſame motives which induced his Majeſty to undertake the reduction of the *Pauliſts*, has alſo occaſioned the changes I have mentioned, to have taken place at the Iſland of St. *Catherine's*. For the Governor of *Rio Grande*, of whom I have already ſpoken, aſſured us, that in the neighbourhood of this Iſland there were conſiderable rivers which were found to be extremely rich, and that this was the reaſon that a garriſon, a military Governor, and a new colony was ſettled there. And as the harbour at this Iſland is by much the ſecureſt and the moſt capacious of any on the coaſt, it is not improbable, if the riches of the neighbourhood anſwer their expectation, but it may become in time the principal ſettlement in *Brazil*, and the moſt conſiderable port in all South *America*.

Thus much I have thought neceſſary to inſert, in relation to the preſent ſtate of *Brazil*, and of the Iſland of St. *Catherine's*. For as this laſt place has been generally recommended as the moſt eligible port for our cruizers to refreſh at, which are bound to the *South-*

Seas, I believed it to be my duty to inſtruct my countrymen in the hitherto unſuſpected inconveniencies which attend that place. And as the *Braſilian* gold and diamonds are ſubjects, about which, from their novelty, very few particulars have been hitherto publiſhed, I conceived this account I had collected of them, would appear to the reader to be neither a trifling nor a uſeleſs digreſſion. Theſe ſubjects being thus diſpatched, I ſhall now return to the ſeries of our own proceedings.

When we firſt arrived at St. *Catherine's*, we were employed in refreſhing our ſick on ſhore, in wooding and watering the ſquadron, cleanſing our ſhips, and examining and ſecuring our maſts and rigging, as I have already obſerved in the foregoing chapter. At the ſame time Mr. *Anſon* gave directions, that the ſhips companies ſhould be ſupplied with freſh meat, and that they ſhould be victualled with whole allowance of all the kinds of proviſions. In conſequence of theſe orders, we had freſh beef ſent on board us continually for our daily expence, and what was wanting to make up our allowance we received from our Victualler the *Anna Pink*, in order to preſerve the proviſions on board our ſquadron entire for our future ſervice. The ſeaſon of the year growing each day leſs favourable for our paſſage round Cape *Horn*, Mr. *Anſon* was very deſirous of leaving this place as ſoon as poſſible; and we were at firſt in hopes that our whole buſineſs would be done, and we ſhould be in a readineſs to ſail in about a fortnight from our arrival; but on examining the *Tryal's* maſts, we to our no ſmall vexation, found inevitable employment for twice that time. For, on a ſurvey, it was found that the main-maſt was ſprung at the upper woulding, though it was thought capable of being ſecured by a couple of fiſhes; but the fore-maſt was reported to be unfit for ſervice, and thereupon the Carpenters were ſent into the woods, to endeavour to find a ſtick proper for a fore-maſt. But after a ſearch of four days, they returned without having been able to meet with any tree fit for the purpoſe. This obliged them to come to a ſecond conſultation about the old fore-maſt, when it was agreed to endeavour to ſecure it by caſing it with three fiſhes: And in this work the

Carpenters were employed till within a day or two of our ſailing. In the mean time, the Commodore thinking it neceſſary to have a clean veſſel on our arrival in the *South-Seas*, ordered the *Tryal* to be hove down, as this would not occaſion any loſs of time, but might be compleated while the Carpenters were refitting her maſts, which was done on ſhore.

On the 27th of *December* we diſcovered a ſail in the offing, and not knowing but ſhe might be a *Spaniard*, the eighteen oared-boat was manned and armed, and ſent under the command of our ſecond Lieutenant, to examine her before ſhe arrived within the protection of the forts. She proved to be a *Portugueſe* Brigantine from *Rio Grande*. And though our Officer, as it appeared on inquiry, had behaved with the utmoſt civility to the Maſter, and had refuſed to accept a calf, which the maſter would have forced on him as a preſent: Yet the Governor took great offence at our ſending our boat; and talked of it in a high ſtrain, as a violation of the peace ſubſiſting between the Crowns of *Great-Britain* and *Portugal*. We at firſt imputed this ridiculous bluſtering to no deeper a cauſe, than Don *Joſe*'s inſolence; but as we found he proceeded ſo far as to charge our Officer with behaving rudely, and opening letters, and particularly with an attempt to take out of the veſſel, by violence, the very calf which we knew he had refuſed to receive as a preſent, (a circumſtance which we were ſatisfied the Governor was well acquainted with) we had hence reaſon to ſuſpect, that he purpoſely ſought this quarrel, and had more important motives for engaging in it, than the mere captious biaſs of his temper. What theſe motives were, it was not ſo eaſy for us to determine at that time; but as we afterwards found by letters which fell into our hands in the *South-Seas*, that he had diſpatched an expreſs to *Buenos Ayres*, where *Pizarro* then lay, with an account of our ſquadron's arrival at St. *Catherine's*, together with the moſt ample and circumſtantial intelligence of our force and condition, we thence conjectured that Don *Joſe* had raiſed this groundleſs clamour, only to prevent our viſiting the Brigantine when ſhe ſhould

put

put to ſea again, leſt we might there find proofs of his perfidious behaviour, and perhaps at the ſame time diſcover the ſecret of his ſmuggling correſpondence with his neighbouring Governors, and the *Spaniards* at *Buenos Ayres*. But to proceed,

It was near a month before the *Tryal* was refitted; for not only her lower maſts were defective, as hath been already mentioned, but her main top-maſt and fore-yard were likewiſe decayed and rotten. While this work was carrying on, the other ſhips of the ſquadron fixed new ſtanding rigging, and ſet up a ſufficient number of preventer ſhrouds to each maſt, to ſecure them in the moſt effectual manner. And in order to render the ſhips ſtiffer, and to enable them to carry more ſail abroad, and to prevent their ſtraining their upper works in hard gales of wind, each Captain had orders given him to ſtrike down ſome of their great guns into the hold. Theſe precautions being complied with, and each ſhip having taken in as much wood and water as there was room for, the *Tryal* was at laſt compleated, and the whole ſquadron was ready for the ſea: On which the tents on ſhore were ſtruck, and all the ſick were received on board. And here we had a melancholy proof how much the healthineſs of this place had been over-rated by former writers, for we found that though the *Centurion* alone had buried no leſs than twenty-eight men ſince our arrival, yet, the number of her ſick was in the ſame interval increaſed from eighty to ninety-ſix. When our crews were embarked, and every thing was prepared for our departure, the Commodore made a ſignal for all Captains, and delivered them their orders, containing the ſucceſſive places of rendezvous from hence to the coaſt of *Chili*. And then, on the next day, being the 18th of *January*, the ſignal was made for weighing, and the ſquadron put to ſea, leaving without regret this Iſland of St. *Catherine's*; where we had been ſo extremely diſappointed in our refreſhments, in our accommodations, and in the humane and friendly offices which we had been taught to expect in a place, which hath been ſo much celebrated for its hoſpitality, freedom, and conveniency.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The run from St. *Catherine's* to port St. *Julian*, with ſome account of that port, and of the country to the ſouthward of the river of *Plate*.

IN leaving St. *Catherine's*, we left the laſt amicable port we propoſed to touch at, and were now proceeding to an hoſtile, or at beſt, a deſart and inhoſpitable coaſt. And as we were to expect a more boiſterous climate to the ſouthward than any we had yet experienced, not only our danger of ſeparation would by this means be much greater than it had been hitherto, but other accidents of a more miſchievous nature were likewiſe to be apprehended, and as much as poſſible to be provided againſt. Mr. *Anſon*, therefore in appointing the various ſtations at which the ſhips of the ſquadron were to rendezvous, had conſidered, that it was poſſible his own ſhip might be diſabled from getting round Cape *Horn*, or might be loſt, and had given proper directions, that even in that caſe the expedition ſhould not be abandoned. For the orders delivered to the Captains, the day before we ſailed from St. *Catherine's*, were, that in caſe of ſeparation, which they were with the utmoſt care to endeavour to avoid, the firſt place of rendezvous ſhould be the bay of port St. *Julian*; deſcribing the place from Sir *John Narborough*'s account of it: There they were to ſupply themſelves with as much ſalt as they could take in, both for their own uſe, and for the uſe of the ſquadron; and if, after a ſtay of ten days, they were not joined by the Commodore, they were then to proceed through *Streights Le Maire* round Cape *Horn*, into the *South-Seas*, where the next place of rendezvous was to be the Iſland of *Noſtra Senora del Socoro*, in the latitude of 45° South, and longitude from the *Lizard* 71° : 12′ Weſt. They were to bring

this Iſland to bear E. N. E, and to cruize from five to twelve leagues diſtance from it, as long as their ſtore of wood and water would permit, both which they were to expend with the utmoſt frugality. And when they were under an abſolute neceſſity of a freſh ſupply, they were to ſtand in, and endeavour to find out an anchoring place; and in caſe they could not, and the weather made it dangerous to ſupply their ſhips by ſtanding off and on, they were then to make the beſt of their way to the Iſland of *Juan Fernandes*, in the latitude of 33°: 37′ South. At this Iſland, as ſoon as they had recruited their wood and water, they were to continue cruizing off the anchoring place for fifty-ſix days; in which time, if they were not joined by the Commodore, they might conclude that ſome accident had befallen him, and they were forthwith to put themſelves under the command of the ſenior Officer, who was to uſe his utmoſt endeavours to annoy the enemy both by ſea and land. With theſe views their new Commodore was to continue in thoſe ſeas as long as his proviſions laſted, or as long as they were recruited by what he ſhould take from the enemy, reſerving only a ſufficient quantity to carry him and the ſhips under his command to *Macao*, at the entrance of the river of *Canton* on the coaſt of *China*, where having ſupplied himſelf with a new ſtock of proviſions, he was thence, without delay, to make the beſt of his way to *England*. And as it was found impoſſible as yet to unload our Victualler the *Anna Pink*, the Commodore gave the Maſter of her the ſame rendezvous, and the ſame orders to put himſelf under the command of the remaining ſenior Officer.

Under theſe orders the ſquadron ſailed from St. *Catherine's* on *Sunday* the 18th of *January*, as hath been already mentioned in the preceding chapter. The next day we had very ſqually weather, attended with rain, lightning and thunder, but it ſoon became fair again with light breezes, and continued thus till *Wedneſday* evening, when it blew freſh again; and encreaſing all night, by eight the next morning it became a moſt violent ſtorm, and we had with it ſo thick a fog, that it was impoſſible to ſee at the diſtance

of

of two ſhips length, ſo that the whole ſquadron diſappeared. On this, a ſignal was made, by firing guns, to bring too with the larboard tacks, the wind being then due Eaſt. We ourſelves immediately handed the top-ſails, bunted the main-ſail, and lay too under a reefed mizen till noon, when the fog diſperſed, and we ſoon diſcovered all the ſhips of the ſquadron, except the *Pearl*, who did not join us till near a month afterwards. Indeed the *Tryal* Sloop was a great way to leeward, having loſt her main-maſt in the ſquall, and having been obliged, for fear of bilging, to cut away the raft. We therefore bore down with the ſquadron to her relief, and the *Glouceſter* was ordered to take her in tow; for the weather did not entirely abate till the day after, and even then, a great ſwell continued from the eaſtward, in conſequence of the preceding ſtorm.

After this accident we ſtood to the ſouthward with little interruption, and here we experienced the ſame ſetting of the current, which we had obſerved before our arrival at St. *Catherine's*; that is, we generally found ourſelves to the ſouthward of our reckoning, by about twenty miles each day. This deviation, with a little inequality, laſted till we had paſſed the latitude of the river of *Plate*; and even then, we diſcovered that the ſame current, however difficult to be accounted for, did yet undoubtedly take place; for we were not ſatisfied in deducing it from the error in our reckoning, but we actually tried it more than once, when a calm made it practicable.

As ſoon as we had paſſed the latitude of the river of *Plate*, we had ſoundings which continued all along the coaſt of *Patagonia*. Theſe ſoundings, when well aſcertained, being of great uſe in determining the poſition of the ſhip, and we having tried them more frequently, and in greater depths, and with more attention, than I believe hath been done before us; I ſhall recite our obſervations as ſuccinctly as I can, referring to the chart hereafter inſerted in the ninth chapter of this book, for a general view of the whole. In the latitude of 36° : 52', we had ſixty fathom of water, with a bottom of fine black and grey ſand; from thence to 39° : 55', we varied our depths from fifty to eighty fathom, though we had conſtantly the ſame bottom as before: between

the laſt mentioned latitude, and 43° : 16′, we had only fine grey ſand, with the ſame variation of depths, except that we once or twice leſſened our water to forty fathom. After this, we continued in forty fathom for about half a degree, having a bottom of coarſe ſand and broken ſhells, at which time we were in ſight of land, and not above ſeven leagues from it: As we edged from the land we met with variety of ſoundings; firſt black ſand, then muddy, and ſoon after rough ground with ſtones; but when we had encreaſed our water to forty-eight fathom, we had a muddy bottom to the latitude of 46° : 10′. Hence drawing towards the ſhore, we had firſt thirty-ſix fathom, and ſtill kept ſhoaling our water, till at length we came into twelve fathom, having conſtantly ſmall ſtones and pebbles at the bottom. Part of this time we had a view of Cape *Blanco*, which lies in about the latitude of 47° : 10′, and longitude Weſt from *London* 69°. This is the moſt remarkable land upon the coaſt: Two very exact views of it are exhibited in the annexed plate, where *(b)* repreſents the Cape itſelf; theſe draughts will fully enable future Voyagers to diſtinguiſh it. Steering from hence S. by E. nearly, we, in a run of about thirty leagues deepned our water to fifty fathom, without once altering the bottom; and then drawing towards the ſhore with a S. W. courſe, varying rather to the weſtward, we had conſtantly a ſandy bottom, till our coming into thirty fathom, where we had again a ſight of land diſtant from us, about eight leagues, lying in the latitude of 48° : 31′. We made this land on the 17th of *February*, and at five that afternoon, we came to an anchor having the ſame ſoundings as before, in the latitude of 48° : 58′, the ſouthermoſt land then in view bearing S. S. W, the northermoſt N. ½ E, a ſmall Iſland N. W, and the weſtermoſt hummock W. S. W. In this ſtation we found the tide to ſet S. by W; and weighing again at five the next morning, we, an hour afterwards, diſcovered a ſail, upon which the *Severn* and *Glouceſter* were both directed to give chace; but we ſoon perceived it to be the *Pearl*, which ſeparated from us a few days after we left St. *Catherine's*, and on this we made a ſignal for the *Severn* to rejoin the ſquadron,

leaving the *Gloucester* alone in the purſuit. And now we were ſurprized to ſee that on the *Gloucester*'s approach, the people on board the *Pearl* increaſed their ſail, and ſtood from her. However, the *Gloucester* came up with them, but found them with their hammocks in their nettings, and every thing ready for an engagement. At two in the afternoon the *Pearl* joined us, and running up under our ſtern, Lieutenant *Salt* haled the Commodore, and acquainted him that Captain *Kidd* died on the 31ſt of *January*. He likewiſe informed us, that he had ſeen five large ſhips the 10th inſtant, which he for ſome time imagined to be our ſquadron: So that he ſuffered the commanding ſhip, which wore a red broad pendant, exactly reſembling that of the Commodore, at the main top maſt head, to come within gun-ſhot of him before he diſcovered his miſtake; but then finding it not to be the *Centurion*, he haled cloſe upon the wind, and crowded from them with all his ſail, and ſtanding croſs a ripling, where they heſitated to follow him, he happily eſcaped. He made them to be five *Spaniſh* men of war, one of them exceedingly like the *Gloucester*, which was the occaſion of his apprehenſions when the *Gloucester* chaſed him. By their appearance he thought they conſiſted of two ſhips of ſeventy guns, two of fifty, and one of forty guns. It ſeems the whole ſquadron continued in chace of him all that day, but at night findiny they could not get near him, they gave over the chace, and directed their courſe to the ſouthward.

Had it not been for the neceſſity we were under of refitting the *Tryal*, this piece of intelligence would have prevented our making any ſtay at St. *Julian's*; but as it was impoſſible for that ſloop to proceed round the Cape in her preſent condition, ſome ſtay there was inevitable, and therefore the ſame evening we came to an anchor again in twenty-five fathom water, the bottom a mixture of mud and ſand, and the high hummock bearing S. W. by W. And weighing at nine in the morning, we ſent the two Cutters belonging to the *Centurion* and *Severn* in ſhore, to diſcover the harbour of St. *Julian*, while the ſhips kept ſtanding along the

coaſt

coaſt, about the diſtance of a league from the land. At ſix o'clock we anchored in the bay of St. *Julian*, in nineteen fathom, the bottom muddy ground with ſand, the northermoſt land in ſight bearing N. and by E, the ſouthermoſt S. ½ E, and the high hummock, to which Sir *John Narborough* formerly gave the name of *Wood*'s *Mount*, W. S. W. Soon after, the Cutter returned on board having diſcovered the harbour, which did not appear to us in our ſituation, the northermoſt point ſhutting in upon the ſouthermoſt, and in appearance cloſing the entrance. To facilitate the knowledge of this coaſt to future Navigators, there are two views annexed; the firſt of the land of *Patagonia*, to the northward of port St. *Julian*, where *(w)* is *Wood*'s *Mount*, and the bay of St. *Julian* lies round the point *(c)*. The ſecond view is of the bay itſelf; and here again *(w)* is *Wood*'s *Mount*, *(a)* is cape St. *Julian*, and *(b)* the port or river's mouth.

Being come to an anchor in this bay of St. *Julian*, principally with a view of refitting the *Tryal*, the Carpenters were immediately employed in that buſineſs, and continued ſo during our whole ſtay at the place. The *Tryal*'s main-maſt having been carried away about twelve feet below the cap, they contrived to make the remaining part of the maſt ſerve again; and the *Wager* was ordered to ſupply her with a ſpare main top-maſt, which the Carpenters converted into a new fore-maſt. And I cannot help obſerving, that this accident to the *Tryal*'s maſt, which gave us ſo much uneaſineſs at that time, on account of the delay it occaſioned, was, in all probability, the means of preſerving the ſloop, and all her crew. For before this, her maſts, how well ſoever proportioned to a better climate, were much too lofty for theſe high ſouthern latitudes: So that, had they weathered the preceding ſtorm, it would have been impoſſible for them to have ſtood againſt thoſe ſeas and tempeſts we afterwards encountered in paſſing round Cape *Horn*, and the loſs of maſts in that boiſterous climate, would ſcarcely have been attended with leſs than the loſs of the veſſel, and of every man on board her; ſince it would have been impracticable for the other ſhips to have

given

given them any relief, during the continuance of thoſe impetuous ſtorms.

Whilſt we ſtayed at this place, the Commodore appointed the Honourable Captain *Murray* to ſucceed to the *Pearl*, and Captain *Cheap* to the *Wager*, and he promoted Mr. *Charles Saunders*, his firſt Lieutenant, to the command of the *Tryal* Sloop: But Captain *Saunders* lying dangerouſly ill of a fever on board the *Centurion*, and it being the opinion of the Surgeons, that the removing him on board his own ſhip, in his preſent condition, might tend to the hazard of his life; Mr. *Anſon* gave an order to Mr. *Saumarez*, firſt Lieutenant of the *Centurion*, to act as Maſter and Commander of the *Tryal*, during the Illneſs of Captain *Saunders*.

Here the Commodore too, in order to eaſe the expedition of all unneceſſary expence, held a farther conſultation with his Captains about unloading and diſcharging the *Anna Pink*; but they repreſented to him, that they were ſo far from being in a condition of taking any part of her loading on board, that they had ſtill great quantities of proviſions in the way of their guns between decks, and that their ſhips were withal ſo very deep, that they were not fit for action without being cleared. This put the Commodore under a neceſſity of retaining the *Pink* in the ſervice; and as it was apprehended we ſhould certainly meet with the *Spaniſh* ſquadron, in paſſing the Cape, Mr. *Anſon* thought it adviſeable to give orders to the Captains, to put all their proviſions, which were in the way of their guns, on board the *Anna Pink*, and to remount ſuch of their guns as had formerly, for the eaſe of their ſhips, been ordered into the hold.

This bay of St. *Julian*, where we are now at anchor, being a convenient rendezvous, in caſe of ſeparation, for all cruizers bound to the ſouthward, and the whole coaſt of *Patagonia*, from the river of *Plate* to the Streights of *Magellan*, lying nearly parallel to their uſual route, a ſhort account of the ſingularity of this country, with a particular deſcription of port St. *Julian*, may perhaps be neither unacceptable to the curious, nor unworthy the attention of future

Navigators,

Navigators, as ſome of them, by unforeſeen accidents, may be obliged to run in with the land, and to make ſome ſtay on this coaſt, in which caſe the knowledge of the country, its produce and inhabitants, cannot but be of the utmoſt conſequence to them.

To begin then with the tract of country uſually ſtiled *Patagonia*. This is the name often given to the ſouthermoſt part of South *America*, which is unpoſſeſſed by the *Spaniards*, extending from their ſettlements to the Streights of *Magellan*. This country, on the eaſt ſide, is extremely remarkable, for a peculiarity not to be paralleled in any other known part of the globe; for though the whole territory to the northward of the river of *Plate* is full of wood, and ſtored with an immenſe quantity of large timber trees, yet to the ſouthward of the river no trees of any kind are to be met with, except a few peach-trees, firſt planted and cultivated by the *Spaniards* in the neighbourhood of *Buenos Ayres*: So that on the whole eaſtern coaſt of *Patagonia*, extending near four hundred leagues in length, and reaching as far back as any diſcoveries have yet been made, no other wood has been found than a few inſignificant ſhrubs. Sir *John Narborough* in particular, who was ſent out, by King *Charles* the ſecond, expreſsly to examine this country, and the Streights of *Magellan*, and who, in purſuance of his orders, wintered upon this coaſt in port St. *Julian* and port *Deſire*, in the year 1670; Sir *John Narborough*, I ſay, tells us, that he never ſaw a ſtick of wood in the country, large enough to make the handle of an hatchet.

But though the country be ſo deſtitute of wood, it abounds with paſture. For the land appears in general to be made up of downs of a light dry gravelly ſoil, and produces great quantities of long coarſe graſs, which grows in tufts interſperſed with large barren ſpots of gravel between them. This graſs, in many places, feeds immenſe herds of cattle: For the *Spaniards* at *Buenos Ayres*, having, ſoon after their firſt ſettling there, brought over a few black cattle from *Europe*, they have thriven prodigiouſly by the plenty of herbage which they every where met with, and are now increaſed to that degree, and are extended

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ſo far into different parts of *Patagonia* that they are not conſidered as private property; but many thouſands at a time are ſlaughtered every year by the Hunters, only for their hides and tallow. The manner of killing theſe cattle, being a practice peculiar to that part of the world merits a more circumſtantial deſcription. The Hunters employed on this occaſion being all of them mounted on horſeback, (and both the *Spaniards* and *Indians* in that part of the world, are uſually moſt excellent horſemen) they arm themſelves with a kind of a ſpear, which, at its end, inſtead of a blade fixed in the ſame line with the wood, in the uſual manner, has its blade fixed acroſs; with this inſtrument they ride at a beaſt, and ſurround him; when the Hunter that comes behind him hamſtrings him: And as after this operation the beaſt ſoon tumbles, without being able to raiſe himſelf again, they leave him on the ground, and purſue others, whom they ſerve in the ſame manner. Sometimes there is a ſecond party, who attend the Hunters, to ſkin the cattle as they fall: But it is ſaid, that at other times the Hunters chuſe to let them languiſh in torment till the next day, from an opinion that the anguiſh, which the animal in the mean time endures, may burſt the lymphaticks, and thereby facilitate the ſeparation of the ſkin from the carcaſs: And though their Prieſts have loudly condemned this moſt barbarous practice, and have gone ſo far, if my memory does not fail me, as to excommunicate thoſe who follow it, yet all their efforts to put an entire ſtop to it have hitherto proved ineffectual.

Beſides the numbers of cattle which are every year ſlaughtered for their hides and tallow, in the manner already deſcribed, it is often neceſſary for the uſes of agriculture, and for other purpoſes to take them alive, without wounding them: This is performed with a moſt wonderful and almoſt incredible dexterity, and principally by the uſe of a machine, which the *Engliſh*, who have reſided at *Buenos Ayres*, generally denominated a laſh. It is made of a thong of ſeveral fathoms in length, and very ſtrong, with a running nooſe at one end of it: This the Hunters (who in this caſe are alſo mounted on horſeback) take in their right hands, it being

 firſt

firſt properly coiled up, and having its end oppoſite to the nooſe faſtened to the ſaddle; and thus prepared they ride at a herd of cattle. When they arrive within a certain diſtance of a beaſt, they throw their thong at him with ſuch exactneſs, that they never fail of fixing the nooſe about his horns. The beaſt, when he finds himſelf entangled, generally runs, but the horſe, being ſwifter, attends him, and prevents the thong from being too much ſtrained, till a ſecond Hunter, who follows the game, throws another nooſe about one of its hind legs; and this being done, both horſes (for they are trained to this practice) inſtantly turn different ways, in order to ſtrain the two thongs in contrary directions, on which the beaſt, by their oppoſite pulls, is preſently overthrown, and then the horſes ſtop, keeping the thongs ſtill upon the ſtretch: Being thus on the ground, and incapable of reſiſtance, (for he is extended between the two horſes) the Hunters alight, and ſecure him in ſuch a manner, that they afterwards eaſily convey him to whatever place they pleaſe. They in like manner nooſe horſes, and, as it is ſaid, even tygers; and however ſtrange this laſt circumſtance may appear, there are not wanting perſons of credit who aſſert it. Indeed, it muſt be owned, that the addreſs both of the *Spaniards* and *Indians* in that part of the world, in the uſe of this laſh or nooſe, and the certainty with which they throw it, and fix it on any intended part of the beaſt at a conſiderable diſtance, are matters only to be believed, from the repeated and concurrent teſtimony of all who have frequented that country, and might reaſonably be queſtioned, did it rely on a ſingle report, or had it ever been contradicted or denied by any one who had reſided at *Buenos Ayres*.

The cattle which are killed in the manner I have already obſerved, are ſlaughtered only for their hides and tallow, to which ſometimes are added their tongues, but the reſt of their fleſh is left to putrify, or to be devoured by the birds and wild beaſts. The greateſt part of this carion falls to the ſhare of the wild dogs, of which there are immenſe numbers to be found in that country. Theſe are ſuppoſed to have been originally produced by *Spaniſh*

dogs

dogs from *Buenos Ayres*, who, allured by the great quantity of carion, and the facility they had by that means of ſubſiſting, left their Maſters, and ran wild amongſt the cattle; for they are plainly of the breed of the *European* dogs, an animal not originally found in *America*. But though theſe dogs are ſaid to be ſome thouſands in a company, they hitherto neither diminiſh nor prevent the increaſe of the cattle, not daring to attack the herds, by reaſon of the numbers which conſtantly feed together; but contenting themſelves with the carion left them by the Hunters, and perhaps now and then with a few ſtragglers, who, by accident, are ſeparated from the main body they belong to.

Beſides the wild cattle which have ſpread themſelves in ſuch vaſt herds from *Buenos Ayres* towards the ſouthward, the ſame country is in like manner furniſhed with horſes. Theſe too were firſt brought from *Spain*, and are alſo prodigiouſly encreaſed, and run wild to a much greater diſtance than the black cattle: And though many of them are excellent, yet their number makes them of very little value; the beſt of them being often ſold, in the neighbouring ſettlements, where money is plenty and commodities very dear, for not more than a dollar a-piece. It is not as yet certain how far to the ſouthward theſe herds of wild cattle and horſes have extended themſelves; but there is ſome reaſon to conjecture, that ſtragglers of both kinds are to be met with very near the Streights of *Magellan*; and they will in time doubtleſs fill all the ſouthern part of the Continent with their breed, which cannot fail of proving of conſiderable advantage to ſuch ſhips as may touch upon the coaſt; for the horſes themſelves are ſaid to be very good eating, and as ſuch, are preferred by ſome of the *Indians* even before the black cattle. But whatever plenty of fleſh proviſions may be hereafter found here, there is one material refreſhment which this eaſtern ſide of *Patagonia* ſeems to be very defective in, and that is freſh water; for the land being generally of a nitrous and ſaline nature, the ponds and ſtreams are frequently brackiſh. However, as good water has been found there, though

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in ſmall quantities, it is not improbable, but on a further ſearch, this inconvenience may be removed.

To the account already given, I muſt add, that there are in all parts of this country a good number of *Vicunnas* or *Peruvian* ſheep; but theſe. by reaſon of their ſhyneſs and ſwiftneſs, are killed with difficulty. On the eaſtern coaſt too, there are found immenſe quantities of ſeals, and a vaſt variety of ſea-fowl, amongſt which the moſt remarkable are the *Penguins*; they are in ſize and ſhape like a gooſe, but inſtead of wings they have ſhort ſtumps like fins, which are of no uſe to them, except in the water; their bills are narrow, like that of an *Albitroſs*, and they ſtand and walk in an erect poſture. From this, and their white bellies, Sir *John Narborough* has whimſically likened them to little children ſtanding up in white aprons.

The inhabitants of this eaſtern coaſt (to which I have all along hitherto confined my relation) appear to be but few, and have rarely been ſeen more than two or three at a time, by any ſhips that have touched here. We, during our ſtay at the port of St. *Julian*, ſaw none. However, towards *Buenos Ayres* they are ſufficiently numerous, and oftentimes very troubleſome to the *Spaniards*; but there the greater breadth and variety of the country, and a milder climate, yield them a better protection; for in that place the Continent is between three and four hundred leagues in breadth, whereas at port St. *Julian* it is little more than an hundred: So that I conceive the ſame *Indians* who frequent the weſtern coaſt of *Patagonia* and the Streights of *Magellan*, often ramble to this ſide. As the *Indians* near *Buenos Ayres* exceed the ſouthern *Indians* in numbers, ſo they greatly ſurpaſs them in activity and ſpirit, and ſeem in their manners to be nearly allied to thoſe gallant *Chilian Indians*, who have long ſet the whole *Spaniſh* power at defiance, have often ravaged their country, and remain to this hour independent. For the *Indians* about *Buenos Ayres* have learnt to be excellent horſemen, and are extremely expert in the management of all cutting weapons, though ignorant of the uſe of fire-arms, which

the *Spaniards* are very ſolicitous to keep out of their hands. And of the vigour and reſolution of theſe *Indians*, the behaviour of *Orellana* and his followers, whom we have formerly mentioned, is a memorable inſtance. Indeed were we diſpoſed to aim at the utter ſubverſion of the *Spaniſh* power in *America*, no means ſeem more probable to effect it, than due encouragement and aſſiſtance given to theſe *Indians* and thoſe of *Chili*.

Thus much may ſuffice in relation to the eaſtern coaſt of *Patagonia*. The weſtern coaſt is of leſs extent; and by reaſon of the *Andes* which ſkirt it, and ſtretch quite down to the water, is a very rocky and dangerous ſhore. However, I ſhall be hereafter neceſſitated to make further mention of it, and therefore ſhall not enlarge thereon at this time, but ſhall conclude this account with a ſhort deſcription of the harbour of St. *Julian*, the general form of which may be conceived from the annexed ſketch. But it muſt be remembered, that the bar, which is there marked at the entrance, is often ſhifting, and has many holes in it. The tide flows here N. and S, and at full and change, riſes four fathom.

We, on our firſt arrival here, ſent an Officer on ſhore to the ſalt-pond, marked (D) in the plan, in order to procure a quantity of ſalt for the uſe of the ſquadron, Sir *John Narborough* having obſerved, when he was here, that the ſalt produced in that place was very white and good, and that in *February* there was enough of it to fill a thouſand ſhips; but our Officer returned with a ſample which was very bad, and he told us, that even of this there was but little to be got; I ſuppoſe the weather had been more rainy than ordinary, and had deſtroyed it. To give the reader a better idea of this port, and of the adjacent country, to which the whole coaſt I have deſcribed bears a great reſemblance, I have inſerted two very accurate views, one of them repreſenting the appearance of the country, when looking up the river; the other, being a view taken from the ſame ſpot, but the obſerver is now ſuppoſed to turn round oppoſite to his former ſituation, and conſequently this is the repreſentation of the appearance of the country down the river, betwixt the ſtation of the obſerver, and the river's mouth.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Departure from the bay of St. *Julian*, and the paſſage from thence to Streights *Le Maire*.

THE *Tryal* being nearly refitted, which was our principal occupation at this bay of St. *Julian*, and the ſole occaſion of our ſtay, the Commodore thought it neceſſary, as we were now directly bound for the *South-Seas* and the enemy's coaſts, to fix the plan of his firſt operations: And therefore, on the 24th of *February*, a ſignal was made for all Captains, and a Council of war was held on board the *Centurion*, at which were preſent the Honourable *Edward Legg*, Captain *Matthew Mitchell*, the Honourable *George Murray*, Captain *David Cheap*, together with Colonel *Mordaunt Cracherode*, Commander of the land-forces. At this Council Mr. *Anſon* propoſed, that their firſt attempt, after their arrival in the *South-Seas*, ſhould be the attack of the town and harbour of *Baldivia*, the principal frontier of the diſtrict of *Chili*; Mr. *Anſon* informing them, at the ſame time, that it was an article contained in his Majeſty's inſtructions to him, to endeavour to ſecure ſome port in the *South-Seas*, where the ſhips of the ſquadron might be careened and refitted. To this propoſition made by the Commodore, the Council unanimouſly and readily agreed; and in conſequence of this reſolution, new inſtructions were given to the Captains of the ſquadron, by which, though they were ſtill directed, in caſe of ſeparation, to make the beſt of their way to the Iſland of *Nueſtra Senoro del Socoro*, yet (notwithſtanding the orders they had formerly given them at St. *Catherine's*) they were to cruize off that Iſland only ten days; from whence, if not joined by the Commodore, they were to proceed, and cruize off the harbour of *Baldivia*, making the land between the latitudes of 40°, and 40°: 30', and taking care to keep to the ſouthward of the port; and, if in

in fourteen days they were not joined by the reſt of the ſquadron, they were then to quit this ſtation, and to direct their courſe to the Iſland of *Juan Fernandes*, after which they were to regulate their further proceedings by their former orders. The ſame directions were alſo given to the Maſter of the *Anna Pink*, who was not to fail in anſwering the ſignals made by any ſhip of the ſquadron, and was to be very careful to deſtroy his papers and orders, if he ſhould be ſo unfortunate, as to fall into the hands of the enemy. And as the ſeparation of the ſquadron might prove of the utmoſt prejudice to his Majeſty's ſervice, each Captain was ordered to give it in charge to the reſpective Officers of the watch, not to keep their ſhip at a greater diſtance from the *Centurion* than two miles, as they would anſwer it at their peril; and if any Captain ſhould find his ſhip beyond the diſtance ſpecified, he was to acquaint the Commodore with the name of the Officer, who had thus neglected his duty.

Theſe neceſſary regulations being eſtabliſhed, and the *Tryal* Sloop compleated, the ſquadron weighed on *Friday* the 27th of *February*, at ſeven in the morning, and ſtood to the ſea; the *Glouceſter* indeed found a difficulty in purchaſing her anchor, and was left a conſiderable way a-ſtern, ſo that in the night we fired ſeveral guns as a ſignal to her Captain to make ſail, but he did not come up to us till the next morning, when we found that they had been obliged to cut their cable, and leave their beſt bower behind them. At ten in the morning, the day after our departure, *Wood's Mount*, the highland over St. *Julian*, bore from us N. by W. diſtant ten leagues, and we had fifty-two fathom of water. And now ſtanding to the ſouthward, we had great expectation of falling in with *Pizarro's* ſquadron; for, during our ſtay at port St. *Julian*, there had generally been hard gales between the W. N. W. and S. W, ſo that we had reaſon to conclude the *Spaniards* had gained no ground upon us in that interval. Indeed it was the proſpect of meeting with them, that had occaſioned our Commodore to be ſo very ſolicitous to prevent the ſeparation of our ſhips: For, had we

been solely intent upon getting round Cape *Horn* in the shortest time, the properest method for this purpose would have been, to have ordered each ship to have made the best of her way to the rendezvous, without waiting for the rest.

From our departure from St. *Julian* to the 4th of *March*, we had little wind, with thick hazy weather, and some rain; and our soundings were generally from forty to fifty fathom, with a bottom of black and grey sand, sometimes intermixed with pebble stones. On the 4th of *March* we were in sight of Cape *Virgin Mary*, and not more than six or seven leagues distant from it: This Cape is the northern boundary of the entrance of the Streights of *Magellan*, it lies in the latitude of 52°: 21′ South, and longitude from *London* 71°: 44′ West, and seems to be a low flat land, ending in a point. And for a direction to such ships as may, by particular reasons, be induced hereafter to pass through those Streights into the *South-Seas*, I have annexed a very accurate draught of its appearance, where *(a)* represents the Cape itself. Off this Cape our depth of water was from thirty-five to forty-eight fathom. The afternoon of this day was very bright and clear, with small breezes of wind, inclinable to a calm, and most of the Captains took the opportunity of this favourable weather to pay a visit to the Commodore; but while they were in company together, they were all greatly alarmed by a sudden flame, which burst out on board the *Gloucester*, and which was succeeded by a cloud of smoak. However, they were soon relieved from their apprehensions, by receiving information, that the blast was occasioned by a spark of fire from the forge lighting on some gunpowder and other combustibles, which an Officer on board was preparing for use, in case we should fall in with the *Spanish* fleet; and that it had been extinguished, without any damage to the ship.

We here found what was constantly verified by all our observations in these high latitudes, that fair weather was always of an exceeding short duration, and that when it was remarkably fine, it was a certain presage of a succeeding storm, for the calms and

ſunſhine of our afternoon ended in a moſt turbulent night, the wind freſhning from the S. W. as the night came on, and encreaſing its violence continually till nine in the morning the next day, when it blew ſo hard, that we were obliged to bring too with the ſquadron, and to continue under a reefed mizen till eleven at night, having in that time from forty-three to fifty-ſeven fathom water, with black ſand and gravel; and by an obſervation we had at noon, we concluded a current had ſet us twelve miles to the ſouthward of our reckoning. Towards midnight, the wind abating, we made ſail again; and ſteering South, we diſcovered in the morning for the firſt time the land, called *Terra del Fuego*, ſtretching from the S. by W, to the S. E. ½ E. This indeed afforded us but a very uncomfortable proſpect, it appearing of a ſtupendous height, covered every where with ſnow. And though the dreariness of this ſcene can be but imperfectly repreſented by any Drawing, yet the annexed plate contains ſo exact a delineation of the form of the country, that it may greatly aſſiſt the reader in framing ſome idea of this uncouth and rugged coaſt. In this Drawing *(a)* is the opening of Streights *Le Maire*, *(b)* Cape St. *Diego*, (1) (2) (3) the three hills, called the three brothers, and (4) *Montegorda*, an highland which lies up in the country, and appears over the three brothers. We ſteered along this ſhore all day, having ſoundings from forty to fifty fathom, with ſtones and gravel. And as we intended to paſs through Streights *Le Maire* next day, we lay too at night, that we might not overſhoot them, and took this opportunity to prepare ourſelves for the tempeſtuous climate we were ſoon to be engaged in; with which view, we employed ourſelves good part of the night in bending an entire new ſuit of ſails to the yards. At four the next morning, being the 7th of *March*, we made ſail, and at eight ſaw the land; and ſoon after we began to open the Streights, at which time Cape St. *James* bore from us E. S. E, Cape St. *Vincent* S. E. ½ E, the middlemoſt of the three brothers S. and by W, *Montegorda* South, and Cape St. *Bartholomew*, which is the ſouthermoſt point of *Staten-land*, E. S. E.

The appearance of the Streights in this ſituation, is repreſented in the annexed plate, where *(a)* is part of *Staten-land*, *(b)* Cape St. *Bartholomew*, *(c)* part of *Terra del Fuego*, *(d)* port *Maurice*, and *(e)* ſuppoſed to be *Valentine*'s bay, or the bay of good ſucceſs. And here I muſt obſerve, that though *Frezier* has given us a very correct proſpect of the part of *Terra del Fuego*, which borders on the Streights, yet he has omitted that of *Staten-land*, which forms the oppoſite ſhore: Hence we found it difficult to determine exactly where the Streights lay, till they began to open to our view; and for want of this, if we had not happened to have coaſted a conſiderable way along ſhore, we might have miſſed the Streights, and have got to the eaſtward of *Staten-land* before we knew it. This is an accident that has happened to many ſhips, particularly as *Frezier* mentions, to the *Incarnation* and *Concord*; who intending to paſs through Streights *Le Maire*, were deceived by three hills on *Staten-land* like the three brothers, and ſome creeks reſembling thoſe of *Terra del Fuego*, and thereby over-ſhot the Streights. To prevent theſe accidents for the future, there is inſerted the Weſt proſpect of *Staten-land*, where *(a)* is Cape St. *Diego*, on *Terra del Fuego*, *(b)* Cape St. *Bartholomew*, on *Staten-land*. This Drawing will hereafter render it impoſſible for any ſhips to be deceived in the manner abovementioned, or to find any difficulty in diſtinguiſhing the points of land by which the Streights are formed.

And on occaſion of this proſpect of *Staten-land* here inſerted, I cannot but remark, that though *Terra del Fuego* had an aſpect extremely barren and deſolate, yet this Iſland of *Staten-land* far ſurpaſſes it, in the wildneſs and horror of its appearance: It ſeeming to be entirely compoſed of inacceſſible rocks, without the leaſt mixture of earth or mold between them. Theſe rocks terminate in a vaſt number of ragged points, which ſpire up to a prodigious height, and are all of them covered with everlaſting ſnow; the points themſelves are on every ſide ſurrounded with frightful precipices, and often overhang in a moſt aſtoniſhing manner; and the hills which bear them, are generally ſeparated from each other by

narrow

narrow clefts, which appear as if the country had been frequently rent by earthquakes; for these chasms are nearly perpendicular, and extend through the substance of the main rocks, almost to their very bottoms: So that nothing can be imagined more savage and gloomy, than the whole aspect of this coast. But to proceed:

I have above mentioned, that on the 7th of *March*, in the morning, we opened Streights *Le Maire*, and soon after, or about ten o'clock, the *Pearl* and the *Tryal* being ordered to keep a-head of the squadron, we entered them with fair weather and a brisk gale, and were hurried through by the rapidity of the tide in about two hours, though they are between seven and eight leagues in length. As these Streights are often esteemed to be the boundary between the *Atlantick* and *Pacifick* Oceans, and as we presumed we had nothing before us from hence but an open sea, till we arrived on those opulent coasts where all our hopes and wishes centered, we could not help perswading ourselves, that the greatest difficulty of our voyage was now at an end, and that our most sanguine dreams were upon the point of being realised; and hence we indulged our imaginations in those romantick schemes which the fancied possession of the *Chilian* gold and *Peruvian* silver might be conceived to inspire. These joyous ideas were considerably heightened by the brightness of the sky and serenity of the weather, which was indeed most remarkably pleasing; for though the winter was now advancing apace, yet the morning of this day, in its brilliancy and mildness, gave place to none we had seen since our departure from *England*. Thus animated by these flattering delusions, we passed those memorable Streights, ignorant of the dreadful calamities which were then impending, and just ready to break upon us; ignorant that the time drew near, when the squadron would be separated never to unite again, and that this day of our passage was the last chearful day that the greatest part of us would ever live to enjoy.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

From Streights *Le Maire* to Cape *Noir*.

WE had ſcarcely reached the ſouthern extremity of the Streights of *Le Maire*, when our flattering hopes were inſtantly loſt in the apprehenſions of immediate deſtruction: For before the ſternmoſt ſhips of the ſquadron were clear of the Streights, the ſerenity of the ſky was ſuddenly obſcured, and we obſerved all the preſages of an impending ſtorm; and preſently the wind ſhifted to the ſouthward, and blew in ſuch violent ſqualls, that we were obliged to hand our top-ſails, and reef our main-ſail; whilſt the tide too, which had hitherto favoured us, at once turned furiouſly againſt us, and drove us to the eaſtward with prodigious rapidity, ſo that we were in great anxiety for the *Wager* and the *Anna Pink*, the two ſternmoſt veſſels, fearing they would be daſhed to pieces againſt the ſhore of *Staten-land*: Nor were our apprehenſions without foundation, for it was with the utmoſt difficulty they eſcaped. And now the whole ſquadron, inſtead of purſuing their intended courſe to the S. W. were driven to the eaſtward by the united force of the ſtorm, and of the currents; ſo that next day in the morning we found ourſelves near ſeven leagues to the eaſtward of Streights *Le Maire*, which then bore from us N. W. The violence of the current, which had ſet us with ſo much precipitation to the eaſtward, together with the fierceneſs and conſtancy of the weſterly winds, ſoon taught us to conſider the doubling of Cape *Horn* as an enterprize, that might prove too mighty for our efforts, though ſome amongſt us had lately treated the difficulties which former voyagers were ſaid to have met with in this undertaking, as little better than chimerical, and had ſuppoſed them to ariſe rather from timidity and unſkilfulneſs, than from the real embarraſments of the winds and

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ſeas: But we were now ſeverely convinced, that theſe cenſures were raſh and ill-grounded: For the diſtreſſes with which we ſtruggled, during the three ſucceeding months, will not eaſily be paralleled in the relation of any former naval expedition. This will, I doubt not, be readily allowed by thoſe who ſhall carefully peruſe the enſuing narration.

From the ſtorm which came on before we had well got clear of Streights *Le Maire*, we had a continual ſucceſſion of ſuch tempeſtuous weather, as ſurprized the oldeſt and moſt experienced Mariners on board, and obliged them to confeſs, that what they had hitherto called ſtorms were inconſiderable gales, compared with the violence of theſe winds, which raiſed ſuch ſhort, and at the ſame time ſuch mountainous waves, as greatly ſurpaſſed in danger all ſeas known in any other part of the globe: And it was not without great reaſon, that this unuſual appearance filled us with continual terror; for, had any one of theſe waves broke fairly over us, it muſt, in all probability, have ſent us to the bottom. Nor did we eſcape with terror only; for the ſhip rolling inceſſantly gunwale too, gave us ſuch quick and violent motions, that the men were in perpetual danger of being daſhed to pieces againſt the decks, or ſides of the ſhip. And though we were extremely careful to ſecure ourſelves from theſe ſhocks, by graſping ſome fixed body, yet many of our people were forced from their hold; ſome of whom were killed, and others greatly injured; in particular, one of our beſt ſeamen was canted over-board and drowned, another diſlocated his neck, a third was thrown into the main-hold and broke his thigh, and one of our Boatſwain's Mates broke his collar-bone twice; not to mention many other accidents of the ſame kind. Theſe tempeſts, ſo dreadful in themſelves, though unattended by any other unfavourable circumſtance, were yet rendered more miſchievous to us by their inequality, and the deceitful intervals which they at ſome-times afforded; for though we were oftentimes obliged to lie too for days together under a reefed mizen, and were frequently reduced to lie at the mercy of the waves under our bare poles, yet

now

now and then we ventured to make ſail with our courſes double reefed; and the weather proving more tolerable, would perhaps encourage us to ſet our top-ſails; after which, the wind, without any previous notice, would return upon us with redoubled force, and would in an inſtant tear our ſails from the yards. And that no circumſtance might be wanting which could aggrandize our diſtreſs, theſe blaſts generally brought with them a great quantity of ſnow and ſleet, which caſed our rigging, and froze our ſails, thereby rendring them and our cordage brittle, and apt to ſnap upon the ſlighteſt ſtrain, adding great difficulty and labour to the working of the ſhip, benumbing the limbs of our people, and making them incapable of exerting themſelves with their uſual activity, and even diſabling many of them, by mortifying their toes and fingers. It were indeed endleſs to enumerate the various diſaſters of different kinds which befel us; and I ſhall only mention the moſt material, which will ſufficiently evince the calamitous condition of the whole ſquadron, during the courſe of this navigation.

It was on the 7th of *March*, as hath been already obſerved, that we paſſed Streights *Le Maire*, and were immediately afterwards driven to the eaſtward by a violent ſtorm, and the force of the current which ſet that way. For the four or five ſucceeding days we had hard gales of wind from the ſame quarter, with a moſt prodigious ſwell; ſo that though we ſtood, during all that time, towards the S. W, yet we had no reaſon to imagine, we had made any way to the weſtward. In this interval we had frequent ſqualls of rain and ſnow, and ſhipped great quantities of water; after which, for three or four days, though the ſeas ran mountains high, yet the weather was rather more moderate: But, on the 18th, we had again ſtrong gales of wind with extreme cold, and at midnight the main top-ſail ſplit, and one of the ſtraps of the main dead eyes broke. From hence, to the 23d, the weather was more favourable, though often intermixed with rain and ſleet, and ſome hard gales; but as the waves did not ſubſide, the ſhip, by labouring in this lofty ſea, was now grown ſo looſe in her upper works, that ſhe let in the

water at every ſeam, ſo that every part within board was conſtantly expoſed to the ſea-water, and ſcarcely any of the Officers ever lay in dry beds. Indeed it was very rare, that two nights ever paſſed without many of them being driven from their beds, by the deluge of water that came in upon them.

On the 23d, we had a moſt violent ſtorm of wind, hail, and rain, with a very great ſea; and though we handed the main top-ſail before the height of the ſquall, yet we found the yard ſprung; and ſoon after the foot-rope of the main-ſail breaking, the main-ſail itſelf ſplit inſtantly to rags, and, in ſpite of our endeavours to ſave it, much the greater part of it was blown over-board. On this, the Commodore made the ſignal for the ſquadron to bring too; and the ſtorm at length flattening to a calm, we had an opportunity of getting down our main top-ſail yard to put the Carpenters to work upon it, and of repairing our rigging; after which, having bent a new main-ſail, we got under ſail again with a moderate breeze; but in leſs than twenty-four hours we were attacked by another ſtorm, ſtill more furious than the former; for it proved a perfect hurricane, and reduced us to the neceſſity of lying too under our bare poles. As our ſhip kept the wind better than any of the reſt, we were obliged in the afternoon, to wear ſhip, in order to join the ſquadron to the leeward, which otherwiſe we ſhould have been in danger of loſing in the night: And as we dared not venture any ſail abroad, we were obliged to make uſe of an expedient, which anſwered our purpoſe; this was putting the helm a weather, and manning the fore-ſhrouds: But though this method proved ſucceſsful for the end intended, yet in the execution of it, one of our ableſt ſeamen was canted over-board; we perceived that notwithſtanding the prodigious agitation of the waves, he ſwam very ſtrong, and it was with the utmoſt concern that we found ourſelves incapable of aſſiſting him; indeed we were the more grieved at his unhappy fate, as we loſt ſight of him ſtruggling with the waves, and conceived from the manner in which he ſwam, that he might

continue

continue ſenſible for a conſiderable time longer, of the horror attending his irretrievable ſituation.

Before this laſt mentioned ſtorm was quite abated, we found two of our main-ſhrouds and one mizen-ſhroud broke, all which we knotted, and ſet up immediately. From hence we had an interval of three or four days leſs tempeſtuous than uſual, but accompanied with a thick fog, in which we were obliged to fire guns almoſt every half hour, to keep our ſquadron together. On the 31ſt, we were alarmed by a gun fired from the *Glouceſter*, and a ſignal made by her to ſpeak with the Commodore; we immediately bore down to her, and were prepared to hear of ſome terrible diſaſter; but we were apprized of it before we joined her, for we ſaw that her main-yard was broke in the ſlings. This was a grievous misfortune to us all at this juncture; as it was obvious it would prove an hindrance to our ſailing, and would detain us the longer in theſe inhoſpitable latitudes. But our future ſucceſs and ſafety was not to be promoted by repining, but by reſolution and activity; and therefore, that this unhappy incident might delay us as little as poſſible, the Commodore ordered ſeveral Carpenters to be put on board the *Glouceſter* from the other ſhips of the ſquadron, in order to repair her damage with the utmoſt expedition. And the Captain of the *Tryal*, complaining at the ſame time, that his pumps were ſo bad, and the ſloop made ſo great a quantity of water, that he was ſcarcely able to keep her free, the Commodore ordered him a pump ready fitted from his own ſhip. It was very fortunate for the *Glouceſter* and the *Tryal*, that the weather proved more favourable this day than for many days, both before and after; ſince by this means they were enabled to receive the aſſiſtance which ſeemed eſſential to their preſervation, and which they could ſcarcely have had at any other time, as it would have been extremely hazardous to have ventured a boat on board.

The next day, that is, on the 1ſt of *April*, the weather returned again to its cuſtomary bias, the ſky looked dark and gloomy,

and

and the wind began to freſhen and to blow in ſqualls; however, it was not yet ſo boiſterous, as to prevent our carrying our top-ſails cloſe reefed; but its appearance was ſuch, as plainly prognoſticated that a ſtill ſeverer tempeſt was at hand: And accordingly, on the 3d of *April*, there came on a ſtorm, which both in its violence and continuation (for it laſted three days) exceeded all that we had hitherto encountered. In its firſt onſet we received a furious ſhock from a ſea which broke upon our larboard quarter, where it ſtove in the quarter gallery, and ruſhed into the ſhip like a deluge; our rigging too ſuffered extremely from the blow; amongſt the reſt one of the ſtraps of the main dead-eyes was broke, as was alſo a main-ſhroud and puttock-ſhroud, ſo that to eaſe the ſtreſs upon the maſts and ſhrouds, we lowered both our main and fore-yards, and furled all our ſails, and in this poſture we lay too for three days, when the ſtorm ſomewhat abating, we ventured to make ſail under our courſes only; but even this we could not do long, for, the next day, which was the 7th, we had another hard gale of wind, with lightning and rain, which obliged us to lie too again all night. It was wonderful, that notwithſtanding the hard weather we had endured, no extraordinary accident had happened to any of the ſquadron ſince the breaking of the *Glouceſter*'s main-yard: But this good fortune now no longer attended us; for at three the next morning, ſeveral guns were fired to leeward as ſignals of diſtreſs: And the Commodore making a ſignal for the ſquadron to bring too, we, at day-break, ſaw the *Wager* a conſiderable way to leeward of any of the other ſhips; and we ſoon perceived that ſhe had loſt her mizen-maſt, and main top-ſail yard. We immediately bore down to her, and found this diſaſter had ariſen from the badneſs of her iron work; for all the chain-plates to windward had given way, upon the ſhip's fetching a deep roll. This proved the more unfortunate to the *Wager*, as her Carpenter had been on board the *Glouceſter* ever ſince the 31ſt of *March*, and the weather was now too ſevere to permit him to return: Nor was the *Wager* the only ſhip of the ſquadron that ſuffered in this tempeſt; for, the next day, a ſignal of diſtreſs was made by the *Anna*

Pink, and, upon ſpeaking with the Maſter, we learnt that they had broke their fore-ſtay and the gammon of the bowſprit, and were in no ſmall danger of having all their maſts come by the board; ſo that we were obliged to bear away until they had made all faſt, after which we haled upon a wind again.

And now, after all our ſolicitude, and the numerous ills of every kind, to which we had been inceſſantly expoſed for near forty days, we had great conſolation in the flattering hopes we entertained, that our fatigues were drawing to a period, and that we ſhould ſoon arrive in a more hoſpitable climate, where we ſhould be amply repayed for all our paſt ſufferings. For, towards the latter end of *March*, we were advanced, by our reckoning, near 10° to the weſtward of the weſtermoſt point of *Terra del Fuego*, and this allowance being double what former Navigators have thought neceſſary to be taken, in order to compenſate the drift of the weſtern current, we eſteemed ourſelves to be well advanced within the limits of the ſouthern Ocean, and had therefore been ever ſince ſtanding to the northward with as much expedition, as the turbulence of the weather, and our frequent diſaſters permitted. And, on the 13th of *April*, we were but a degree in latitude to the ſouthward of the Weſt entrance of the Streights of *Magellan*; ſo that we fully expected, in a very few days, to have experienced the celebrated tranquillity of the *Pacifick* Ocean.

But theſe were deluſions which only ſerved to render our diſappointment more terrible; for the next morning, between one and two, as we were ſtanding to the northward, and the weather, which had till then been hazy, accidentally cleared up, the *Pink* made a ſignal for ſeeing land right a-head; and it being but two miles diſtant, we were all under the moſt dreadful apprehenſions of running on ſhore; which, had either the wind blown from its uſual quarter with its wonted vigour, or had not the moon ſuddenly ſhone out, not a ſhip amongſt us could poſſibly have avoided: But the wind, which ſome few hours before blew in ſqualls from the S. W, having fortunately ſhifted to W. N. W, we were enabled

to ſtand to the ſouthward, and to clear ourſelves of this unexpected danger; and were fortunate enough by noon to have gained an offing of near twenty leagues.

By the latitude of this land we fell in with, it was agreed to be a part of *Terra del Fuego*, near the ſouthern outlet deſcribed in *Frezier*'s Chart of the Streights of *Magellan*, and was ſuppoſed to be that point called by him Cape *Noir*. It was indeed moſt wonderful, that the currents ſhould have driven us to the eaſtward with ſuch ſtrength; for the whole ſquadron eſteemed themſelves upwards of ten degrees more weſterly than this land, ſo that in running down, by our account, about nineteen degrees of longitude, we had not really advanced half that diſtance. And now, inſtead of having our labours and anxieties relieved by approaching a warmer climate and more tranquil ſeas, we were to ſteer again to the ſouthward, and were again to combat thoſe weſtern blaſts, which had ſo often terrified us; and this too, when we were greatly enfeebled by our men falling ſick, and dying apace, and when our ſpirits, dejected by a long continuance at ſea, and by our late diſappointment, were much leſs capable of ſupporting us in the various difficulties, which we could not but expect in this new undertaking. Add to all this too, the diſcouragement we received by the diminution of the ſtrength of the ſquadron; for three days before this, we loſt ſight of the *Severn* and the *Pearl* in the morning; and though we ſpread our ſhips, and beat about for them ſome time, yet we never ſaw them more; whence we had apprehenſions that they too might have fallen in with this land in the night, and by being leſs favoured by the wind and the moon than we were, might have run on ſhore and have periſhed. Full of theſe deſponding thoughts and gloomy preſages, we ſtood away to the S. W, prepared by our late diſaſter to ſuſpect, that how large ſoever an allowance we made in our weſting for the drift of the weſtern current, we might ſtill, upon a ſecond trial, perhaps find it inſufficient.

CHAP. IX.

Observations and directions for facilitating the paſſage of our future Cruiſers round Cape *Horn*.

THE improper ſeaſon of the year in which we attempted to double Cape *Horn*, and to which is to be imputed the diſappointment (recited in the foregoing chapter) of falling in with *Terra del Fuego*, when we reckoned ourſelves above a hundred leagues to the weſtward of that whole coaſt, and conſequently well advanced into the *Pacifick* Ocean ; this unſeaſonable navigation, I ſay, to which we were neceſſitated by our too late departure from *England*, was the fatal ſource of all the misfortunes we afterwards encountered. For from hence proceeded the ſeparation of our ſhips, the deſtruction of our people, the ruin of our project on *Baldivia*, and of all our other views on the *Spaniſh* places, and the reduction of our ſquadron from the formidable condition in which it paſſed Streights *Le Maire*, to a couple of ſhattered half manned cruiſers and a ſloop, ſo far diſabled, that in many climates they ſcarcely durſt have put to ſea. To prevent therefore, as much as in me lies, all ſhips hereafter bound to the *South-Seas* from ſuffering the ſame calamities, I think it my duty to inſert in this place ſuch directions and obſervations, as either my own experience and reflection, or the converſation of the moſt ſkilful Navigators on board the ſquadron could furniſh me with, in relation to the moſt eligible manner of doubling Cape *Horn*, whether in regard to the ſeaſon of the year, the courſe proper to be ſteered, or the places of refreſhment both on the Eaſt and Weſt-ſide of *South America*.

And firſt with regard to the proper place for refreſhment on the Eaſt-ſide of *South-America*. For this purpoſe the Iſland of St. *Catherine's* has been uſually recommended by former writers, and on

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their faith we put in there, as has been formerly mentioned: But the treatment we met with, and the ſmall ſtore of refreſhments we could procure there, are ſufficient reaſons to render all ſhips for the future cautious, how they truſt themſelves in the government of Don *Joſe Sylva de Paz*; for they may certainly depend on having their ſtrength, condition and deſigns betrayed to the *Spaniards*, as far as the knowledge, the Governor can procure of theſe partiulars, will give him leave. And as this treacherous conduct is inſpired by the views of private gain, in the illicit commerce carried on to the river of *Plate*, rather than by any national affection which the *Portugueſe* bear the *Spaniards*, the ſame perfidy may perhaps be expected from moſt of the Governors of the *Brazil* coaſt; ſince theſe ſmuggling engagements are doubtleſs very extenſive and general. And though the Governors ſhould themſelves deteſt ſo faithleſs a procedure, yet as ſhips are perpetually paſſing from ſome or other of the *Brazil* ports to the river of *Plate*, the *Spaniards* could ſcarcely fail of receiving, by this means, caſual intelligence of any *Britiſh* ſhips upon the coaſt; which, however imperfect ſuch intelligence might be, would prove of dangerous import to the views and intereſts of thoſe cruiſers who were thus diſcovered.

For the *Spaniſh* trade in the *South-Seas* running all in one track from North to South, with very little deviation to the eaſtward or weſtward, it is in the power of two or three cruiſers, properly ſtationed in different parts of this track, to poſſeſs themſelves of every ſhip that puts to ſea: But this is only ſo long as they can continue concealed from the neighbouring coaſt; for the inſtant an enemy is known to be in thoſe ſeas, all navigation is prohibited, and conſequently all captures are at an end; ſince the *Spaniards*, well apprized of theſe advantages of the enemy, ſend expreſſes along the coaſt, and lay a general embargo on all their trade; a meaſure which they prudentially foreſee, will not only prevent their veſſels being taken, but will ſoon lay any cruiſers, who have not ſtrength ſufficient to attempt their places, under a neceſſity of returning home. Hence then appears the great importance of concealing all

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expeditions of this kind; and hence too it follows, how extremely prejudicial that intelligence may prove, which is given by the *Portuguese* Governors to the *Spaniards*, in relation to the designs of ships touching at the ports of *Brazil*.

' However, notwithstanding the inconveniencies we have mentioned of touching on the coast of *Brazil*, it will oftentimes happen, that ships bound round Cape *Horn* will be obliged to call there for a supply of wood and water, and other refreshments. In this case St. *Catherine's* is the last place I would recommend, both as the proper animals for a live stock at sea, as hogs, sheep and fowls cannot be procured there, (for want of which we found ourselves greatly distressed, by being reduced to live almost entirely on salt provisions) and also because from its being nearer the river of *Plate* than many of their other settlements, the inducements and conveniencies of betraying us are much stronger. The place I would recommend is *Rio Janeiro*, where two of our squadron put in after they were separated from us in passing Cape *Horn*; for here, as I have been informed by one of the Gentlemen on board those ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry may be procured, and this place being more distant from the river of *Plate*, the difficulty of intelligence is somewhat inhanced, and consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered, in some degree augmented. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these embarrassments, shall be considered more at large hereafter.

I next proceed to the consideration of the proper course to be steered for doubling Cape *Horn*. And here, I think, I am sufficiently authorized by our own fatal experience, and by a careful comparison and examination of the journals of former Navigators, to give this piece of advice, which in prudence I think ought never to be departed from: That is, that all ships bound to the *South-Seas*, instead of passing through Streights *Le Maire*, should constantly pass to the eastward of *Staten-land*, and should be invariably bent on running to the southward, as far as the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before they endeavour to stand to the westward; and that when they are

are got into that latitude, they ſhould then make ſure of ſufficient weſting, before they once think of ſteering to the northward.

But as directions diametrically oppoſite to theſe have been formerly given by other writers, it is incumbent on me to produce my reaſons for each part of this maxim. And firſt, as to the paſſing to the eaſtward of *Staten-land*. Thoſe who have attended to the riſque we ran in paſſing Streights *Le Maire*, the danger we were in of being driven upon *Staten-land* by the current, when though we happily eſcaped being put ſhore, we were yet carried to the eaſtward of that Iſland: Thoſe who reflect on this, and on the like accidents which have happened to other ſhips, will ſurely not eſteem it prudent to paſs through Streights *Le Maire*, and run the riſque of ſhipwreck, and after all find themſelves no farther to the weſtward (the only reaſon hitherto given for this practice) than they might have been in the ſame time, by a ſecure navigation in an open ſea.

And next, as to the directions I have given for running into the latitude of 61 or 62 South, before any endeavour is made to ſtand to the weſtward: The reaſons for this precept are, that in all probability the violence of the currents will be hereby avoided, and the weather will prove leſs tempeſtuous and uncertain. This laſt circumſtance we ourſelves experienced moſt remarkably; for after we had unexpectedly fallen in with the land, as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, we ſtood away to the ſouthward to run clear of it, and were no ſooner advanced into ſixty degrees or upwards, but we met with much better weather, and ſmoother water than in any other part of the whole paſſage: The air indeed was very cold and ſharp, and we had ſtrong gales, but they were ſteady and uniform, and we had at the ſame time ſunſhine and a clear ſky; whereas in the lower latitudes, the winds every now and then intermitted, as it were, to recover new ſtrength, and then returned ſuddenly in the moſt violent guſts, threatening at each blaſt the loſs of our maſts, which muſt have ended in our certain deſtruction. And that the currents in this high latitude would be of much leſs

efficacy

efficacy than nearer the land, ſeems to be evinced from theſe conſiderations, that all currents run with greater violence near the ſhore than at ſea, and that at great diſtances from ſhore they are ſcarcely perceptible: Indeed the reaſon of this ſeems ſufficiently obvious, if we conſider, that conſtant currents are, in all probability, produced by conſtant winds, the wind driving before it, though with a ſlow and imperceptible motion, a large body of water, which being accumulated upon any coaſt that it meets with, muſt eſcape along the ſhore by the endeavours of its ſurface, to reduce itſelf to the ſame level with the reſt of the Ocean. And it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that thoſe violent guſts of wind which we experienced near the ſhore, ſo very different from what we found in the latitude of ſixty degrees and upwards, may be owing to a ſimilar cauſe; for a weſterly wind almoſt perpetually prevails in the ſouthern part of the *Pacifick* Ocean: And this current of air being interrupted by thoſe immenſe hills called the *Andes*, and by the mountains on *Terra del Fuego*, which together bar up the whole country to the ſouthward as far as Cape *Horn*, a part of it only can force its way over the tops of theſe prodigious precipices, whilſt the reſt muſt naturally follow the direction of the coaſt, and muſt range down the land to the ſouthward, and ſweep with an impetuous and irregular blaſt round Cape *Horn*, and the ſouthermoſt part of *Terra del Fuego*. However, not to rely on theſe ſpeculations, we may, I believe, eſtabliſh, as inconteſtible, theſe matters of fact, that both the rapidity of the currents, and the violence of the weſtern gales, are leſs ſenſible in the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, than nearer the ſhore of *Terra del Fuego*.

But though I am ſatisfied both from our own experience, and the relations of other Navigators, of the importance of the precept I here inſiſt on, that of running into the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before any endeavours are made to ſtand to the weſtward; yet I would adviſe no ſhips hereafter to truſt ſo far to this management, as to neglect another moſt eſſential maxim, which is the making this paſſage in the height of ſummer, that is, in the months of *December*

and

and *January*; and the more diſtant the time of paſſing is taken from this ſeaſon, the more diſaſtrous it may be reaſonably expected to prove. Indeed, if the mere violence of the weſtern winds be conſidered, the time of our paſſage, which was about the Equinox, was perhaps the moſt unfavourable of the whole year; but then it muſt be remembered, that independent of the winds there are in the depth of winter many other inconveniencies to be apprehended, which are almoſt inſuperable: For the ſeverity of the cold, and the ſhortneſs of the days, would render it impracticable at that ſeaſon to run ſo far to the ſouthward as is here recommended; and the ſame reaſons would greatly augment the alarms of ſailing in the neighbourhood of an unknown ſhore, dreadful in its appearance in the midſt of ſummer, and would make a winter navigation on this coaſt to be, of all others, the moſt diſmaying and terrible. As I would therefore adviſe all ſhips to make their paſſage in *December* and *January*, if poſſible; ſo I would warn them never to attempt the doubling Cape *Horn*, from the eaſtward, after the month of *March*.

And now as to the remaining conſideration, that is, the propereſt port for cruiſers to refreſh at on their firſt arrival in the *South-Seas*: On this head there is ſcarcely any choice, the Iſland of *Juan Fernandes* being the only place that can be prudently recommended for this purpoſe. For though there are many ports on the weſtern ſide of *Patagonia*, between the Streights of *Magellan* and the *Spaniſh* ſettlements (a plan of one of which I ſhall inſert in the courſe of this work) where ſhips might ride in great ſafety, might recruit their wood and water, and might procure ſome few refreſhments; yet that coaſt is in itſelf ſo dangerous from its numerous rocks and breakers, and from the violence of the weſtern winds, which blow conſtantly full upon it, that it is by no means adviſeable to fall in with that land, at leaſt till the roads, channels and anchorage in each part of it are accurately ſurveyed, and both the perils and ſhelter it abounds with are more diſtinctly known.

Thus having given the beſt directions in my power for the ſucceſs of our cruiſers, who may be hereafter bound to the *South-Seas*; it might be expected that I ſhould again reſume the thread of my narration. Yet as both in the preceding and ſubſequent parts of this work, I have thought it my duty not only to recite all ſuch facts, and to inculcate ſuch maxims as had the leaſt appearance of proving beneficial to future Navigators, but alſo occaſionally to recommend ſuch meaſures to the Public, as I conceive are adapted to promote the ſame laudable purpoſe; I cannot deſiſt from the preſent ſubject, without beſeeching thoſe to whom the conduct of our naval affairs is committed, to endeavour to remove the many perplexities and embarraſſments with which the navigation to the *South-Seas* is, at preſent, neceſſarily encumbered. An effort of this kind could not fail of proving highly honourable to themſelves, and extremely beneficial to their country. For it ſeems to be ſufficiently evident, that whatever improvements navigation ſhall receive, either by the invention of methods that ſhall render its practice leſs hazardous, or by the more accurate delineation of the coaſts, roads and ports already known, or by the diſcovery of new nations, or new ſpecies of commerce; it ſeems, I ſay, ſufficiently evident, that by whatever means navigation is promoted, the conveniencies hence ariſing muſt ultimately redound to the emolument of *Great Britain*. Since as our fleets are at preſent ſuperior to thoſe of the whole world united; it muſt be a matchleſs degree of ſupineneſs or mean-ſpiritedneſs, if we permitted any of the advantages which new diſcoveries, or a more extended navigation may produce to mankind, to be raviſhed from us.

As therefore it appears that all our future expeditions to the *South-Seas* muſt run a conſiderable riſque of proving abortive, whilſt in our paſſage thither, we are under the neceſſity of touching at *Brazil*; the diſcovery of ſome place more to the ſouthward, where ſhips might refreſh and ſupply themſelves with the neceſſary ſea-ſtock for their voyage round *Cape Horn*, would be an expedient which would relieve us from this embarraſſment, and would ſurely be a

matter

matter worthy of the attention of the public. Nor does this ſeem difficult to be effected. For we have already the imperfect knowledge of two places, which might perhaps, on examination, prove extremely convenient for this purpoſe: One of them is *Pepys*'s Iſland, in the latitude of 47° South, and laid down by Dr. *Halley*, about eighty leagues to the eaſtward of Cape *Blanco*, on the coaſt of *Patagonia*; the other is *Falkland*'s Iſles, in the latitude of 51° ½ lying nearly South of *Pepys*'s Iſland. The firſt of theſe was diſcovered by Captain *Cowley*, in his Voyage round the World in the year 1686; who repreſents it as a commodious place for ſhips to wood and water at, and ſays, it is provided with a very good and capacious harbour, where a thouſand ſail of ſhips might ride at anchor in great ſafety; that it abounds with fowls, and that as the ſhore is either rocks or ſands, it ſeems to promiſe great plenty of fiſh. The ſecond place, or *Falkland*'s Iſles, have been ſeen by many ſhips both *French* and *Engliſh*, being the land laid down by *Frezier*, in his Chart of the extremity of South *America*, under the title of the *New Iſlands*. *Woods Rogers*, who run along the N. E. coaſt of theſe Iſles in the year 1708, tells us, that they extended about two degrees in length, and appeared with gentle deſcents from hill to hill, and ſeemed to be good ground, interſperſed with woods, and not deſtitute of harbours. Either of theſe places, as they are Iſlands at a conſiderable diſtance from the Continent, may be ſuppoſed, from their latitude, to lie in a climate ſufficiently temperate. It is true, they are too little known to be at preſent recommended as the moſt eligible places of refreſhment for ſhips bound to the ſouthward: But if the Admiralty ſhould think it adviſeable to order them to be ſurveyed, which may be done at a very ſmall expence, by a veſſel fitted out on purpoſe; and if, on this examination, one or both of theſe places ſhould appear proper for the purpoſe intended, it is ſcarcely to be conceived, of what prodigious import a convenient ſtation might prove, ſituated ſo far to the ſouthward, and ſo near Cape *Horn*. The Duke and Ducheſs of *Briſtol* were but thirty-five days from their loſing ſight of

land's Isles to their arrival at *Juan Fernandes* in the *South-Seas*: And as the returning back is much facilitated by the western winds, I doubt not but a voyage might be made from *Falkland*'s Isles to *Juan Fernandes* and back again, in a little more than two months. This, even in time of peace, might be of great consequence to this Nation; and, in time of war, would make us masters of those seas.

And as all discoveries of this kind, though extremely honourable to those who direct and promote them, may yet be carried on at an inconsiderable expence, since small vessels are much the properest to be employed in this service: It were to be wished, that the whole coast of *Patagonia*, *Terra del Fuego*, and *Staten-land*, were carefully surveyed, and the numerous channels, roads and harbours with which they abound, were accurately examined. This might open to us facilities of passing into the *Pacifick* Ocean, which as yet we may be unacquainted with, and would render all that southern navigation infinitely securer than at present; particularly, an exact draught of the West coast of *Patagonia*, from the Streights of *Magellan* to the *Spanish* settlements, might perhaps furnish us with better and more convenient ports for refreshment, and better situated for the purposes either of war or commerce, and above a fortnight's sail nearer to *Falkland*'s Islands, than the Island of *Juan Fernandes*. The discovery of this coast hath formerly been thought of such consequence, by reason of its neighbourhood to the *Araucos* and other *Chilian Indians*, who are generally at war, or at least on ill terms with their *Spanish* neighbours, that Sir *John Narborough* was purposely fitted out in the reign of King *Charles* II, to survey the Streights of *Magellan*, the neighbouring coast of *Patagonia*, and the *Spanish* ports on that frontier, with directions, if possible, to procure some intercourse with the *Chilian Indians*, and to establish a commerce and a lasting correspondence with them. His Majesty's views in employing Sir *John Narborough* in this expedition, were not solely the advantage he might hope to receive from the alliance of those savages, in restraining and intimidating the Crown of *Spain*; but he conceived, that, independent of those motives, the immediate traffick with these *Indians* might prove ex-

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tremely advantagious to the *English* Nation. For it is well known, that at the first discovery of *Chili* by the *Spaniards*, it abounded with vast quantities of gold, much beyond what it has at any time produced, since it has been in their possession. And hence it has been generally believed, that the richest mines are carefully concealed by the *Indians*, as well knowing that the discovery of them would only excite in the *Spaniards* a greater thirst for conquest and tyranny, and would render their own independence more precarious. But with respect to their commerce with the *English*, these reasons would no longer influence them; since it would be in our power to furnish them with arms and ammunition of all kinds, of which they are extremely desirous, together with many other conveniencies which their intercourse with the *Spaniards* has taught them to relish. They would then, in all probability, open their mines, and gladly embrace a traffick of such mutual convenience to both Nations; for then their gold, instead of proving an incitement to enslave them, would procure them weapons to assert their liberty, to chastise their tyrants, and to secure themselves for ever from the *Spanish* yoke; whilst with our assistance, and under our protection, they might become a considerable people, and might secure to us that wealth, which formerly by the House of *Austria*, and lately by the House of *Bourbon*, has been most mischievously lavished in the pursuit of universal Monarchy.

It is true, Sir *John Narborough* did not succeed in opening this commerce, which in appearance promised so many advantages to this Nation. However, his disappointment was merely accidental, and his transactions upon that coast (besides the many valuable improvements he furnished to geography and navigation), are rather an encoaragement for future trials of this kind, than any objection against them; his principal misfortune being the losing company of a small bark which attended him, and having some of his people trapanned at *Baldivia*. However, it appeared, by the precautions and fear of the *Spaniards*, that they were fully convinced of the practicability of the scheme he was sent to execute, aud extremely

alarmed

alarmed with the apprehenſion of its conſequences. It is ſaid, that his Majeſty King *Charles* the Second was ſo far prepoſſeſſed with the belief of the emoluments which might redound to the public from this expedition, and was ſo eager to be informed of the event of it, that having intelligence of Sir *John Narborough*'s paſſing through the *Downs* on his return, he had not patience to attend his arrival at Court, but went himſelf in his barge to *Graveſend* to meet him.

To facilitate as much as poſſible any attempts of this kind, which may be, hereafter undertaken, I have, in the annexed plate, given a chart of that part of the world, as far as it is hitherto known, which I flatter myſelf is in ſome reſpects much correcter than any which has been yet publiſhed. To evince which, it may be neceſſary to mention what materials I have principally made uſe of, and what changes I have introduced different from other authors.

The two moſt celebrated charts hitherto publiſhed of the ſouthermoſt part of South *America*, are thoſe of Dr. *Halley*, in his general chart of the magnetic variation, and of *Frezier* in his voyage to the *South-Seas*. But beſides theſe, there is a chart of the Streights of *Magellan*, and of ſome part of the adjacent coaſt, by Sir *John Narborough*, above-mentioned, which is doubtleſs infinitely exacter in that part than *Frezier*'s, and in ſome reſpects ſuperior to *Halley*'s, particularly in what relates to the longitudes of the different parts of thoſe Streights. The coaſt from Cape *Blanco* to *Terra del Fuego*, and thence to Streights *Le Maire*, we were in ſome meaſure capable of correcting by our own obſervations, as we ranged that ſhore generally in ſight of land. The poſition of the land to the northward of the Streights of *Magellan*, on the Weſt ſide, is doubtleſs laid down in our chart but very imperfectly; and yet I believe it to be much nearer the truth than what has hitherto been done: As it is drawn from the information of ſome of the *Wager*'s crew, who were ſhipwrecked on that ſhore, and afterwards coaſted it down; and as it agrees pretty nearly with the deſcription of ſome *Spaniſh* manuſcripts I have ſeen. The Chan-

nel dividing *Terra del Fuego* is drawn from *Frezier*; but Sir *Francis Drake*, who firſt diſcovered Cape *Horn*, and the S. W. part of *Terra del Fuego*, obſerved that whole coaſt to be divided by a great number of inlets, all which he conceived did communicate with the Streights of *Magellan*. And I doubt not, that whenever this country is thorougly examined, this circumſtance will be verified, and *Terra del Fuego* will be found to conſiſt of ſeveral Iſlands.

And having mentioned *Frezier* ſo often, I muſt not omit warning all future Navigators, againſt relying on the longitude of Streights *Le Maire*, or of any part of that coaſt, laid down in his chart; the whole being from 8 to 10 degrees too far to the eaſtward, if any faith can be given to the concurrent evidences of a great number of journals, verified in ſome particulars by aſtronomical obſervation. For inſtance, Sir *John Narborough* places Cape *Virgin Mary* in $65^{\circ}:42'$ of Weſt longitude from the *Lizard*, that is in about $71^{\circ}\frac{1}{3}$ from *London*. And the ſhips of our ſquadron, who took their departure from St. *Catherine's* (where the longitude was rectified by an obſervation of the eclipſe of the moon) found Cape *Virgin Mary* to be from $70^{\circ}\frac{1}{4}$, to $72\frac{1}{2}$ from *London*, according to their different reckonings: And ſince there were no circumſtances in our run that could render it conſiderably erroneous, it cannot be eſteemed in leſs than 71 degrees of Weſt longitude; whereas *Frezier* lays down in leſs than 66 degrees from *Paris*, that is little more than 63 degrees from *London*, which is doubtleſs 8 degrees ſhort of its true quantity. Again, our ſquadron found Cape *Virgin Mary* and Streights *Le Maire* to be not more than $2^{\circ}\frac{1}{2}$ different in longitude, which in *Frezier* are diſtant near 4 degrees; ſo that not only the longitude of Cape St. *Bartholomew* is laid down in him near 10 degrees too little, but the coaſt from the Streights of *Magellan* to Streights *Le Maire*, is enlarged to near double its real extent.

But to have done with *Frezier*, whoſe errors, the importance of the ſubject, and not a fondeſs for cavilling, has obliged me to remark, (though his treatment of Dr. *Halley* might, on the preſent occaſion,

occaſion, authorize much ſeverer uſage) I muſt, in the next place, relate wherein the chart I have here inſerted differs from that of our learned countryman laſt mentioned.

It is well known that this Gentleman was ſent abroad by the Public, to make ſuch geographical and aſtronomical obſervations, as might facilitate the future practice of navigation, and particularly to determine the variation of the compaſs in ſuch places as he ſhould touch at, and if poſſible, to aſcertain its general laws and affections. Theſe things Dr. *Halley*, to his immortal reputation and the honour of our Nation, in good meaſure accompliſhed, eſpecially with regard to the variation of the compaſs, a ſubject of all others, the moſt intereſting to thoſe employed in the art of navigation. He likewiſe corrected the poſition of the coaſt of *Brazil*, which had been very erroneouſly laid down by all former Hydrographers; and from a judicious compariſon of the obſervations of others, he happily ſucceeded in ſettling the geography of many conſiderable places, where he had not himſelf been. So that the chart he compoſed, with the variation of the needle marked thereon, being the reſult of his labours on this ſubject, was allowed by all *Europe* to be far compleater in its geography than any that had till then been publiſhed, whilſt it was at the ſame time moſt ſurprizingly exact in the quantity of variation aſſigned to the different parts of the globe; a ſubject ſo very intricate and perplexing, that all general determinations about it had been uſually deemed impoſſible.

But as the only means he had of correcting the ſituation of thoſe coaſts, where he did not touch himſelf, were the obſervations of others; when thoſe obſervations were wanting, or were inaccurate, it was no imputation on his ſkill, that his deciſions were defective. And this upon the beſt compariſon I have been able to make, is the caſe with regard to that part of his chart, which contains the South-coaſt of South *America*. For though the coaſt of *Brazil*, and the oppoſite coaſt of *Peru* on the *South-Seas* are laid down, I preſume, with the greateſt accuracy; yet from about the river of *Plate* on the Eaſt ſide, and its oppoſite point on the Weſt, the coaſt gradually declines

too

too much to the weſtward, ſo as at the Streights of *Magellan* to be, as I conceive, about fifty leagues removed from its true poſition: At leaſt, this is the reſult of the obſervations of our ſquadron, which agree extremely well with thoſe of Sir *John Narborough*. I muſt add, that Dr. *Halley* has, in the Philoſophical Tranſactions, given the foundation on which he has proceeded, in fixing Port St. *Julian* in 76°½ of Weſt longitude: which the concurrent journals of our ſquadron place from 70°¾ to 71°½. This he tells us, was an obſervation of an eclipſe of the moon, made at that place by Mr. *Wood*, then Sir *John Narborough*'s Lieutenant, and which is ſaid to have happened there at eight in the evening, on the 18th of *September*, 1670. But Captain *Wood*'s journal of this whole voyage under Sir *John Narborough* is ſince publiſhed, together with this obſervation, in which he determines the longitude of Port St. *Julian* to be 73 degrees from *London*, and the time of the eclipſe to have been very different from Dr. *Halley*'s account. But the numbers he has given are ſo faultily printed, that nothing can be determined from them.

To what I have already mentioned with regard to the chart hereunto annexed, I ſhall only add, that to render it more compleat, I have inſerted therein the route of our ſquadron, and have delineated, in the paſſage round Cape *Horn*, both the real track which we deſcribed, and the imaginary track exhibited by our reckoning, whence the violence of the currents in that part of the world, and the enormous deviations which they produce, will appear by inſpection. And that no material article might be omitted in this important affair, the ſoundings on the coaſt of *Patagonia*, and the variation of the magnetic needle, are annexed to thoſe parts of this track, where, by our obſervations, we found them to be of the quantity there ſpecified.

CHAP. X.

From Cape *Noir* to the Iſland of *Juan Fernandes.*

AFTER the mortifying diſappointment of falling in with the coaſt of *Terra del Fuego*, when we eſteemed ourſelves ten degrees to the weſtward of it; as hath been at large recited in the eighth chapter, we ſtood away to the S. W. till the 22d of *April*, when we were in upwards of 60° of South latitude, and by our account near 6° to the weſtward of Cape *Noir*; in this run, we had a ſeries of as favourable weather, as could well be expected in that part of the world, even in a better ſeaſon: So that this interval, ſetting the inquietude of our thoughts aſide, was by far the moſt eligible of any we enjoyed from Streights *Le Maire* to the Weſt coaſt of *America*. This moderate weather continued with little variation till the 24th; but on the 24th, in the evening the wind began to blow freſh, and ſoon encreaſed to a prodigious ſtorm; and the weather being extremely thick, about midnight we loſt ſight of the other four ſhips of the ſquadron, which, notwithſtanding the violence of the preceding ſtorms had hitherto kept in company with us. Nor was this our ſole misfortune; for, the next morning, endeavouring to hand the top-ſails, the clew-lines and bunt-lines broke, and the ſheets being half flown, every ſeam in the top-ſails was ſoon ſplit from top to bottom, and the main top-ſail ſhook ſo ſtrongly in the wind, that it carried away the top lanthorn, and endangered the head of the maſt; however, at length ſome of the moſt daring of our men ventured upon the yard, and cut the ſail away cloſe to the reefs, though with the utmoſt hazard of their lives. Whilſt at the ſame time, the foretop-ſail beat about the yard with ſo much fury, that it was ſoon blown to pieces; nor was our attention to our top-ſails our ſole employments, for the main-ſail blew looſe,

which obliged us to lower down the yard to ſecure the ſail, and the fore-yard being likewiſe lowered, we lay too under a mizen: In this ſtorm beſides the loſs of our top-ſails, we had much of our rigging broke, and loſt a main ſtudding-ſail-boom out of the chains.

On the 25th, about noon, the weather became more moderate, which enabled us to ſway up our yards, and to repair, in the beſt manner we could, our ſhattered rigging; but ſtill we had no ſight of the reſt of our ſquadron, nor indeed were we joined by any of them again, till after our arrival at *Juan Fernandes*; nor did any two of them, as we have ſince learned, continue in company together: This total and almoſt inſtantaneous ſeparation was the more wonderful, as we had hitherto kept together for ſeven weeks, through all the reiterated tempeſts of this turbulent climate. It muſt indeed be owned, that we had hence room to expect, that we might make our paſſage in a ſhorter time, than if we had continued together, becauſe we could now make the beſt of our way without being retarded by the misfortunes of the other ſhips; but then we had the melancholy reflection, that we ourſelves were hereby deprived of the aſſiſtance of others, and our ſafety would depend upon our ſingle ſhip; ſo that if a plank ſtarted, or any other accident of the ſame nature ſhould take place, we muſt all irrecoverably periſh; or ſhould we be driven on ſhore, we had the uncomfortable proſpect of ending our days on ſome deſolate coaſt, without any reaſonable hope of ever getting off again: Whereas with another ſhip in company, all theſe calamities are much leſs formidable, ſince in every kind of danger, there would be ſome probability that one ſhip at leaſt might eſcape, and might be capable of preſerving or relieving the crew of the other.

The remaining part of this month of *April* we had generally hard gales, although we had been every day, ſince the 22d, edging to the northward; however, on the laſt day of the month, we flattered ourſelves with the expectation of ſoon terminating all our ſufferings, for we that day found ourſelves in the latitude of 52°: 13′, which being to the northward of the Streights of *Magellan*, we were

aſſured that we had compleated our paſſage, and had arrived in the confines of the ſouthern Ocean; and this Ocean being denominated *Pacifick*, from the equability of the ſeaſons which are ſaid to prevail there, and the facility and ſecurity with which navigation is there carried on, we doubted not but we ſhould be ſpeedily cheared with the moderate gales, the ſmooth water, and the temperate air for which that tract of the globe has been ſo renowned. And under the influence of theſe pleaſing circumſtances, we hoped to experience ſome kind of compenſation, for the complicated miſeries, which had ſo conſtantly attended us for the laſt eight weeks. But here we were again diſappointed; for in the ſucceeding month of *May*, our ſufferings roſe to a much higher pitch than they had ever yet done, whether we conſider the violence of the ſtorms, the ſhattering of our ſails and rigging, or the diminiſhing and weakening of our crew by deaths and ſickneſs, and the probable proſpect of our total deſtruction. All this will be ſufficiently evident, from the following circumſtantial account of our diverſified misfortunes.

Soon after our paſſing Streights *Le Maire*, the ſcurvy began to make its appearance amongſt us; and our long continuance at ſea, the fatigue we underwent, and the various diſappointments we met with, had occaſioned its ſpreading to ſuch a degree, that at the latter end of *April*, there were but few on board who were not in ſome degree afflicted with it, and that month no leſs than forty-three died of it on board the *Centurion*. But though we thought that the diſtemper had then riſen to an extraordinary height, and were willing to hope, that as we advanced to the northward, its malignity would abate, yet we found on the contrary, that in the month of *May* we loſt near double that number: And as we did not get to land till the middle of *June*, the mortality went on increaſing, and the diſeaſe extended itſelf ſo prodigiouſly, that after the loſs of above two hundred men, we could not at laſt muſter more than ſix fore-maſt men in a watch capable of duty.

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This diſeaſe ſo frequently attending long voyages, and ſo particularly deſtructive to us, is ſurely the moſt ſingular and unaccountable of any that affects the human body: Its ſymptoms are inconſtant and innumerable, and its progreſs and effects extremely irregular; for ſcarcely any two perſons have complaints exactly reſembling each other, and where there hath been found ſome conformity in the ſymptoms, the order of their appearance has been totally different. However, tho' it frequently puts on the form of many other diſeaſes, and is therefore not to be deſcribed by any excluſive and infallible criterions; yet there are ſome ſymptoms which are more general than the reſt, and occurring the ofteneſt, deſerve a more particular enumeration. Theſe common appearances are large diſcoloured ſpots diſperſed over the whole ſurface of the body, ſwelled legs, putrid gums, and above all, an extraordinary laſſitude of the whole body, eſpecially after any exerciſe, however inconſiderable; and this laſſitude at laſt degenerates into a proneneſs to ſwoon and even die on the leaſt exertion of ſtrength, or even on the leaſt motion.

This diſeaſe is likewiſe uſually attended with a ſtrange dejection of the ſpirits, and with ſhiverings, tremblings, and a diſpoſition to be ſeized with the moſt dreadful terrors on the ſlighteſt accident. Indeed it was moſt remarkable, in all our reiterated experience of this malady, that whatever diſcouraged our people, or at any time damped their hopes, never failed to add new vigour to the diſtemper; for it uſually killed thoſe who were in the laſt ſtages of it, and confined thoſe to their hammocks, who were before capable of ſome kind of duty; ſo that it ſeemed as if alacrity of mind, and ſanguine thoughts, were no contemptible preſervatives from its fatal malignity.

But it is not eaſy to compleat the long roll of the various concomitants of this diſeaſe; for it often produced putrid fevers, pleuriſies, the jaundice, and violent rheumatick pains, and ſometimes it occaſioned an obſtinate coſtiveneſs, which was generally attended with a difficulty of breathing; and this was eſteemed the moſt deadly of all the ſcorbutick ſymptoms: At other times the whole

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body, but more eſpecially the legs, were ſubject to ulcers of the worſt kind, attended with rotten bones, and ſuch a luxuriancy of fungous fleſh, as yielded to no remedy. But a moſt extraordinary circumſtance, and what would be ſcarcely credible upon any ſingle evidence, is, that the ſcars of wounds which had been for many years healed, were forced open again by this virulent diſtemper: Of this, there was a remarkable inſtance in one of the invalids on board the *Centurion*, who had been wounded above fifty years before at the battle of the *Boyne*; for though he was cured ſoon after, and had continued well for a great number of years paſt, yet on his being attacked by the ſcurvy, his wounds, in the progreſs of his diſeaſe, broke out afreſh, and appeared as if they had never been healed: Nay, what is ſtill more aſtoniſhing, the callous of a broken bone, which had been compleatly formed for a long time, was found to be hereby diſſolved, and the fracture ſeemed as if it had never been conſolidated. Indeed, the effects of this diſeaſe were in almoſt every inſtance wonderful; for many of our people, though confined to their hammocks, appeared to have no inconſiderable ſhare of health, for they eat and drank heartily, were chearful, and talked with much ſeeming vigour, and with a loud ſtrong tone of voice; and yet, on their being the leaſt moved, though it was only from one part of the ſhip to the other, and that too in their hammocks, they have immediately expired; and others, who have confided in their ſeeming ſtrength, and have reſolved to get out of their hammocks, have died before they could well reach the deck; nor was it an uncommon thing for thoſe who were able to walk the deck, and to do ſome kind of duty, to drop down dead in an inſtant, on any endeavours to act with their utmoſt effort, many of our people having periſhed in this manner during the courſe of this voyage.

With this terrible diſeaſe we ſtruggled the greateſt part of the time of our beating round Cape *Horn*; and though it did not then rage with its utmoſt violence, yet we buried no leſs than forty-three men on board the *Centurion*, in the month of *April*, as hath

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been already obſerved, however, we ſtill entertained hopes, that when we ſhould have once ſecured our paſſage round the Cape, we ſhould put a period to this, and all the other evils which had ſo conſtantly purſued us. But it was our misfortune to find, that the *Pacifick* Ocean was to us leſs hoſpitable than the turbulent neighbourhood of *Terra del Fuego* and Cape *Horn*. For being arrived, on the 8th of *May*, off the Iſland of *Socoro*, which was the firſt rendezvous appointed for the ſquadron, and where we hoped to have met with ſome of our companions, we cruized for them in that ſtation ſeveral days. But here we were not only diſappointed in our expectations of being joined by our friends, and were thereby induced to favour the gloomy ſuggeſtions of their having all periſhed; but we were likewiſe perpetually alarmed with the fears of being driven on ſhore upon this coaſt, which appeared too craggy and irregular to give us the leaſt proſpect, that in ſuch a caſe any of us could poſſibly eſcape immediate deſtruction. For the land had indeed a moſt tremendous aſpect: The moſt diſtant part of it, and which appeared far within the country, being the mountains uſually called the *Andes* or *Cordilleras*, was extremely high and covered with ſnow; and the coaſt itſelf ſeemed quite rocky and barren, and the water's edge ſkirted with precipices. In ſome places indeed we diſcerned ſeveral deep bays running into the land, but the entrance into them was generally blocked up by numbers of little Iſlands; and though it was not improbable but there might be convenient ſhelter in ſome of thoſe bays, and proper channels leading thereto; yet, as we were utterly ignorant of the coaſt, had we been driven aſhore by the weſtern winds which blew almoſt conſtantly there, we did not expect to have avoided the loſs of our ſhip and of our lives.

This continued peril, which laſted for above a fortnight, was greatly aggravated by the difficulties we found in working the ſhip; as the ſcurvy had by this time deſtroyed ſo great a part of our hands, and had in ſome degree affected almoſt the whole crew. Nor did we, as we hoped, find the winds leſs violent, as we advanced to the northward; for we had often prodigious ſqualls which ſplit

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our sails, greatly damaged our rigging, and endangered our masts. Indeed, during the greatest part of the time we were upon this coast, the wind blew so hard, that in another situation, where we had sufficient sea-room, we should certainly have lain too; but in the present exigency we were necessitated to carry both our courses and top-sails, in order to keep clear of this lee-shore. In one of these squalls, which was attended by several violent claps of thunder, a sudden flash of fire darted along our decks, which, dividing, exploded with a report like that of several pistols, and wounded many of our men and officers as it passed, marking them in different parts of the body: This flame was attended with a strong sulphurous stench, and was doubtless of the same nature with the larger and more violent blasts of lightning which then filled the air.

It were endless to recite minutely the various disasters, fatigues and terrors which we encountered on this coast; all these went on encreasing till the 22d of *May*, at which time, the fury of all the storms which we had hitherto encountered, seemed to be combined, and to have conspired our destruction. In this hurricane almost all our sails were split, and great part of our standing rigging broken; and, about eight in the evening, a mountainous over-grown sea took us upon our starboard-quarter, and gave us so prodigious a shock, that several of our shrouds broke with the jerk, by which our masts were greatly endangered; our ballast and stores too were so strangely shifted, that the ship heeled afterwards two streaks to port. Indeed it was a most tremendous blow, and we were thrown into the utmost consternation from the apprehension of instantly foundering; and though the wind abated in a few hours, yet, as we had no more sails left in a condition to bend to our yards, the ship laboured very much in a hollow sea, rolling gunwale too, for want of sail to steady her: So that we expected our masts, which were now very slenderly supported, to come by the board every moment. However, we exerted ourselves the best we could to stirrup our shrouds, to reeve new lanyards, and to mend our sails; but while these necessary operations were carrying on, we ran great risque of being driven

driven on ſhore on the Iſland of *Chiloe*, which was not far diſtant from us; but in the midſt of our peril the wind happily ſhifted to the ſouthward, and we ſteered off the land with the main-ſail only, the Maſter and myſelf undertaking the management of the helm, while every one elſe on board was buſied in ſecuring the maſts, and bending the ſails as faſt as they could be repaired. This was the laſt effort of that ſtormy climate; for in a day or two after, we got clear of the land, and found the weather more moderate than we had yet experienced ſince our paſſing Streights *Le Maire*. And now having cruized in vain for more than a fortnight in queſt of the other ſhips of the ſquadron, it was reſolved to take the advantage of the preſent favourable ſeaſon and the offing we had made from this terrible coaſt, and to make the beſt of our way for the Iſland of *Juan Fernandes*. For though our next rendezvous was appointed off the harbour of *Baldivia*, yet as we had hitherto ſeen none of our companions at this firſt rendezvous, it was not to be ſuppoſed that any of them would be found at the ſecond: Indeed we had the greateſt reaſon to ſuſpect, that all but ourſelves had periſhed. Beſides, we were by this time reduced to ſo low a condition, that inſtead of attempting to attack the places of the enemy, our utmoſt hopes could only ſuggeſt to us the poſſibility of ſaving the ſhip, and ſome part of the remaining enfeebled crew, by our ſpeedy arrival at *Juan Fernandes*; for this was the only road in that part of the world where there was any probability of our recovering our ſick, or refitting our veſſel, and conſequently our getting thither was the only chance we had left to avoid periſhing at ſea.

Our deplorable ſituation then allowing no room for deliberation, we ſtood for the Iſland of *Juan Fernandes*; and to ſave time, which was now extremely precious, (our men dying four, five and ſix in a day) and likewiſe to avoid being engaged again with a lee-ſhore, we reſolved, if poſſible to hit the Iſland upon a meridian. And, on the 28th of *May*, being nearly in the parallel upon which it is laid down, we had great expectations of ſeeing it: But not finding

it in the poſition in which the charts had taught us to expect it, we began to fear that we had got too far to the weſtward; and therefore, though the Commodore himſelf was ſtrongly perſuaded, that he ſaw it on the morning of the 28th, yet his Officers believing it to be only a cloud, to which opinion the hazineſs of the weather gave ſome kind of countenance, it was, on a conſultation, reſolved to ſtand to the eaſtward, in the parallel of the Iſland; as it was certain, that by this courſe we ſhould either fall in with the Iſland, if we were already to the weſtward of it; or ſhould at leaſt make the main-land of *Chili*, from whence we might take a new departure, and aſſure ourſelves, by running to the weſtward afterwards, of not miſſing the Iſland a ſecond time.

On the 30th of *May*, we had a view of the Continent of *Chili*, diſtant about twelve or thirteen leagues; the land made exceeding high and uneven, and appeared quite white; what we ſaw being doubtleſs a part of the *Cordilleras*, which are always covered with ſnow. Though by this view of the land we aſcertained our poſition, yet it gave us great uneaſineſs to find that we had ſo needleſsly altered our courſe, when we were, in all probability, juſt upon the point of making the Iſland; for the mortality amongſt us was now encreaſed to a moſt dreadful degree, and thoſe who remained alive were utterly diſpirited by this new diſappointment, and the proſpect of their longer continuance at ſea: Our water too began to grow ſcarce; ſo that a general dejection prevailed amongſt us, which added much to the virulence of the diſeaſe, and deſtroyed numbers of our beſt men; and to all theſe calamities there was added this vexatious circumſtance, that when, after having got a ſight of the Main, we tacked and ſtood to the weſtward in queſt of the Iſland, we were ſo much delayed by calms and contrary winds, that it coſt us nine days to regain the weſting, which, when we ſtood to the eaſtward, we ran down in two. In this deſponding condition, with a crazy ſhip, a great ſcarcity of freſh water, and a crew ſo univerſally diſeaſed, that there were not above ten fore-maſt men in a watch capable of doing duty, and even ſome of theſe lame, and

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unable to go aloft: Under theſe diſheartening circumſtances, we ſtood to the weſtward; and, on the 9th of *June*, at day-break, we at laſt diſcovered the long-wiſhed for Iſland of *Juan Fernandes*. With this diſcovery, I ſhall cloſe this chapter and the firſt book, after obſerving (which will furniſh a very ſtrong image of our unparalleled diſtreſſes) that by our ſuſpecting ourſelves to be to the weſtward of the Iſland on the 28th of *May*, and in conſequence of this, ſtanding in for the Main, we loſt between ſeventy and eighty of our men, whom we ſhould doubtleſs have ſaved had we made the Iſland that day, which had we kept on our courſe for a few hours longer we could not have failed to have done.

END of BOOK I.